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INTRODUCTION 
P 
ROPOSALS to “strip” jurisdiction from the federal courts 
raise fundamental questions about the power of Congress un-
der the separation of powers and about the necessary role of the FALLON_PRE_PP  8/19/2010 12:28 PM 
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federal courts in the constitutional scheme.
1 For better or for 
worse, many of the most mooted of those questions remain unan-
swered. Although the constitutional text, history, and precedent 
work in conjunction to resolve some issues, the Constitution’s lan-
guage leaves other questions debatable, and scholars have ad-
vanced remarkably varied claims about the original understanding 
of Congress’s powers to define or curb federal jurisdiction. That 
debate exists about the historically understood meaning of consti-
tutional provisions bearing on jurisdiction-stripping should pro-
voke no surprise. As James Madison remarked in The Federalist 
No. 37, much of the Constitution emerged from the 1787 Conven-
tion and the subsequent ratification debates with uncertain impli-
cations.
2 Accordingly, Madison said, the meaning of some provi-
sions would need to be “liquidated” through practice and 
precedent.
3 With respect to many questions about Congress’s 
power to oust the federal courts of jurisdiction, however, practice 
and precedent speak inconclusively, if at all. Although jurisdiction-
stripping bills are frequently introduced in Congress, they seldom 
pass.
4 Moreover, on the infrequent occasions when Congress has 
enacted laws that appear to attempt comprehensive jurisdiction 
withdrawals, the Supreme Court, more often than not, has strained 
to read them as effecting less than total preclusions in order to 
avoid the serious constitutional questions that otherwise would 
arise.
5 As a result, the Court has decided few cases squarely ad-
dressing the constitutionality of selective withdrawals of federal ju-
risdiction. 
1 See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, The Two-Tiered Structure of the Judiciary Act of 
1789, 138 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1499, 1500–01 (1990) [hereinafter Amar, Two-Tiered Struc-
ture] (“[T]he issues implicated by the jurisdiction-stripping debate go to the very 
heart of the role of the federal courts in our constitutional order.”). 
2 The Federalist No. 37, at 197–98 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1999); see 
also Henry Paul Monaghan, Doing Originalism, 104 Colum. L. Rev. 32, 38 n.37 (2004) 
(“Neither Madison nor anyone else believed that the document set out, once and for 
all, a clear set of rules.”). 
3 The Federalist No. 37 (James Madison), supra note 2, at 197. 
4 Proposals to strip the federal courts of jurisdiction have been introduced regularly 
since the early nineteenth century. See Gerald Gunther, Congressional Power to Cur-
tail Federal Court Jurisdiction: An Opinionated Guide to the Ongoing Debate, 36 
Stan. L. Rev. 895, 895–97 (1984). 
5 See, e.g., INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 299–300, 314 (2001); Webster v. Doe, 486 
U.S. 592, 603 (1988). FALLON_PRE_PP  8/19/2010 12:28 PM 
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The Military Commissions Act (“MCA”), adopted in 2006,
6 
marked a deviation from the historical norm. The MCA purported 
to eliminate federal habeas corpus jurisdiction to review the deten-
tion of any alien who had “been determined by the United States 
to have been properly detained as an enemy combatant or is await-
ing such determination.”
7 The Supreme Court reviewed the juris-
dictional withdrawal and held it unconstitutional in Boumediene v. 
Bush.
8 In doing so, the Court ruled that the Suspension Clause
9 
protects a right to habeas corpus at least as broad as that which ex-
isted in 1789.
10 
Boumediene’s holding that the Suspension Clause mandates ha-
beas jurisdiction for detainees at the United States detention facil-
ity at the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base was important but narrow. 
The writ of habeas corpus protects only those who are unlawfully 
subjected to physical detention;
11 it does not avail those who seek 
access to a court to enforce other legal rights. Of further interest 
and potentially broader import is Boumediene’s interpretive meth-
odology. Writing for the majority, Justice Anthony Kennedy began 
by inquiring into the original understanding of the Suspension 
Clause, but he shortly concluded that historical materials could not 
resolve the issue that the case presented. Insofar as the question 
was whether the guarantee of the writ extended to a non-citizen 
detained by the United States in territory that it controlled but 
over which it did not possess sovereignty, Justice Kennedy de-
clared that the eighteenth-century precedents provided no clear 
answer.
12 But he did not stop with this assessment of eighteenth-
century history. Instead, he suggested that the question before the 
6 Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (2006) (codified in scattered sections of 10, 18, 
28, and 42 U.S.C.). 
7 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e)(1) (2006). 
8 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008). 
9 U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 2 (“The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not 
be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may 
require it.”). 
10 Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2248 (explaining that “‘at the absolute minimum’ the 
[Suspension] Clause protects the writ as it existed when the Constitution was drafted 
and ratified” (quoting St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 301)). 
11 See Richard H. Fallon, Jr. et al., Hart and Wechsler’s The Federal Courts and The 
Federal System 1301–03 (6th ed. 2009) [hereinafter Fallon et al., Hart & Wechsler] 
(discussing the custody requirement). 
12 128 S. Ct. at 2251. FALLON_PRE_PP  8/19/2010 12:28 PM 
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Court was one that the Founding generation could not even possi-
bly have foreseen, involving “the unique status of Guantanamo 
Bay and the particular dangers of terrorism in the modern age.”
13 
Under these historically unforeseeable circumstances, Justice Ken-
nedy concluded, the Court appropriately resolved the case based 
on principles immanent in several of its own precedents, all de-
cided in the twentieth century, and functional considerations. He 
also held open “the possibility that the protections of the Suspen-
sion Clause have expanded along with post-1789 developments 
that define the present scope of the writ.”
14 
In many areas of constitutional law, Boumediene’s guarded rec-
ognition of the limitations of narrowly textual and rigidly original-
ist analysis would arouse no comment. In the context of a dispute 
about Congress’s power to curb jurisdiction, however, it not only 
provoked a caustic dissent by Justice Scalia, but also diverged no-
tably from the originalist and textualist style of reasoning that has 
characterized nearly all leading academic writings on congressional 
control of jurisdiction. Professor Henry Hart, who remains the 
most influential contributor to the discussion, rested principally on 
originalist grounds when he maintained that “it’s been clear ever 
since September 17, 1787”—the date on which the Constitutional 
Convention finished its work—that the Constitution makes “[t]he 
state courts . . . the primary guarantors of constitutional rights, and 
in many cases they may be the ultimate ones.”
15 In the most impor-
tant challenge to Hart’s conclusion that few limits exist on Con-
gress’s power to strip federal court jurisdiction as long as state 
courts remain open, Akhil Amar has similarly relied almost en-
tirely on Article III’s text and original understanding to support his 
“neo-federalist” theory: although Congress could strip jurisdiction 
from either the Supreme Court or the lower federal courts, it can-
not simultaneously withdraw the jurisdiction of both in important 
categories of cases, including those “arising under” the Constitu-
tion, laws, and treaties of the United States.
16 
13 Id.  
14 Id. at 2248. 
15 Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal 
Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 Harv. L. Rev. 1362, 1401 (1953). 
16 The relevant articles include Akhil Reed Amar, A Neo-Federalist View of Article 
III: Separating the Two Tiers of Federal Jurisdiction, 65 B.U. L. Rev. 205, 271–72 FALLON_PRE_PP  8/19/2010 12:28 PM 
1048  Virginia Law Review [Vol.  96:1043 
 
Following Boumediene, the time seems ripe for a general recon-
sideration of Congress’s power to withdraw jurisdiction from the 
federal courts as a means of shielding questions about the legality 
of official conduct from judicial review. At the core of my perspec-
tive lie two closely related organizing ideas. First, any modern as-
sessment of Congress’s power to control and limit federal jurisdic-
tion should “decenter” originalist analysis under Article III for at 
least some purposes
17 and rely openly on such considerations as 
consistency with judicial precedent and functional desirability. In 
many areas of constitutional law, the prevailing doctrines diverge 
enormously from widely held expectations in 1789 or even in 1868, 
following the ratification of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth 
Amendments,
18 and reflect adaptations to accommodate develop-
ments, interests, and practical imperatives that the Founding gen-
eration—as in Boumediene—could not have anticipated. Free 
speech and equal protection furnish leading examples.
19 Indeed, 
non-originalist decisions and doctrines are by no means unknown 
in the domain of congressional power to allocate judicial jurisdic-
tion and to exclude some cases and issues from the Article III 
courts. Prior to Boumediene, the most prominent example came 
from cases acknowledging congressional power to assign adjudica-
tive responsibilities to administrative agencies that also perform 
rulemaking and prosecutorial functions and to limit judicial review 
of agency rulings.
20 The Supreme Court has seldom, if ever, tried to 
justify Congress’s withdrawal of “private rights” cases—involving 
(1985) [hereinafter Amar, Neo-Federalist View]; Akhil Reed Amar, Marbury, Section 
13, and the Original Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 443, 487 
(1989); Akhil Reed Amar, Reports of My Death Are Greatly Exaggerated: A Reply, 
138 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1651, 1673 (1990); Akhil Reed Amar, Taking Article III Seriously: 
A Reply to Professor Freedman, 85 Nw. U. L. Rev. 442, 445 (1991); Amar, Two-
Tiered Structure, supra note 1, at 1502–05. 
17 See Louise Weinberg, The Article III Box: The Power of “Congress” to Attack 
the “Jurisdiction” of “Federal Courts,” 78 Tex. L. Rev. 1405, 1422–24 (2000) (arguing 
that the Due Process Clause imposes more salient limits on Congress’s power to curb 
federal jurisdiction than does Article III). 
18 See, e.g., Henry Paul Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional Adjudication, 
88 Colum. L. Rev. 723, 727–39 (1988). 
19 Michael J. Perry, Interpretivism, Freedom of Expression, and Equal Protection, 
42 Ohio St. L.J. 261, 287 (1981). 
20 See, e.g., Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 858 (1986); 
Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 65 (1932). FALLON_PRE_PP  8/19/2010 12:28 PM 
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the liability of one private party to another—from the courts, and 
their assignment instead to administrative agencies, by direct ap-
peal to original understandings of how the Constitution’s language 
would be applied.
21 
In calling for a decentering of originalist analysis in assessments 
of congressional power to strip the jurisdiction of the federal 
courts, I do not mean to dismiss original understandings as irrele-
vant to constitutional adjudication. In previous work, I have de-
fended a multi-factor interpretive theory that takes account of 
relevant constitutional text, evidence of its original intent or under-
standing, constitutional structure, precedent, and value arguments 
involving normative attractiveness and functional workability.
22 Far 
better than originalism, a multi-factored approach reflects the im-
plicit, tacit norms of our constitutional practice, within which 
judges and Justices routinely employ multiple categories or modali-
ties of constitutional argument.
23 It is also a striking feature of our 
actual practice that participants in constitutional argument typi-
cally employ interpretive techniques that avoid open conflict 
among the considerations that they acknowledge as relevant:
24 they 
familiarly adjust their provisional assessment of the strongest ar-
guments within one category in light of their judgments with re-
spect to others.
25 As a result, it is normally possible for judges and 
Justices to find interpretations of the constitutional text, the Fram-
ers’ intent or original understanding, structurally identifiable 
norms, and judicial precedent that bring all of the categories of ar-
gument into a relationship of “constructivist coherence” or reflec-
tive equilibrium in which all support the same result.
26 Within this 
process, evidence concerning the historically expected applications 
of constitutional language is always relevant, but judges and Jus-
21 See, e.g., Crowell, 285 U.S. at 50–51 (distinguishing “public” from “private” rights 
and characterizing withdrawal of judicial jurisdiction in private rights cases as present-
ing unresolved constitutional issues). 
22 See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Implementing the Constitution 134–35 (2001) [herein-
after Fallon, Implementing]; Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A Constructivist Coherence The-
ory of Constitutional Interpretation, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 1189, 1252–68 (1987) [herein-
after Fallon, Constructivist Coherence]. 
23 See Philip Bobbitt, Constitutional Fate: Theory of the Constitution 6–8 (1982) 
(identifying modalities of constitutional argument). 
24 See Fallon, Constructivist Coherence, supra note 22, at 1238–39. 
25 See id. at 1240–43. 
26 See id. FALLON_PRE_PP  8/19/2010 12:28 PM 
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tices can also, in some cases, appeal to a provision’s more abstract 
purposes or emphasize the uncertainty of the relevant evidence in 
reaching a result that accords well with judicial precedent and func-
tional or policy concerns
27—as the Court did in Boumediene.
28 
The second substantial idea driving this Article involves the rela-
tionship between Congress’s power to strip jurisdiction under pro-
visions such as Article III, the Suspension Clause, and the Due 
Process Clause, on the one hand, and non-jurisdictional doctrines 
defining substantive constitutional rights, on the other hand. With 
respect to this relationship, my argument—which follows Henry 
Hart on this point
29—holds that when substantive constitutional 
rights exist, the Constitution requires that some court have jurisdic-
tion to provide sufficient remedies to prevent those rights from be-
coming practical nullities.
30 If this argument is accepted, then the 
emergence of once unrecognized substantive rights—including 
some that would be impossible to defend by exclusive reference to 
the original understanding—can generate rights to judicial reme-
dies that in turn establish limits on Congress’s power to strip judi-
cial jurisdiction. 
An example of the need to synthesize understandings of Con-
gress’s power to control jurisdiction with non-originalist develop-
ments in substantive constitutional law comes from statutes pre-
cluding judicial review of administrative action. Conventional 
wisdom holds that the original understanding of Article III and the 
Due Process Clause required no judicial review of government de-
cisions involving “public rights” or “privileges” such as claims of 
entitlement to benefits or gratuities.
31 Based on this assumption, 
27 See id. at 1198–99; Monaghan, supra note 2, at 32, 38. 
28 Especially when constitutional interpretation proceeds in this way, the search for 
the Constitution’s meaning will sometimes yield only relatively vague conclusions. In 
such cases, a further aspect of the judicial function involves the crafting of doctrinal 
tests to implement the Constitution’s meaning. See Fallon, Implementing, supra note 
22, at 41–42. Familiar examples include tests that inquire whether legislation has a ra-
tional basis, is necessary to promote a compelling government interest, or reflects a 
forbidden purpose. See id. at 77–79. 
29 See Hart, supra note 15, at 1372. 
30 See Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction, Sub-
stantive Rights, and the War on Terror, 120 Harv. L. Rev. 2029, 2038–39 (2007). 
31 See Ex parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438, 452 (1929); Murray’s Lessee v. Hobo-
ken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 284 (1856) (explaining that 
“there are matters, involving public rights, which may be presented in such form that FALLON_PRE_PP  8/19/2010 12:28 PM 
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the Supreme Court once affirmed that Congress can establish non-
Article III tribunals to adjudicate “public rights” disputes and pre-
clude judicial review of administrative decisions.
32 Today, however, 
that conclusion seems sufficiently discordant with developments in 
substantive constitutional law to provoke a reconsideration of 
whether evidence of the Founding generation’s specific expecta-
tions should be regarded as controlling. Although the Constitution 
may not have been originally understood to require judicial review 
of benefits disputes, neither would the Constitution, as understood 
in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, have prohib-
ited the government from discriminating against women and racial 
minorities by providing benefits—which would then have been de-
nominated as privileges or gratuities—exclusively to white males. 
With a non-originalist understanding of the of the Fifth Amend-
ment’s Due Process Clause having prevailed since Bolling v. 
Sharpe,
33 limitations on Congress’s power to preclude judicial juris-
diction to enforce equal protection rights (among others) should be 
regarded as having expanded commensurately with the rights 
themselves. 
In taking a fresh, post-Boumediene look at the constitutional is-
sues posed by jurisdiction-stripping, Part I begins by closely exam-
ining Boumediene itself, and especially its animating methodologi-
cal assumptions. Boumediene,  I argue, also furnishes a possible 
template for inquiries into the permissibility of jurisdiction-
stripping under other constitutional provisions, including Article 
the judicial power is capable of acting on them, . . . but which congress may or may 
not bring within the cognizance of the courts of the United States, as it may deem 
proper”). For a history of the public rights doctrine, see Gordon G. Young, Public 
Rights and the Federal Judicial Power: From Murray’s Lessee Through Crowell to 
Schor, 35 Buff. L. Rev. 765, 772–89 (1986). The notion that benefits disputes involve 
public rights and do not necessarily require judicial review appears to be rooted partly 
in the concept of sovereign immunity. See N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe 
Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 67 (1982); Murray’s Lessee, 59 U.S. (18 How.) at 284; cf. Caleb 
Nelson, Adjudication in the Political Branches, 107 Colum. L. Rev. 559, 583–84 (2007) 
(asserting that benefits disputes were historically understood to involve “privileges” 
rather than “rights”). Whatever the underlying explanation, claims against the United 
States for money have long been understood to involve public rights. See, e.g., Cro-
well v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 51 (1932) (characterizing claims to veterans’ benefits as 
involving public rights); Bakelite, 279 U.S. at 452. 
32 See Bakelite, 279 U.S. at 452; Murray’s Lessee, 59 U.S. (18 How.) at 284; see also 
Crowell, 285 U.S. at 50–51. 
33 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954). FALLON_PRE_PP  8/19/2010 12:28 PM 
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III—one that is generally consistent with the multi-factored, con-
structivist coherence approach outlined above. 
Part II examines the issues that would arise from congressional 
enactment of legislation stripping jurisdiction from the federal 
courts, but permitting adjudication of constitutional issues in the 
state courts, in cases that do not implicate the Suspension Clause. 
In light of developments in other areas of constitutional law, Part 
II argues that a central focus of inquiry should involve Congress’s 
motive or purpose in withdrawing jurisdiction. More particularly, 
legislation should be deemed unconstitutional if its evident pur-
pose is to invite state court defiance of past authoritative Supreme 
Court decisions. 
Part III considers the constitutionality of proposals that would 
strip jurisdiction from federal courts and state courts alike (in cases 
outside Boumediene’s holding concerning the Suspension Clause) 
and thereby leave the victims of constitutional violations with no 
judicial forum in which to assert their claims. The resulting consti-
tutional issues are vastly more complex than is often recognized 
because a gap frequently exists between constitutional rights and 
constitutionally mandated remedies. Simultaneous stripping of 
state and federal jurisdiction would violate the Constitution when 
it precludes the award of constitutionally necessary remedies, but 
not when it bars jurisdiction in cases not involving constitutionally 
necessary remedies (such as remedies against the government that 
fall within the ambit of sovereign immunity).
34 Identifying which 
remedies are constitutionally necessary is an immensely daunting 
task, for reasons that Part III explains. The inquiry must be sensi-
tive to—even if it is not always directly entailed by—evolving, non-
originalist, substantive constitutional doctrine. 
Part IV addresses questions that arise when Congress assigns ad-
judicative responsibilities to legislative courts and administrative 
agencies and strips the Article III courts of jurisdiction to review 
those tribunals’ decisions. In probing the boundaries of congres-
sional power to preclude review of legislative courts’ and agencies’ 
decisions by the Article III courts, Part IV highlights an analogy to 
34 See generally Fallon et al., Hart & Wechsler, supra note 11, at 305–14 (exploring 
the pertinence of substantive constitutional rights, rights to remedies, and immunity 
doctrines to Congress’s power to control jurisdiction). FALLON_PRE_PP  8/19/2010 12:28 PM 
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Boumediene, in which the Supreme Court did not question Con-
gress’s employment of non-Article III tribunals to identify “enemy 
combatants” subject to federal detention in the War on Terror, but 
held that the Constitution nevertheless requires an oversight role 
for the Article III judiciary. Part V provides a brief conclusion. 
I. BOUMEDIENE AND ITS METHODOLOGY: WHAT CONSTITUTIONAL 
THEORY HAS TO DO WITH JURISDICTION-STRIPPING 
Boumediene v. Bush
35 is the first decision since United States v. 
Klein,
36 in 1871, to hold unequivocally that a statute framed as a 
withdrawal of jurisdiction from the federal courts violates the Con-
stitution.
37 Because Boumediene’s ruling rested wholly on the Sus-
pension Clause, it has no necessary bearing on jurisdiction-
stripping proposals outside the scope of that provision. Neverthe-
less, the decision was very much about jurisdiction-stripping—
namely, the removal of the federal courts’ habeas corpus jurisdic-
tion in cases involving non-citizen detainees in the War on Terror. 
Moreover, the Court’s opinion illuminates issues of constitutional 
theory and methodology that participants in debates about Con-
gress’s powers to curb judicial jurisdiction have too often ignored. 
If extended to other cases, the Court’s interpretive methodology—
which is at least loosely consistent with the multi-factored, con-
structivist coherence approach described in the Introduction—
would also result in an overdue decentering of the kind of Article 
III originalism that has dominated discussions of jurisdiction-
stripping. 
A. The Opinion 
Boumediene  arose from Congress’s enactment of the Military 
Commissions Act, which purported to strip the federal courts of 
habeas jurisdiction to review the detentions of non-citizens who 
had been determined by the United States to be enemy combatants 
or were being held pending such a determination.
38 The more spe-
35 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008). 
36 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1872). 
37 See Daniel J. Meltzer, Habeas Corpus, Suspension, and Guantánamo: The Boum-
ediene Decision, 2008 Sup. Ct. Rev. 1, 1. 
38 Military Commissions Act, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (2006). FALLON_PRE_PP  8/19/2010 12:28 PM 
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cific question concerned whether the MCA violated rights guaran-
teed to non-citizens held at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba by the Suspen-
sion Clause, which provides that “[t]he Privilege of the Writ of Ha-
beas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of 
Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.”
39 The Gov-
ernment defended the MCA on the ground that the Suspension 
Clause conferred no rights on non-citizens outside the sovereign 
territory of the United States.
40 But the Supreme Court, in a 5-4 de-
cision, rejected the Government’s position and held the MCA’s ju-
risdiction-stripping provision unconstitutional.
41 
In a methodologically fascinating opinion, Justice Kennedy be-
gan by affirming the Court’s observation in prior cases that “‘at the 
absolute minimum’ the [Suspension] Clause protects the writ as it 
existed when the Constitution was drafted and ratified.”
42 In addi-
tion, he wrote, “[t]he Court has been careful not to foreclose the 
possibility that the protections of the Suspension Clause have ex-
panded along with post-1789 developments that define the present 
scope of the writ.”
43 
Having reasoned that the Suspension Clause protects a habeas 
jurisdiction at least as broad as in 1789, Justice Kennedy proceeded 
to examine Founding-era authorities. In his view, these authorities 
gave no clear guidance concerning whether the writ would then 
have been available to non-citizens at a place such as Guantanamo 
Bay, which is not a part of the United States but is subject to com-
plete U.S. control: 
In none of the cases cited do we find that a common-law court 
would or would not have granted, or refused to hear for lack of 
jurisdiction, a petition for a writ of habeas corpus brought by a 
prisoner deemed an enemy combatant, under a standard like the 
39 U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 2. 
40 See, e.g., Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2251 (“Drawing from its position that at com-
mon law the writ ran only to territories over which the Crown was sovereign, the 
Government says the Suspension Clause affords petitioners no rights because the 
United States does not claim sovereignty over the place of detention.”). 
41 Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion was joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, Gins-
burg, and Breyer. Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito all 
joined the two dissenting opinions, one authored by the Chief Justice and the other by 
Justice Scalia. 
42 Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2248 (quoting INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001)). 
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one the Department of Defense has used in these cases, and 
when held in a territory, like Guantanamo, over which the Gov-
ernment has total military and civil control.
44 
Writing in dissent, Justice Scalia insisted that the Court’s analysis 
should have stopped with this conclusion. He argued that if the 
original understanding of the Suspension Clause did not clearly bar 
a congressional withdrawal of habeas corpus jurisdiction, then the 
Court had no adequate foundation for holding that the Suspension 
Clause applied.
45 
Justice Kennedy disagreed. Although insisting that analysis must 
begin with Founding-era authorities, he suggested that those au-
thorities not only did not, but could not, resolve the issue before 
the Court. Among the reasons that the historical precedents were 
not precisely on point, he wrote, was that they had not reckoned, as 
the Court must, with “the unique status of Guantanamo Bay and 
the particular dangers of terrorism in the modern age.”
46 
“Declin[ing] to infer too much, one way or the other, from the 
lack of historical evidence on point,”
47 Justice Kennedy next re-
viewed both Suspension Clause and non-Suspension Clause cases 
addressing “the Constitution’s extraterritorial application.”
48 From 
those cases he extracted the principle that constitutional guaran-
tees sometimes extend outside the United States and that “ques-
tions of extraterritoriality turn on objective factors and practical 
concerns, not formalism.”
49 To implement that principle in cases 
involving claims of a right of access to the writ of habeas corpus, he 
prescribed a balancing test that requires weighing six considera-
tions: (1) the citizenship of the detainee, (2) the status of the de-
tainee under applicable legal norms, including the laws of war, (3) 
“the adequacy of the process through which that status determina-
tion was made,” (4) the nature of the site where a detainee was ini-
tially apprehended, (5) the nature of the site where a detainee is 
44 Id. 
45 Id. at 2297 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“If [the issue is ambiguous], the Court has no 
basis to strike down the Military Commissions Act, and must leave undisturbed the 
considered judgment of the coequal branches.”). 
46 Id. at 2251 (majority opinion). 
47 Id. 
48 Id. at 2253. 
49 Id. at 2258. FALLON_PRE_PP  8/19/2010 12:28 PM 
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held, and (6) “the practical obstacles inherent in resolving the pris-
oner’s entitlement to the writ.”
50 Although this open-ended for-
mula would appear to leave unresolved whether the right to the 
writ extends to non-citizens in other locations outside the United 
States, the majority held unequivocally that the Suspension Clause 
“has full effect [and thus guarantees the availability of habeas cor-
pus] at Guantanamo Bay.”
51 In embracing a multi-factored analysis, 
and thus rejecting any categorical exclusion of a judicial role in re-
viewing detentions of aliens outside the United States, Justice 
Kennedy cited a weighty separation-of-powers interest in maintain-
ing a regime in which the judicial branch, rather than Congress or 
the President, gets to “say ‘what the law is.’”
52 
Having determined that the Boumediene petitioners had a right 
of access to a federal court possessing habeas jurisdiction, Justice 
Kennedy’s opinion for the Court declined to rule on whether the 
administrative procedures employed by the government to make 
determinations of enemy combatant status satisfied the Due Proc-
ess Clause.
53 Nor did it seek to ascertain what substantive rights to 
freedom from detention the petitioners could assert, whether un-
der the Constitution or any other source of law. The Court framed 
and treated the central question before it as involving the permis-
sibility of the stripping of habeas corpus jurisdiction and found un-
constitutional only a single jurisdiction-stripping provision of the 
MCA.
54 
B. Boumediene’s Potential Methodological Significance 
Because the Court’s ruling in Boumediene relied wholly on the 
Suspension Clause, its pertinence to jurisdiction-stripping cases 
50 Id. at 2259. These considerations are all subsumed within what Justice Kennedy 
characterized as: 
[A]t least three factors . . . relevant in determining the reach of the Suspension 
Clause: (1) the citizenship and status of the detainee and the adequacy of the 
process through which that status determination was made; (2) the nature of the 
sites where apprehension and then detention took place; and (3) the practical 
obstacles inherent in resolving the prisoner’s entitlement to the writ. 
Id.  
51 Id. at 2262. 
52 Id. at 2259 (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)). 
53 Id. at 2270. 
54 Id. at 2275 (“The only law we identify as unconstitutional is MCA § 7.”). FALLON_PRE_PP  8/19/2010 12:28 PM 
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that do not implicate that provision remains uncertain. Neverthe-
less, by employing a multi-factored interpretive approach that 
reads constitutional language in light of precedent, the separation 
of powers, and functional concerns, Boumediene furnishes a possi-
ble model for a broader reframing of jurisdiction-stripping debates. 
It does so along at least four dimensions. 
First,  Boumediene illustrates that questions about Congress’s 
power to strip judicial jurisdiction may depend on background, 
hotly contested issues of constitutional theory. Although Justice 
Kennedy’s majority opinion described the original understanding 
as the appropriate starting point for the Court’s inquiry into the 
constitutionality of the MCA, he also suggested, over the dissent-
ing protest of Justice Scalia, that Founding-era understandings and 
expectations may not control how the Constitution applies to cir-
cumstances that the Founding generation could not have antici-
pated.
55 Justice Kennedy also reserved the possibility, which Justice 
Scalia again thought foreclosed, that the necessary role of the fed-
eral courts in habeas cases might have expanded over time.
56 
For readers not steeped in federal court literature, the proposi-
tion that jurisdiction-stripping debates involve issues of constitu-
tional theory may seem so self-evident as to merit no notice. Nev-
ertheless, scholarship abounds asserting claims about the natural 
linguistic meaning or original understanding of Article III, as if 
those claims, if historically accurate, would necessarily decide cur-
rent controversies.
57 In this context, Boumediene serves as either a 
reminder or a wake-up call. Purported new findings about the 
original understanding of Article III—which have emerged with as-
tonishing frequency—necessarily depend for their significance on 
issues of constitutional theory. 
Second, and relatedly, the Boumediene majority implicitly re-
jected the methodological position—sometimes labeled “exclusive 
originalism”—that courts in principle could, and in practice should, 
55 See id. at 2251. 
56 Id. at 2248. The Court had previously reserved the same question. See INS v. St. 
Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 300–01 (2001). 
57 See, e.g., John Harrison, The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Fed-
eral Courts and the Text of Article III, 64 U. Chi. L. Rev. 203, 204 (1997) (defining 
congressional power over jurisdiction by “[f]ocusing on the language of the Constitu-
tion, and ignoring as much as possible the gloss that has developed”). FALLON_PRE_PP  8/19/2010 12:28 PM 
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resolve every constitutional dispute based on the best evidence of 
the original understanding,
58 typically as evidenced by prevailing 
expectations concerning how constitutional language would be ap-
plied.
59 As the analysis in subsequent parts of this Article will make 
clear, I believe exclusive originalism to be deeply mistaken and 
therefore applaud the Boumediene majority’s rejection of it. With 
the literature on originalism being vast already, this is not the place 
to offer a systematic critique of exclusive originalism—which is 
only one among the proliferating strands of originalist thought.
60 
Many objections will emerge in criticism of particular positions as-
serted in jurisdiction-stripping debates. Nevertheless, it may be 
useful for me to introduce in summary form some of the difficulties 
with exclusive originalism that subsequent arguments will amplify: 
* Often there appears to have been no consensus concerning 
what constitutional language meant or how it applied to eight-
eenth- or
 nineteenth-century problems,
61 much less how it applies 
to
 twentieth- and twenty-first-century issues. 
* In the absence of actual historical agreement, efforts to estab-
lish “the original public meaning”
62 that a reasonable (and rea-
sonably informed) observer
63 would have ascribed to a provision—
58 See Mitchell N. Berman, Originalism Is Bunk, 84 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1, 10 (2009) (so 
labeling the thesis that “whatever may be put forth as the proper focus of interpretive 
inquiry (framers’ intent, ratifiers’ understanding, or public meaning), that object 
would be the sole interpretive target or touchstone”). 
59 See John O. McGinnis & Michael Rappaport, Original Interpretive Principles as 
the Core of Originalism, 24 Const. Comment. 371, 378–79 (2007) (maintaining that 
“some of the best evidence of [originally understood] meaning would be the expected 
applications, especially when widely held”). 
60 Useful surveys include Thomas B. Colby & Peter J. Smith, Living Originalism, 59 
Duke L.J. 239 (2009); Daniel A. Farber, The Originalism Debate: A Guide for the 
Perplexed, 49 Ohio St. L.J. 1085 (1989); Lawrence B. Solum, District of Columbia v. 
Heller and Originalism, 103 Nw. U. L. Rev. 923, 926–40 (2009); Keith E. Whittington, 
The New Originalism, 2 Geo. J.L. & Pub Pol’y 599 (2004). 
61 For discussion of examples, see infra notes 115–32 and 227–231 and accompanying 
text. 
62 See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s Power To 
Execute the Laws, 104 Yale L.J. 541, 553 (1994); Gary Lawson, Proving the Law, 86 
Nw. U. L. Rev. 859, 875 (1992). 
63 See Gary Lawson, Delegation and Original Meaning, 88 Va. L. Rev. 327, 398 
(2002) (explaining that objective public meaning originalism requires “a hypothetical 
inquiry that asks how a fully informed public audience, knowing all that there is to 
know about the Constitution and the surrounding world, would understand a particu-
lar provision”); McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 59, at 374 (maintaining that “the FALLON_PRE_PP  8/19/2010 12:28 PM 
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in light of dictionary definitions of words, for example—frequently 
depend on imputations of value-based assumptions and attitudes 
that are normatively charged and therefore require normative de-
fenses. Doctrinaire insistence that courts should eschew assess-
ments of normative desirability either invites decisions based on 
unacknowledged premises or risks disastrous results in high-stakes 
cases. 
* In cases of reasonable doubt about or division within prevail-
ing historical expectations about how constitutional language 
would be applied, it would be undesirable to the point of foolhar-
diness for courts not to take the practical implications of alterna-
tive possible resolutions into account.
64 
* Precedent and settled expectations sometimes provide more 
than ample reason for rejecting constitutional arguments founded 
on exclusively originalist premises.
65 
* In a body of law that is not exclusively originalist—as contem-
porary constitutional law is not—it would frequently be dysfunc-
tional for courts to decide previously unresolved issues on exclu-
sively originalist grounds when such decisions would be 
normatively and practically out of joint with surrounding prece-
dent.
66 
Having stated my objections to exclusive originalism so summa-
rily, I want to reiterate that nothing I have said implies that the 
original understanding is irrelevant to constitutional adjudication.
67 
I should also emphasize that, as noted above, exclusive originalism 
is not the only form of originalism.
68 Some originalists acknowledge 
that the original understanding may not be sufficiently determinate 
to resolve all important issues.
69 Some also agree that precedent 
focus of originalism should be on how a reasonable person at the time of the Constitu-
tion’s adoption would have understood its words and thought they should be inter-
preted” even in the case of provisions that “may have seemed ambiguous”). 
64 See Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 30, at 2080. 
65 See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Constitutional Precedent Viewed Through the Lens of 
Hartian Positivist Jurisprudence, 86 N.C. L. Rev. 1107, 1147–48 (2008). 
66 See Larry Kramer, Two (More) Problems with Originalism, 31 Harv. J.L. & Pub. 
Pol’y 907, 915 (2008); Adrian Vermeule, The Supreme Court, 2008 Term, Foreword: 
System Effects and the Constitution, 123 Harv. L. Rev. 4, 54–58 (2009). 
67 See supra notes 22–27 and accompanying text. 
68 See Solum, supra note 60, at 926–40 (identifying varieties). 
69 Among the possible routes to this conclusion, some originalists believe that the 
original understanding determines constitutional meaning, but that courts must per-FALLON_PRE_PP  8/19/2010 12:28 PM 
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can sometimes justify departures from the original understanding.
70 
With the line that divides non-exclusive originalists from non-
originalists sometimes being a fine one, my criticisms of exclusively 
originalist stances with regard to jurisdiction-stripping issues do not 
necessarily apply to all forms of originalism. It is Boumediene’s re-
jection of exclusive originalism that deserves emphasis in apprais-
ing the case’s potential methodological significance. 
Third,  Boumediene, which turned wholly on the Suspension 
Clause, pushed Article III from its frequent, if not characteristic, 
center-stage location in disputes about jurisdiction-stripping. Al-
though it might appear unremarkable that the Court’s assessment 
of a claim under the Suspension Clause would focus on that provi-
sion to the exclusion of Article III, Article III’s irrelevance was not 
obvious. On one familiar interpretation, the so-called Madisonian 
Compromise at the Constitutional Convention,
71 which made the 
establishment of lower federal courts optional rather than manda-
tory,
72 rules out arguments that the Suspension Clause requires 
form a further role of “construction” to furnish tests or standards to be applied in ad-
judication when the semantic meaning of the constitutional text is vague, ambiguous, 
or indeterminate. See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, Restoring the Lost Constitution 121–25 
(2004); Keith E. Whittington, Constitutional Construction: Divided Powers and Con-
stitutional Meaning 5 (1999). 
70 See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Law 
138–40 (1997); Kurt T. Lash, Originalism, Popular Sovereignty, and Reverse Stare 
Decisis, 93 Va. L. Rev. 1437, 1441 (2007); Lawrence B. Solum, The Supreme Court in 
Bondage: Constitutional Stare Decisis, Legal Formalism, and the Future of Unenu-
merated Rights, 9 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 155, 159 (2006). 
71 See, e.g., Fallon et al., Hart & Wechsler, supra note 11, at 8; Michael G. Collins, 
Article III Cases, State Court Duties, and the Madisonian Compromise, 1995 Wis. L. 
Rev. 39, 42. 
72 Although the delegates at the Constitutional Convention agreed from the outset 
that their Constitution should provide for one Supreme Court, see Fallon et al., Hart 
& Wechsler, supra note 11, at 7, their debates about lower federal courts exhibited a 
remarkable volatility. After initially adopting language that would have made the es-
tablishment of lower federal courts mandatory, the Convention subsequently reversed 
itself and voted tentatively to preclude the establishment of any national tribunals 
other than the Supreme Court. See 1 The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, 
at 125 (Max Farrand ed., 1911). Madison then made the compromise proposal that 
resulted in the current language of Article III, Section 1, which provides that “[t]he 
judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such 
inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.” U.S. 
Const. art. III, § 1 (emphasis added). FALLON_PRE_PP  8/19/2010 12:28 PM 
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federal habeas corpus jurisdiction.
73 On this view, the Suspension 
Clause only bars Congress from abolishing such habeas jurisdiction 
as state courts might otherwise possess.
74 But the Boumediene 
Court exhibited an utter obliviousness to the notion—which Henry 
Hart trumpeted as reflecting the original understanding of Article 
III—that state rather than federal courts might function as the ul-
timate guarantors of constitutional liberties.
75 
Fourth,  Boumediene rested its invalidation of a jurisdiction-
stripping statute partly on the premise, which Justice Kennedy 
traced to Marbury v. Madison
76 and described as fundamental to 
the separation of powers, that it is the necessary and proper func-
tion of the Judicial Branch to “say [authoritatively] ‘what the law 
is.’”
77 On a narrower interpretation, Marbury’s famous dictum 
would imply only that in cases properly within the jurisdiction of a 
federal court, the court can pronounce and apply all relevant law. 
Over the past fifty years, however, the Supreme Court has repeat-
edly asserted, albeit in dicta, that the Constitution mandates au-
thoritative judicial resolution—and, in particular, determination by 
the Court itself—of constitutional questions more generally.
78 
73 See William F. Duker, A Constitutional History of Habeas Corpus 126–80 (1980); 
see also Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 Yale L.J. 1425, 1509–
10 (1987) (adopting Duker’s reading); Todd E. Pettys, State Habeas Relief for Fed-
eral Extrajudicial Detainees, 92 Minn. L. Rev. 265, 308–21 (2007) (same). 
74 See sources cited supra note 73. 
75 Hart, supra note 15, at 1401. The implication of Hart’s view would have been that 
the Military Commissions Act was unconstitutional only insofar as it divested the 
state courts of their habeas corpus jurisdiction over petitions such as Boumediene’s. A 
partial embarrassment to Hart’s view is the Supreme Court’s decision in Tarble’s 
Case, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 397 (1872), discussed infra at notes 192–93 and accompanying 
text. But just as the Boumediene Court did not discuss Hart’s well-known view, nei-
ther did it refer to Tarble’s Case. 
76 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
77 Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2259 (quoting Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177). 
78 See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 616 n.7 (2000) (“No doubt the 
political branches have a role in interpreting and applying the Constitution, but ever 
since Marbury this Court has remained the ultimate expositor of the constitutional 
text.”);  Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962) (describing the Supreme Court as the 
“ultimate interpreter of the Constitution”); Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958) 
(“[Marbury] declared the basic principle that the federal judiciary is supreme in the 
exposition of the law of the Constitution, and that principle has ever since been re-
spected by this Court and the Country as a permanent and indispensable feature of 
our constitutional system.”). FALLON_PRE_PP  8/19/2010 12:28 PM 
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Before Boumediene, when the Supreme Court emphasized that 
it is the province of the judicial branch to say what the law is, it 
most often did so in cases that were manifestly within its jurisdic-
tion and in which the question involved appropriate interpretive 
deference.
79 In Boumediene, by contrast, the Court treated the judi-
cial branch’s function of saying what the law is as a ground for 
holding that the Constitution mandates federal jurisdiction.
80 
For reasons that Part II will discuss, I am ambivalent about ar-
guments that the Supreme Court’s increasingly accepted status as 
the ultimate expositor of the Constitution
81—which may diverge 
dramatically from prevalent understandings at the Founding
82—
helps to justify non-originalist limitations on Congress’s power to 
curb the Court’s appellate jurisdiction. After Boumediene, how-
ever, it is an open question whether, and if so, how, analysis of ju-
risdiction-stripping statutes would and should be affected by the 
idea that the separation of powers and the rule of law require au-
79 See, e.g., Morrison, 529 U.S. at 616–17 n.7; United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 
704 (1974). 
80 See Martin J. Katz, Guantanamo, Boumediene, and Jurisdiction-Stripping: The 
Imperial President Meets the Imperial Court, 25 Const. Comment. 377, 378 (2009) 
(asserting that Boumediene “should be understood as a case about the Court’s vision 
of separation of powers  .  .  . in which federal courts serve to keep the political 
branches within the bounds of the Constitution and . . . the political branches cannot 
evade judicial review by manipulating jurisdiction”); Stephen I. Vladek, Boumedi-
ene’s Quiet Theory: Access to Courts and the Separation of Powers, 84 Notre Dame 
L. Rev. 2107, 2110 (2009) (“Reading Boumediene, one is left with the distinct impres-
sion that for Justice Kennedy, at least, the writ of habeas corpus is in part a means to 
an end—a structural mechanism protecting individual liberty by preserving the ability 
of the courts to check the political branches.”). Boumediene’s apparent separation-of-
powers theory is not a complete innovation. The Court has cited similar concerns, see, 
e.g., Baker, 369 U.S. at 211, as supporting its near evisceration of the political question 
doctrine, which once acknowledged that the political branches, not the courts, should 
resolve a variety of legal and constitutional questions. See Rachel E. Barkow, More 
Supreme Than Court? The Fall of the Political Question Doctrine and the Rise of Ju-
dicial Supremacy, 102 Colum. L. Rev. 237, 240 (2002). 
81 See, e.g., Larry Kramer, The People Themselves: Popular Constitutionalism and 
Judicial Review 227–28 (2004) (explaining the Court’s accession to that status as a 
modern development). 
82 See, e.g., id. at 98–99, 109 (describing a view common in the 1790s that judicial re-
view should be employed “only where the unconstitutionality of a law was clear be-
yond doubt” and judicial interpretations were not necessarily binding on other 
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thoritative exposition of the Constitution by the federal judiciary as 
a whole or the Supreme Court in particular.
83 
II. ALLOCATION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL 
COURTS 
Outside the context of habeas corpus, the most discussed juris-
diction-stripping proposals would bar the federal courts from re-
solving specific constitutional claims, usually involving politically 
hot-button issues, and thereby channel the litigation of those 
claims exclusively into state courts.
84 Familiar examples come from 
bills introduced in Congress, but not so far enacted into law, that 
would bar both the federal district courts and the Supreme Court 
from entertaining challenges to abortion restrictions,
85 school 
prayer,
86 and governmentally sponsored recitations of the Pledge of 
Allegiance.
87 
There appear to be two reasons why the sponsors of jurisdiction-
stripping bills have most often proposed to exclude constitutional 
claims from federal, but not state, courts. First, the proponents 
have assumed that legislation stripping all courts’ jurisdiction 
would violate the Constitution even if barring federal jurisdiction 
would not. I shall discuss the constitutionality of legislation strip-
ping the jurisdiction of state, as well as federal, courts in Part III. 
Second, proponents of jurisdiction-stripping legislation have, quite 
obviously, assumed that state courts are more likely than federal 
courts to uphold the constitutionality of abortion restrictions and 
such practices as school prayer and recitations of the Pledge of Al-
legiance.
88 
83 For the argument that it would and should have significant influence, see Vladek, 
supra note 80, at 2146–50. 
84 See Gunther, supra note 4, at 895–96 (summarizing thirty jurisdiction-stripping 
bills introduced in 1981 and 1982). 
85 See, e.g., S. 158, 97th Cong. (1981). 
86 See, e.g., H.R. 4756, 97th Cong. (1981) (proposing to strip federal courts of juris-
diction over cases “arising from any statute . . . of any state . . . that permits or facili-
tates voluntary prayer in any public school or public building”). 
87 See, e.g., H.R. 2389, 109th Cong. § 2 (2006) (proposing to strip federal courts of 
jurisdiction over constitutional challenges to the Pledge of Allegiance). 
88 See, e.g., Eugene Gressman & Erik K. Gressman, Necessary and Proper Roots of 
Exceptions to Federal Jurisdiction, 51 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 495, 502–06 (1983). FALLON_PRE_PP  8/19/2010 12:28 PM 
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The conventional wisdom with respect to the constitutionality of 
jurisdiction-stripping holds that Congress (1) has the authority un-
der Article III, Section 1 to withdraw the jurisdiction of the lower 
federal courts to entertain defined sets of issues,
89 (2) can similarly 
create issue-based exceptions to the Supreme Court’s original ju-
risdiction under Article III, Section 2,
90 and, therefore, (3) could, if 
it chose, simultaneously strip both the lower federal courts and the 
Supreme Court of jurisdiction to entertain selected claims.
91 In as-
sessing this multi-part position, it would be impossible wholly to 
avoid the carefully sequenced analysis—asking first whether Con-
gress could strip district court jurisdiction, then whether it could 
eliminate Supreme Court jurisdiction—that commentators have 
conventionally performed.
92 Where multiple constitutional provi-
sions bear on a question, each requires separate discussion. Never-
theless, I want to begin with as holistic an analysis as possible, fo-
cused on whether it would be constitutionally permissible for 
Congress to withdraw both district court and Supreme Court juris-
diction over the same set of contentious, politically salient claims. 
In my view, a jurisdictional withdrawal of this kind would be un-
constitutional. If I can successfully make the case for this conclu-
sion, the core elements of that case will lend nuance to subsequent 
discussions of whether, and if so when, it might be unconstitutional 
for Congress to withdraw just Supreme Court jurisdiction, while 
leaving the lower federal courts open, or to eliminate federal dis-
trict court jurisdiction, while continuing to permit appeals of state 
court judgments to the Supreme Court. 
89 Article III, Section 1 gives Congress the power but not the obligation to create 
lower federal courts. See supra note 72 and accompanying text. 
90 Article III, Section  2 provides that the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction 
shall be subject to “such Exceptions . . . as the Congress shall make.” 
91 Daniel J. Meltzer, The History and Structure of Article III, 138 U. Pa. L. Rev. 
1569, 1569 (1990); James E. Pfander, Federal Supremacy, State Court Inferiority, and 
the Constitutionality of Jurisdiction-Stripping Legislation, 101 Nw. U. L. Rev. 191, 
195, 234–35 (2007). 
92 See, e.g., Fallon et al., Hart & Wechsler, supra note 11, at 287 (differentiating and 
separately analyzing jurisdiction-stripping issues). FALLON_PRE_PP  8/19/2010 12:28 PM 
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A. Withdrawal of Both Federal District Court and Supreme Court 
Jurisdiction 
Because my aim is a reconsideration of arguments that have 
dominated ongoing debates, I shall begin by sketching the tradi-
tional view of Congress’s power to strip federal court jurisdiction 
and appraising a well-known challenge. The traditional framing, I 
shall then argue, overlooks pertinent developments in other areas 
of constitutional law that call for a parsing of Congress’s purposes 
in curbing federal jurisdiction. 
1. The Traditional View 
The traditional view begins by affirming Congress’s authority to 
withdraw lower federal court jurisdiction under Article III, Section 
1, which says that “[t]he judicial Power of the United States, shall 
be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the 
Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.”
93 The itali-
cized language embodies the “Madisonian Compromise”
94 that 
gave Congress the option, but not the obligation, to create lower 
federal courts. From this grant of congressional discretion, the con-
clusion follows almost ineluctably that Congress can establish 
lower courts but give them less than the full jurisdiction that the 
Constitution would permit. Congress did so in the 1789 Judiciary 
Act and has continued to do ever since, sometimes with express ju-
dicial approval.
95 
93 U.S. Const. art. III, § 1 (emphasis added). 
94 See supra notes 71–72 and accompanying text. 
95 Although the First Judiciary Act accepted the invitation of the Madisonian Com-
promise to establish a system of lower federal courts, it vested the lower federal 
courts with far less than all of the jurisdiction that Article III would have permitted 
them to have. See William R. Casto, The First Congress’s Understanding of Its Au-
thority Over the Federal Courts’ Jurisdiction, 26 B.C. L. Rev. 1101, 1110 (1985). In 
perhaps its most striking omission, the 1789 Act made no provision for general federal 
question jurisdiction. See, e.g., Fallon et al., Hart & Wechsler, supra note 11, at 22; 
William R. Casto, An Orthodox View of the Two-Tier Analysis of Congressional 
Control Over Federal Jurisdiction, 7 Const. Comment. 89, 93 (1990). Absent some 
more specialized grant of jurisdiction, cases presenting federal questions had to be 
litigated in state court, subject to Supreme Court review. (The Supreme Court’s juris-
diction over state court decisions of federal questions was limited to those cases in 
which the state court had denied a claim of federal right. See Act of Sept. 24, 1789, 
§ 25, 1 Stat. 73, 85–87.) Apart from a brief interlude under a short-lived statute en-
acted in 1801 and repealed in 1802, see Fallon et al., Hart & Wechsler, supra note 11, FALLON_PRE_PP  8/19/2010 12:28 PM 
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Prominent support for the traditional view comes from Sheldon 
v. Sill,
96 which Professor Hart, in the first edition of The Federal 
Courts and the Federal System, made the leading case on congres-
sional power to restrict the jurisdiction of lower federal courts.
97 A 
provision of the 1789 Judiciary Act vested the lower federal courts 
with diversity jurisdiction, but excepted cases in which one party 
transferred a “chose in action” to another, out-of-state party.
98 In 
upholding this limitation, Sheldon pronounced that a statute re-
stricting the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts “cannot be in 
conflict with the Constitution, unless it confers powers not enu-
merated therein.”
99 
at 744, it was not until 1875 that Congress conferred a general authorization for the 
lower courts to entertain “suits of a civil nature” arising under the Constitution, laws, 
and treaties of the United States, and even then it attached a $500 amount-in-
controversy requirement. See Act of Mar. 3, 1875, § 1, 18 Stat. 470. Even today, “fed-
eral questions” generally cannot be litigated in the lower federal courts unless a fed-
eral question appears on the face of the plaintiff’s well-pleaded complaint. See, e.g., 
Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Constr. Laborers’ Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 9–10 (1983) 
(describing the well-pleaded complaint rule). 
  Since 1789, the jurisdictional statutes have always vested the lower federal courts 
with diversity jurisdiction, but that grant has consistently been subject to an amount-
in-controversy requirement. In 1789, the amount-in-controversy requirement was 
$500. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, § 11, 1 Stat. 73, 78–79. Today, it is $75,000. 28 U.S.C. 
§  1332(a) (2006). In addition, the early case of Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 
Cranch) 267 (1806), construed the 1789 Act as requiring “complete diversity” when 
there are multiple parties on one or both sides of a case, even though Article III does 
not mandate this limitation. See State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523, 
530–31 (1967). 
96 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441 (1850). 
97 See Henry M. Hart, Jr. & Herbert Wechsler, The Federal Courts and the Federal 
System 288 (1st ed. 1953).  
98 See Act of Sept. 24, 1789, § 11, 1 Stat. 73, 79.  
99 Sheldon, 49 U.S. (8 How.) at 449. The other case on which Hart relied most heav-
ily to establish Congress’s power to exclude cases from the lower federal courts was 
Lauf v. Shinner, 303 U.S. 323 (1938). See Hart, supra note 15, at 1363 (relying on 
Sheldon and Lauf). In applying a provision of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, ch. 90, H.R. 
Res. 5315, 72nd Cong., 47 Stat. 70 (1932) (codified as amended and repealed in part at 
29 U.S.C. §§ 101–115 (2006)), that barred lower federal courts from enforcing so-
called “yellow dog” contracts and from issuing injunctions in labor disputes, the Court 
said summarily in Lauf that “[t]here can be no question of the power of Congress thus 
to define and limit the jurisdiction of the inferior courts of the United States.” 303 
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As even defenders of the orthodox position readily acknowl-
edge, this dictum speaks too broadly.
100  Boumediene falsifies it. 
Moreover, surely Congress could not define the jurisdiction of the 
district courts to exclude cases brought by Catholics, women, or 
African-Americans.
101 Those exclusions would violate either the 
First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause or the equal protection 
component of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.
102 But 
these non-Article III limits on Congress’s power over jurisdic-
tion—which commentators often describe as “external” re-
straints
103—would have no application to jurisdiction-stripping leg-
islation that deprived the lower federal courts of jurisdiction to 
entertain challenges to the Pledge of Allegiance or school prayer. 
Such proposed legislation would not employ a “suspect classifica-
tion.” And assertions that it would burden the exercise of a funda-
mental right are question-begging.
104 It cannot simply be assumed 
that a plaintiff who wishes to assert a claim under the Establish-
ment Clause, for example, necessarily has the fundamental right 
that she claims. Nor does the requirement that a party litigate in 
state rather than federal court in the first instance unconstitution-
ally burden the right to litigate.
105 The Supremacy Clause binds 
state courts to enforce federal rights, anything in state law to the 
contrary notwithstanding.
106 Criminal defendants who wish to chal-
lenge the constitutionality of the statutes under which they are 
prosecuted in state courts generally have no right to present their 
100 See, e.g., Paul M. Bator, Congressional Power Over the Jurisdiction of the Fed-
eral Courts, 27 Vill. L. Rev. 1030, 1034 (1982); Gunther, supra note 4, at 916. 
101 See, e.g., Gunther, supra note 4, at 916; Lawrence Gene Sager, The Supreme 
Court, 1980 Term—Foreword: Constitutional Limitations on Congress’s Authority to 
Regulate the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 17, 26 (1981); Laur-
ence H. Tribe, Jurisdictional Gerrymandering: Zoning Disfavored Rights Out of the 
Federal Courts, 16 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 129, 132 (1981). 
102 Cf. Amanda L. Tyler, The Story of Klein: The Scope of Congress’s Authority to 
Shape the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, in Federal Courts Stories 87, 112 (Vicki 
Jackson & Judith Resnik eds., 2010) (ascribing this result to the principle, apparently 
rooted in Article III, “that Congress may not employ the courts in a way that forces 
them to become active participants in violating the Constitution”). 
103 See Fallon et al., Hart & Wechsler, supra note 11, at 292; Gunther, supra note 4, 
at 916–22. 
104 See Gunther, supra note 4, at 917–18. 
105 But cf. Tribe, supra note 101, at 141–49 (arguing that selective jurisdictional with-
drawals impermissibly burden constitutional rights). 
106 See U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2. FALLON_PRE_PP  8/19/2010 12:28 PM 
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claims in a federal district court instead,
107 nor do civil defendants 
who wish to assert federal constitutional defenses against state law 
actions.
108 
Having satisfied themselves that Article I, Section 1 would per-
mit a withdrawal of district court jurisdiction over cases raising a 
particular constitutional issue, defenders of the orthodox view then 
argue that Congress could validly strip the Supreme Court of ap-
pellate jurisdiction under the Exceptions Clause of Article III, Sec-
tion 2, which makes the Court’s otherwise self-executing appellate 
jurisdiction subject to “such Exceptions . . . as the Congress shall 
make.”
109 The Exceptions Clause makes it undeniable that Con-
gress can create at least some exceptions to the Court’s appellate 
jurisdiction. Under the first Judiciary Act, the Supreme Court had 
no appellate jurisdiction over federal criminal cases
110 and cases in 
which state courts upheld constitutional claims.
111 
On the orthodox view, no additional constitutional difficulty 
would arise if Congress combined a withdrawal of district court ju-
risdiction that would be permissible under Article I, Section 1, with 
a withdrawal of Supreme Court jurisdiction that Article I, Section 2 
would authorize. Nor does Congress’s motive for simultaneously 
stripping district court and Supreme Court jurisdiction over the 
same set of cases matter in the traditional analysis. According to 
adherents of the orthodox view, the Constitution’s structure and 
history rule out motive-based objections to jurisdiction-stripping 
proposals.
112 Ex parte McCardle
113 provides the strongest preceden-
tial support for this argument. McCardle arose in the aftermath of 
the Civil War when Congress, fearing that the Court would use the 
107 There is no statutory provision for removal in most such cases, and the doctrine 
of Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 45–49 (1971), bars federal injunctions against pend-
ing state criminal prosecutions. See generally Fallon et al., Hart & Wechsler, supra 
note 11, at 1083–128 (discussing Younger abstention doctrine). 
108 See Fallon et al., Hart & Wechsler, supra note 11, at 776–78 (discussing implica-
tions of the rule that makes federal jurisdiction depend on the contents of the plain-
tiff’s well-pleaded complaint). 
109 U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 2. 
110 See United States v. More, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 159, 172–74 (1805) (holding that 
Congress’s failure to provide for appellate jurisdiction over federal criminal matters in 
the 1789 Judiciary Act barred such jurisdiction). 
111 See Act of Sept. 24, 1789, § 25, 1 Stat. 73, 85. 
112 See, e.g., Bator, supra note 100, at 1036–37; Gunther, supra note 4, at 919–20. 
113 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 514 (1869). FALLON_PRE_PP  8/19/2010 12:28 PM 
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case to hold Reconstruction unconstitutional, repealed the statute 
on which the Court’s jurisdiction depended. After hearing argu-
ment on the constitutionality of the repealing act, the Court 
unanimously upheld it. In response to the argument that the re-
pealer statute was invalid because enacted for the purpose of pre-
cluding the Court from invalidating military Reconstruction, the 
Justices said flatly that “[w]e are not at liberty to inquire into the 
motives of the legislature.”
114 
2. Professor Amar’s Neo-Federalist Rejoinder 
Although the view that Congress could simultaneously withdraw 
both lower federal court and Supreme Court jurisdiction over 
specified issues retains the status of orthodoxy, it now provokes 
lively debate as a result of path-breaking scholarship by Larry 
Sager and Akhil Amar.
115 Amar’s work, in particular, has spurred a 
broad and continuing discussion among Federal Courts scholars, 
largely because it engages traditionalists on common methodologi-
cal ground: Amar roots his arguments almost entirely in the lan-
guage, history, and structure of Article III.
116 
Building on earlier arguments by Justice Joseph Story,
117 Amar 
rests his case partly on Article III, Section 1, which says that the 
judicial power “shall be vested,” and even more on Article III, Sec-
tion 2, Clause 1, which makes selective use of the word “all” in de-
scribing the reach of federal jurisdiction.
118 With respect to the first 
three of the nine jurisdictional categories that Article III, Section 2 
lists, it states that the judicial power “shall extend” to “all cases.” 
114 Id. 
115 See, e.g., Amar, Neo-Federalist View, supra note 16; Sager, supra note 101. 
116 See sources cited supra note 16. 
117 See Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 327–31 (1816). 
118 Article III, Section 2, Clause 1 provides: 
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under 
this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which 
shall be made, under their Authority;—to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, 
other public Ministers and Consuls;—to all cases of Admiralty and maritime Ju-
risdiction;—to Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party;—to 
Controversies between two or more States;—between a State and Citizens of 
another State;–between Citizens of different States;—between Citizens of the 
same State claiming Lands under Grants of different States, and between a 
State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects. 
U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. FALLON_PRE_PP  8/19/2010 12:28 PM 
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With respect to the remaining six categories, it drops the word 
“all,” and says simply that the judicial power shall extend to de-
nominated “controversies.” According to Amar, this selective use 
of the word “all” reflects a division of the categories of federal ju-
risdiction into two tiers: a first tier, comprising three categories in 
which the Constitution mandates federal jurisdiction, and a second 
tier, consisting of the six remaining categories, in which Congress 
has the option to vest federal jurisdiction or not.
119 Even with re-
spect to first-tier cases, Amar maintains, there need not be original 
federal jurisdiction; the Madisonian Compromise gives Congress 
the option not to create lower federal courts.
120 Nor need the Su-
preme Court necessarily have appellate jurisdiction; the Excep-
tions Clause indicates otherwise.
121 But, Amar maintains, the plain 
language of Article III mandates the vesting of jurisdiction over all 
cases arising under the Constitution in either a lower federal court, 
in the Supreme Court, or in both.
122 
Amar buttresses his reading of Article III with other evidence 
concerning the original understanding. He notes that earlier drafts 
of the Judiciary Article at the Constitutional Convention consis-
tently contemplated federal jurisdiction of all cases arising under 
the Constitution while omitting the “all” in describing other cate-
gories of federal judicial power.
123 Despite some gaps, the 1789 Ju-
diciary Act was reasonably consistent with his two-tier thesis, he 
says.
124 
In further support of his textualist-originalist case, Amar ad-
duces arguments based on the Constitution’s structure. In particu-
lar, he argues that his interpretation of Article III would ensure 
that cases of the greatest national consequence are decided, as they 
should be, by national judges who have been appointed by the 
President and confirmed by the Senate, and whose independence is 
119 See Amar, Neo-Federalist View, supra note 16, at 240–46. 
120 Id. at 255. 
121 Id. (“Congress may make exceptions to the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdic-
tion in the mandatory categories, but only if it creates other Article III tribunals with 
the power to hear all the excepted cases.”). 
122 Id. at 255–59. 
123 Id. at 242–45. 
124 Id. at 259–65. FALLON_PRE_PP  8/19/2010 12:28 PM 
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secured by Article III’s guarantees of life tenure and non-reduction 
in salary.
125 
As often happens with brilliant scholarship, Amar’s work pro-
voked searching criticism. In an article in the University of Penn-
sylvania Law Review, my colleague Daniel Meltzer responded to 
Amar’s arguments nearly point-by-point.
126 Meltzer notes that the 
records of the Constitutional Convention include no references to 
Article III’s having a two-tiered structure. He also offers an alter-
native explanation for Article III’s referring to “all Cases” in some 
instances, as distinguished from “Controversies” in others. Accord-
ing to Meltzer, historical evidence suggests that the Founding gen-
eration understood the word “cases” to embrace both civil and 
criminal actions, whereas the word “controversies” referred only to 
civil disputes.
127 The Framers may thus have meant the word “all” 
preceding “cases” to signal the inclusion of both civil and criminal 
actions. Meltzer emphasizes that the 1789 Judiciary Act did not fit 
Amar’s two-tier thesis perfectly.
128 Perhaps most importantly, Sec-
tion 25 permitted Supreme Court review of state courts’ decisions 
of federal questions only when the state courts had rejected a claim 
of federal right.
129 Finally, in response to Amar’s structural argu-
ments, Meltzer doubts that all of the cases in Amar’s first tier are 
likely to prove more consequential than those in the second, which 
includes controversies between states and those to which the 
United States is a party.
130 Echoing Charles Black, he also suggests 
that rigid insistence by federal judges that they have a constitution-
ally necessary role might detract from the national judiciary’s de-
mocratic legitimacy.
131 
125 See Amar, Two-Tiered Structure, supra note 1, at 1511–13. 
126 Meltzer, supra note 91. For a comparably searching and comprehensive critique 
of Amar’s arguments, see Harrison, supra note 57.  
127 Meltzer, supra note 91, at 1575 (citing William A. Fletcher, Exchange on the 
Eleventh Amendment, 57 U. Chi. L. Rev. 131, 133 (1990)). 
128 Id. at 1585–99. 
129 Id. at 1585–93 (discussing Section 25 of the First Judiciary Act). 
130 Id. at 1582–85. 
131 Id. at 1621–22. FALLON_PRE_PP  8/19/2010 12:28 PM 
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3. Deciding in the Face of Historical Uncertainty 
Based on the evidence that Amar and Meltzer adduce, I could 
not confidently answer the question whether Article III originally 
was or would have been understood to require the vesting of juris-
diction of “all cases” arising under the Constitution and laws of the 
United States in some federal court. If forced to make a probabilis-
tic assessment, I would adjudge Meltzer’s negative arguments 
slightly more persuasive than Amar’s affirmative ones,
132 but my 
level of confidence falls far short of total. Among my reasons for 
hesitation is that it seems entirely plausible that different members 
of the Founding generation would have offered different conclu-
sions about the meaning or implications of Article III if they had 
thought about Amar’s two-tier thesis at all. Some originalists 
would say, of course, that the right question is what a reasonable 
and properly informed member of the Founding generation most 
likely would have thought in light of the dictionary meaning of 
words, pertinent rules of grammar, and so forth.
133 But efforts to 
specify what exactly a hypothetical observer would have known—
and what his values might have been and how they might have af-
fected his interpretive judgment
134—generate more dizziness than 
confidence. For anyone with a similar response to the purely his-
torical and textual arguments, the issue thus becomes whether his-
torical and linguistic analysis that focuses narrowly on Article III’s 
historically expected applications should mark the end of constitu-
tional inquiry into whether, today, Congress could permissibly strip 
both the district courts and the Supreme Court of jurisdiction to 
decide controversial issues. 
Each of three reasons independently makes me think not. All 
are suggested by, or at least are consistent with, the Supreme 
Court’s analysis in Boumediene. 
132 Strongly corroborative of that judgment is William A. Fletcher, Congressional 
Power Over the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: The Meaning of the Word “All” in 
Article III, 59 Duke L.J. 929, 952 (2010), which concludes that the historical signifi-
cance of the word “all” in reference to particular jurisdictional categories in Article 
III was to authorize Congress to vest exclusive jurisdiction in the federal courts if it so 
chose, not to mandate that some federal court must have jurisdiction of every case 
within those categories. 
133 See, e.g., McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 59, at 378–79. 
134 See generally Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire 52–55 (1986) (discussing the par-
tial dependence of interpretive judgments on normative values). FALLON_PRE_PP  8/19/2010 12:28 PM 
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First, even if Amar’s neo-federalist argument were rejected on 
texualist-originalist grounds, its rejection would be at most relevant 
to, and not dispositive of, modern debates about jurisdiction-
stripping. The modern question is whether it would be constitu-
tionally permissible for Congress to withdraw all federal court ju-
risdiction, after it had vested, over controversial claims of constitu-
tional right, based on Congress’s anticipated disagreement with 
how the federal courts would decide those claims. This is a differ-
ent question from that framed by Professor Amar and Justice 
Story, who ask whether Article III compels Congress to confer 
federal court jurisdiction in the first instance. The closest analogy 
in early American history took shape in 1802 when Thomas Jeffer-
son’s Democratic-Republicans repealed the grant of federal “aris-
ing under” jurisdiction that a lame-duck Federalist Congress had 
recently conferred.
135 In that era, nearly every question about Con-
gress’s appropriate role in defining and delimiting judicial power 
provoked partisan division about the Constitution’s meaning.
136 
Second, when plausible historical and textual arguments support 
contrary conclusions, courts characteristically do, and should, take 
account of other considerations, including practical workability and 
normative attractiveness.
137 This, admittedly, is a controversial 
claim, especially in its normative dimension, and I shall not repeat 
here arguments that I have made in support of it elsewhere.
138 Nev-
ertheless, in a case of historical doubt, Boumediene turned to 
precedent-based and functional analysis. In my view, constitutional 
decisionmaking should follow the same course in jurisdiction-
stripping cases not involving the Suspension Clause. 
135 See Fallon et al., Hart & Wechsler, supra note 11, at 744. 
136 See Bruce Ackerman, The Failure of the Founding Fathers: Jefferson, Marshall, 
and the Rise of Presidential Democracy 147–244 (2005) (describing controversies sur-
rounding the scope of judicial power in the aftermath of the 1800 presidential elec-
tion). 
137 See Fallon, Constructivist Coherence, supra note 22, at 1237–51.  
138 Prominent among the reasons is that exclusive originalism does not “state a 
workable ideal for a polity with an aged constitution and a robust tradition of judicial 
review that has produced a large body of nonoriginalist precedents.” Fallon, Imple-
menting, supra note 22, at 24. For statements of more affirmative reasons for taking 
practical workability and normative attractiveness into account, see id. at 45–55; 
Fallon, Constructivist Coherence, supra note 22, at 1262–80. FALLON_PRE_PP  8/19/2010 12:28 PM 
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Third, I see no reason to accept the premise that judicial reason-
ing about Congress’s power to curb federal jurisdiction should nec-
essarily be exclusively originalist even insofar as a clear, pertinent 
original understanding—defined by historically expected applica-
tions—might be identifiable. As I have noted already, in many ar-
eas of constitutional law, Justices, judges, and commentators treat 
information about the original understanding as relevant to, but 
not necessarily controlling of, constitutional interpretation.
139 Over 
the course of constitutional history, federal courts have earned 
recognition as stalwart and sometimes necessary guarantors of con-
stitutional rights,
140 and the Supreme Court has assumed the role of 
the “ultimate expositor of the constitutional text.”
141 Under these 
circumstances, it should be treated as an open question whether 
practice and precedent might have established that the federal 
courts have a broader necessary role in the constitutional scheme 
today than they were understood to have in 1789. Even if not spe-
cifically anticipated by the Founding generation, such a role might 
well be consistent with the historical intent and understanding that 
the federal judicial branch would play an important checking and 
balancing role within the constitutional scheme.
142 
4. Supplementing Text-Based Originalism: Congressional Motives 
Reconsidered 
In considering the possible supplementation of originalist analy-
sis, I think it important to emphasize the evident purpose of bills 
139 Fallon, Implementing, supra note 22, at 45–55; Fallon, Constructivist Coherence, 
supra note 22, at 1213. 
140 See Burt Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 1105, 1115–18 (1977). 
For a review of the literature on the question of state court “parity” or lack thereof 
with federal courts, see Fallon et al., Hart & Wechsler, supra note 11, at 278–83. 
141 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 616–17 n.7 (2000). 
142 See, e.g., Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 850 (1986) 
(“Article III, § 1, safeguards the role of the Judicial Branch in our tripartite system by 
barring congressional attempts ‘to transfer jurisdiction [to non-Article III tribunals] 
for the purpose of emasculating’ constitutional courts . . . and thereby preventing ‘the 
encroachment or aggrandizement of one branch at the expense of the other.’” (quot-
ing Nat’l Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582, 644 (1949) (Vinson, 
C.J., dissenting))); N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 58 
(1982) (plurality opinion) (“The Federal Judiciary was . . . designed by the Framers 
to . . . maintain the checks and balances of the constitutional structure . . . .”); Buckley 
v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 122 (1976) (per curiam). FALLON_PRE_PP  8/19/2010 12:28 PM 
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that would remove all federal jurisdiction over cases presenting 
particular constitutional issues. Such proposals aim to license or in-
vite state courts to reach decisions different from those that federal 
courts would reach, typically (though admittedly not always) by 
failing to accord Supreme Court precedents the authority that the 
federal courts would grant them. The sponsors of such bills fre-
quently trumpet this ambition.
143 Moreover, any law so narrowly 
carving an exception to both the Supreme Court’s and the lower 
federal courts’ jurisdiction could seldom have any other rationally 
plausible explanation. Whatever difficulties judicial inquiry into 
congressional motives may pose in some other contexts, legislation 
that simultaneously stripped both Supreme Court and lower fed-
eral court jurisdiction over a narrowly defined set of constitutional 
questions for which Supreme Court precedents clearly prescribed a 
controlling test would constitute an easy case. Jurisdiction-
stripping legislation such as this would thus present the question 
whether it should be deemed necessary and proper for Congress to 
use its power to control federal jurisdiction for the purpose of en-
couraging state courts to ignore, reject, or defy pertinent prece-
dents. 
In addressing this question, I proceed from the premise that, fol-
lowing an attempted stripping of federal jurisdiction, the Supreme 
Court’s precedents would remain binding on state courts as a mat-
ter of law. The Supreme Court has held repeatedly that the lower 
courts must adhere to its precedents, even when judges believe that 
the Court erred or would now reverse itself.
144 Treating the Court’s 
pronouncements as authoritative, most commentators have as-
sumed that Congress could not excuse state courts from their obli-
gation of obedience.
145 
143 See Gressman & Gressman, supra note 88, at 502–03, 505. 
144 See, e.g., State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 20 (1997); Rivers v. Roadway Express, 
Inc., 511 U.S. 298, 312–13 (1994); Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 
490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989); Thurston Motor Lines v. Jordan K. Rand, Ltd., 460 U.S. 533, 
535 (1983) (per curiam). But cf. Frederic M. Bloom, State Courts Unbound, 93 Cor-
nell L. Rev. 501, 502–06 (2008) (arguing that state courts not infrequently contradict 
Supreme Court precedent and that the Supreme Court sometimes condones such ac-
tion). 
145 See, e.g., Paul M. Bator, Withdrawing Jurisdiction from Federal Courts, 7 Harv. 
J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 31, 33 (1984); Steven G. Calabresi & Gary Lawson, Equity & Hier-
archy: Reflections on the Harris Execution, 102 Yale L.J. 255, 276 n.106 (1992); Evan 
H. Caminker, Why Must Inferior Courts Obey Superior Court Precedents?, 46 Stan. FALLON_PRE_PP  8/19/2010 12:28 PM 
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Several originalist scholars have recently challenged this view. 
Professor John Harrison has argued that the plain text and original 
understanding of Article III neither require nor forbid doctrines of 
precedential authority.
146 According to Harrison, current rules oc-
cupy the status of “general” or common law that Congress could 
change.
147 Professor Michael Paulsen has advanced the further ar-
gument that Congress could repeal doctrines of stare decisis on a 
selective basis and, thus, excuse the lower courts from any obliga-
tion to adhere to Supreme Court decisions involving school prayer 
or abortion.
148 
Although these arguments deserve serious attention, I find them 
unpersuasive for reasons that I have stated at length in earlier writ-
ing.
149 To minimize repetition, I shall restate my views here only 
summarily. If questions about the constitutional authority of Su-
preme Court precedents depended solely on the text and original 
understanding of Article III, the historical record is less clear than 
Professors Harrison and Paulsen suggest.
150 A respectable case can 
be made that Article III’s grant of “the judicial power” presup-
L. Rev. 817, 869 (1994) (arguing that “Supreme Court precedents should continue to 
bind lower courts” even if Congress enacted jurisdiction-stripping legislation); Mi-
chael C. Dorf, Prediction and the Rule of Law, 42 UCLA L. Rev. 651, 672–73 (1995); 
Martin H. Redish, Congressional Power to Regulate Supreme Court Appellate Juris-
diction Under the Exceptions Clause: An Internal and External Examination, 27 Vill. 
L. Rev. 900, 925–26 (1982); Herbert Wechsler, The Courts and the Constitution, 65 
Colum. L. Rev. 1001, 1006 (1965). But see Amar, Neo-Federalist View, supra note 16, 
at 258–59 n.170; Leonard Ratner, Majoritarian Constraints on Judicial Review: Con-
gressional Control of Supreme Court Jurisdiction, 27 Vill. L. Rev. 929, 937 (1982); 
Charles E. Rice, Congress and the Supreme Court’s Jurisdiction, 27 Vill. L. Rev. 959, 
985 (1982). 
146 See John Harrison, The Power of Congress Over the Rules of Precedent, 50 
Duke L.J. 503, 513–30 (2000). 
147 Id. at 505. 
148 See Michael Stokes Paulsen, Abrogating Stare Decisis by Statute: May Congress 
Remove the Precedential Effect of Roe and Casey?, 109 Yale L.J. 1535, 1596–97 
(2000) (suggesting that a congressional abrogation of stare decisis limited to abortion 
cases might be constitutionally acceptable). 
149 See Fallon, supra note 65; Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Precedent-Based Constitutional 
Adjudication, Acceptance, and the Rule of Recognition, in The Rule of Recognition 
and the U.S. Constitution 47, 59–60 (Matthew D. Adler & Kenneth Einar Himma 
eds., 2009) [hereinafter Fallon, Precedent-Based Adjudication]; Richard H. Fallon, 
Jr., Stare Decisis and the Constitution: An Essay on Constitutional Methodology, 76 
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 570 (2001) [hereinafter Fallon, Stare Decisis]. 
150 See Fallon, Stare Decisis, supra note 149, at 578–82. FALLON_PRE_PP  8/19/2010 12:28 PM 
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poses that Supreme Court precedents will bind lower courts and, to 
some extent, the Court itself.
151 
But more is involved than the original understanding. The foun-
dations of law lie in practices of acceptance.
152 The Constitution is 
law in the United States today, while the Articles of Confederation 
(and the dictates of the British Parliament) are not, because the 
Constitution is accepted as law.
153 And because the Constitution 
requires interpretation, what it means today is a function, not just 
of the original understanding, but also of currently accepted inter-
pretive norms.
154 Under interpretive practices that have prevailed 
throughout constitutional history, all of the Justices of the Supreme 
Court, including those currently sitting, have accepted that prior 
Court decisions can authorize or even bind them in some cases to 
reach decisions contrary to what they would otherwise have inter-
preted the Constitution to require.
155 If the Court’s precedents can 
sometimes lawfully prevail over what the Constitution would oth-
erwise demand, it must be because practice and precedent have 
settled that Supreme Court decisions become part of the fabric of 
constitutional law.
156 In other words, practice and precedent have 
settled that Supreme Court precedent is a constituent element of 
constitutional meaning—just as the original understanding is an 
element of constitutional meaning.
157 This being so, Congress could 
not validly direct lower courts to ascertain the Constitution’s mean-
ing without regard to Supreme Court precedent any more than it 
could direct either the Supreme Court or lower courts to determine 
151 See id. at 579. 
152 See Fallon, supra note 65, at 1128. 
153 See id. 
154 For expressions of the contrary, outlier view that precedent can never lawfully 
displace the Constitution’s originally understood meaning, see, e.g., Randy E. Bar-
nett, Trumping Precedent With Original Meaning: Not as Radical as It Sounds, 22 
Const. Comment. 257 (2005), Gary Lawson, The Constitutional Case Against Prece-
dent, 17 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 23 (1994), and Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Intrinsi-
cally Corrupting Influence of Precedent, 22 Const. Comment. 289 (2005). The argu-
ments of Fallon, Precedent-Based Adjudication, supra note 149, at 50–55, and Fallon, 
supra note 65, aim to show that the view that the Constitution’s originally understood 
meaning is always constitutionally authoritative rests on untenable jurisprudential as-
sumptions.  
155 See Fallon, supra note 65, at 1130 n.84. 
156 See Fallon, Precedent-Based Adjudication, supra note 149.  
157 See Fallon, Constructivist Coherence, supra note 22, at 1202–04, 1260–62 (treat-
ing precedent as a constituent element of constitutional meaning). FALLON_PRE_PP  8/19/2010 12:28 PM 
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the Constitution’s meaning without reference to the original un-
derstanding.
158 
If this analysis is correct, it puts into stark relief the question 
whether congressional motives bear on the validity of jurisdiction-
stripping legislation. The question is whether the Constitution 
should be interpreted to permit Congress to invite or encourage 
state court judges—almost ninety percent of whom must stand for 
election
159—to defy their constitutional obligations to enforce Su-
preme Court precedents. In so framing the issue, I do not mean to 
suggest that the Court’s constitutional interpretations are always 
correct. But whether Congress should be entitled to strip jurisdic-
tion as a means of promoting official and lower court disobedience 
of the Court’s decisions is another matter. 
In maintaining that Congress’s purposes for stripping federal ju-
risdiction are constitutionally irrelevant, adherents to the orthodox 
view rest their conclusions on the imagined original understanding 
of Article III
160 and, especially, the Supreme Court’s 1869 decision 
in Ex parte McCardle.
161 But McCardle would be an easily distin-
guishable precedent for a Supreme Court that wanted to distin-
guish it. As the Court pointedly noted in its decision, the repealer 
statute left open an alternative avenue by which the petitioner 
could seek appellate review.
162 The Court’s jurisdiction to entertain 
challenges to military reconstruction was not completely elimi-
nated. In addition, the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts re-
mained untouched. 
Moreover, only a few years after McCardle, the Court cited Con-
gress’s purposes as relevant to its invalidation of a statute purport-
158 See Fallon, Stare Decisis, supra note 149, at 591–92. 
159 Jed H. Shugerman, Economic Crisis and the Rise of Judicial Elections and Judi-
cial Review, 123 Harv. L. Rev. 1061, 1063 (2010). “Recent studies demonstrate that 
elected judges face more political pressure and reach legal results more in keeping 
with local public opinion than appointed judges do.” Id. at 1064. 
160 See, e.g., Bator, supra note 100, at 1030–31, 1036–37. 
161 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1869). 
162 See id. at 515 (“Counsel seem to have supposed, if effect be given to the repealing 
act in question, that the whole appellate power of the court, in cases of habeas corpus, 
is denied. But this is an error. The act of 1868 does not except from that jurisdiction 
any cases but appeals from the Circuit Courts under the act of 1867. It does not affect 
the jurisdiction which was previously exercised.”). The Court subsequently exercised 
jurisdiction under the previously existing statute in Ex parte Yerger, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 
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ing to eliminate its appellate jurisdiction in United States v. Klein.
163 
Klein arose under an act of Congress authorizing noncombatant 
Southern property owners to recover for property seized by the 
federal government during the Civil War upon proof of their non-
combatant status.
164 In ruling in favor of Klein, the Court of Claims 
relied on a prior Supreme Court decision holding that a presiden-
tial pardon established an applicant’s status as a loyal citizen dur-
ing the Civil War.
165 By the time the case reached the Supreme 
Court, however, Congress had passed a statute prescribing that the 
Court of Claims and the Supreme Court must dismiss for want of 
jurisdiction any case in which a claimant relied on a presidential 
pardon as proof of loyalty.
166 
In a confusing opinion that included several strands,
167 the Court 
asserted as one of its grounds for decision that jurisdiction-
stripping legislation that is enacted “as a means to an end” that is 
itself constitutionally impermissible “is not an exercise of the ac-
knowledged power of Congress to make exceptions and prescribe 
regulations to the appellate power.”
168 Although Klein’s tangled 
163 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 145 (1872). 
164 See Act of Mar. 3, 1863, § 3, ch. 120, 12 Stat. 820 (providing for compensation for 
property seized “on proof to the satisfaction of [the Court of Claims] . . . that [the 
property owner] has never given any aid or comfort to the present rebellion”). 
165 Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 132–33; United States v. Padelford, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 
531, 542–43 (1870). 
166 See Act of July 12, 1870, ch. 251, 16 Stat. 230, 235. 
167 The first strand suggested that the challenged statute, although framed as a limi-
tation on judicial jurisdiction, was in fact more substantive than jurisdictional. See 
Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 146 (“The court has jurisdiction of the cause to a given 
point; but when it ascertains that a certain state of things exists, its jurisdiction is to 
cease and it is required to dismiss the cause for want of jurisdiction.”). Congress, the 
Court said, lacked power to “prescribe rules of decision to the Judicial Department of 
the government in cases pending before it.” Id. But this assertion flatly contradicts 
both prior and subsequent cases that clearly recognize Congress’s power to enact 
statutes prescribing rules of decision applicable to pending cases. See, e.g., United 
States v. Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 103, 110 (1801) (“[I]f subsequent to the 
judgment and before the decision of the appellate court, [an otherwise valid] law in-
tervenes and positively changes the rule which governs, the law must be 
obeyed . . . .”). 
  A second strand asserted a clear and unexceptionable basis for the decision: the 
Court found that the challenged congressional statute was unconstitutional because it 
impaired the effect of a presidential pardon, as established by one of the Court’s 
precedents, and thus “infring[ed] the constitutional power of the Executive.” Klein, 80 
U.S. (13 Wall.) at 147. 
168  Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 145–46. FALLON_PRE_PP  8/19/2010 12:28 PM 
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reasoning raises as many questions as it answers,
169 it is surely rele-
vant to the issues posed when Congress attempts to strip the fed-
eral courts of jurisdiction “as a means to [the] end” of stopping 
them from issuing particular rulings on the merits—especially if the 
rulings that Congress seeks to avert are ones that, like the ruling in 
Klein, the Supreme Court would regard as compelled by its prece-
dents.
170 Any good doctrinalist would want to inquire how McCar-
dle and Klein fit together and whether they can be reconciled. 
In a recent article, Professor Caleb Nelson argues that—the ap-
parently contrary statement in McCardle notwithstanding
171—the 
nineteenth-century Supreme Court regarded congressional motive 
as pertinent to the validity of legislation in a variety of doctrinal 
contexts,
172 including that of jurisdiction-stripping under Article III. 
In support of that thesis, he cites Klein.
173 Under nineteenth-
century jurisprudential understandings, Nelson maintains, the deci-
sive difference between McCardle and Klein was that in the latter 
case Congress’s illicit motive was evident on the face of the statute, 
whereas in the former the identification of an illicit purpose—
namely, that of frustrating the enforcement of constitutional guar-
antees—would have required reference to other evidence.
174 
Regardless of whether Professor Nelson is correct that the Su-
preme Court has long recognized congressional purpose as rele-
vant to the validity of jurisdiction-stripping under Article III, it is 
certainly not categorically true today that the validity of legislation 
cannot depend on the motivations of the legislature. Motive or 
purpose tests feature prominently in contemporary constitutional 
law, including in cases under the Free Exercise Clause, the Free 
Speech Clause, and the Equal Protection Clause.
175 The reason is 
169 For provocative analyses, see Martin H. Redish & Christopher R. Pudelski, Leg-
islative Deception, Separation of Powers, and Democratic Process: Harnessing the 
Political Theory of United States v. Klein, 100 Nw. U. L. Rev. 437 (2006); Lawrence G. 
Sager, Klein’s First Principle: A Proposed Solution, 86 Geo. L.J. 2525 (1998); Tyler, 
supra note 102.  
170 Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 145. 
171 See supra note 114 and accompanying text. 
172 See Caleb Nelson, Judicial Review of Legislative Purpose, 83 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 
1784, 1790–91 & nn.17–22 (2008). 
173 Id. at 1790–91. 
174 Id. 
175 See, e.g., Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 
532–33 (1993) (Free Exercise Clause); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240–41 FALLON_PRE_PP  8/19/2010 12:28 PM 
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not hard to locate. When important constitutional values are at 
stake, and it is difficult for the Supreme Court to agree on an alter-
native test of constitutional validity to protect those values, pur-
pose tests provide a minimal protection against abuses of govern-
mental power.
176 They stop legislatures from achieving indirectly 
aims that the Constitution would forbid the government to pursue 
directly. 
To be sure, the Supreme Court has not held that courts should 
subject legislation to motive tests in all possible contexts.
177 The 
Court eschews motive-based inquiries when determining whether 
legislation comes within Congress’s power to regulate interstate 
commerce.
178 More generally, the Court appears to treat motive as 
more frequently relevant in cases involving the Constitution’s 
rights-guaranteeing than its structural provisions.
179 Defenders of 
the orthodox view that congressional motive is irrelevant to the 
constitutionality of congressional preclusions of federal jurisdiction 
might therefore argue that Klein was ambiguous or confused and 
that  McCardle’s purported disavowal of motive-based inquiries 
should remain authoritative in matters of jurisdiction-stripping. But 
this intractable insistence that a single sentence in McCardle defini-
tively resolves a question that that case did not present—namely, 
whether Congress could strip all jurisdiction to entertain constitu-
tional challenges from both the Supreme Court and the lower federal 
courts—requires a normative justification that defenders of the ortho-
dox view have not provided. There is nothing inherent in a legislative 
power over jurisdiction to preclude inquiries into legislative motiva-
tion,
180 as the Supreme Court recognized in its 2009 decision in 
(1976) (equal protection component of the Due Process Clause). See generally Fallon, 
Implementing, supra note 22, at 89–95 (discussing purpose tests in constitutional law). 
176 See Fallon, Implementing, supra note 22, at 93–95. 
177 See, e.g., Calvin Massey, The Role of Governmental Purpose in Constitutional 
Judicial Review, 59 S.C. L. Rev. 1, 35 (2007) (criticizing the Supreme Court for its 
“fractured pattern of consideration of purpose”). 
178 See, e.g., United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 115 (1941) (“The motive and pur-
pose of a regulation of interstate commerce are matters for the legislative judgment 
upon the exercise of which the Court places no restriction . . . .”). 
179 According to Massey, supra note 177, at 23–24, it is “partly, but not universally, 
true” that “courts would think governmental purpose less relevant to the judiciary’s 
role in policing federalism limits on federal power and more relevant to questions of 
the scope of constitutional individual liberties.” 
180 See, e.g., Sager, supra note 101, at 74–77; Tribe, supra note 101, at 151. FALLON_PRE_PP  8/19/2010 12:28 PM 
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Haywood v. Drown.
181 Ordinarily, a state legislature can limit state 
court jurisdiction in any way that it chooses, as long as it does not dis-
criminate against federal claims. Nevertheless, Haywood invalidated a 
New York statute depriving state courts of jurisdiction to entertain 
damages claims against state correction officers under either state law 
or 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which creates a cause of action against state offi-
cials who violate federal rights. A state, the Court found, cannot val-
idly strip its courts of jurisdiction over federal claims when its purpose 
is to “shut the courthouse door to federal claims that it considers at 
odds with its local policy.”
182 
Indeed, the Supreme Court’s 1986 decision in Commodity Fu-
tures Trading Commission v. Schor mandates a limited inquiry into 
congressional purposes in assessments of the permissibility of ju-
risdictional legislation under Article III.
183 At issue in Schor was 
whether Congress violated Article III when it authorized a federal 
administrative agency not only to adjudicate disputes under the 
federal Commodity Futures Trading Act, but also to exercise pen-
dent jurisdiction over a state law counterclaim. In addressing that 
question, Justice O’Connor’s opinion for the Court began its con-
stitutional analysis by eschewing “conclusory reference to the lan-
guage of Article III”
184 and by affirming that the outcome should 
turn on the purposes of the Judiciary Article, one of which is to es-
tablish the federal courts as “an inseparable element of the consti-
tutional system of checks and balances.”
185 In determining whether 
agency adjudication unacceptably diminished the judicial role, the 
Court found that an important consideration involved “the con-
cerns that drove Congress” to assign cases to an agency instead of 
an Article III court.
186 Article III, the Court held, bars Congress 
from legislating “for the purpose of emasculating’ constitutional 
courts  .  .  .  and thereby preventing ‘the encroachment or aggran-
dizement of one branch at the expense of the other.”
187 
181 129 S. Ct. 2108, 2116 (2009). 
182 Id. at 2117. 
183 478 U.S. 833, 851 (1986). 
184 Id. at 847. 
185 See id. at 850 (quoting N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 
U.S. 50, 58 (1982)). 
186 Id. at 851. 
187 Id. at 850 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 122 (1976); Nat’l Mut. Ins. Co. v. 
Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582, 644 (1949)). FALLON_PRE_PP  8/19/2010 12:28 PM 
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In my judgment, the functional interest in ensuring a checking 
and balancing role for the federal judiciary that underlies the ana-
lytical framework developed in Schor would align with recent 
precedents in other areas of modern doctrine to support a motive-
based inquiry if Congress should ever enact legislation totally ex-
cluding a class of constitutional cases defined by subject matter 
from the Article III courts. Because it is almost always reprehensi-
ble for government officials—including judges—to engage in law-
breaking, Congress’s power over jurisdiction should not be inter-
preted as a license to encourage lawbreaking by either state or 
federal officials or by state court judges.
188 Legislation barring both 
Supreme Court and lower federal court jurisdiction over challenges 
to anti-abortion legislation or school prayer should, accordingly, be 
held invalid based on its constitutionally forbidden purpose of en-
couraging defiance of applicable Supreme Court precedent. 
5. Beyond Motive: Broader Limitations on the Total Stripping of 
Federal Jurisdiction 
Not every imaginable jurisdiction-limiting statute would have 
the purpose of encouraging lower court defiance of Supreme Court 
precedents. Consider a statute withdrawing federal court jurisdic-
tion of cases presenting constitutional challenges to the Pledge of 
Allegiance. The Supreme Court has never ruled definitively on 
whether government-sponsored recitations of the Pledge, which re-
fers to “one nation, under God,” violate the Establishment 
Clause.
189 Legislation stripping federal jurisdiction over Pledge of 
188 In recent years, many thoughtful commentators—whose otherwise diverse posi-
tions are often linked under the rubric of “popular constitutionalism”—have argued 
for one or another kind of public role in, or influence on, constitutional interpreta-
tion. See Helen Norton, Reshaping Federal Jurisdiction: Congress’s Latest Challenge 
to Judicial Review, 41 Wake Forest L. Rev. 1003, 1014–18 (2006) (linking defenses of 
jurisdiction-stripping legislation to the “popular constitutionalism” movement). Al-
though I am reasonably sympathetic to some versions of popular constitutionalism, 
for Congress to invite state judicial defiance of Supreme Court authority seems a 
crude and possibly self-defeating way of promoting ultimate, authoritative settlements 
of constitutional issues that reflect the values of what Dean Kramer has called “the 
People themselves.” See generally Kramer, supra note 81. 
189 The question was presented but avoided in Elk Grove Unified School District v. 
Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 5 (2004). The Court held that Newdow, who was a non-custodial 
parent suing on his daughter’s behalf, lacked prudential standing to bring suit in fed-
eral court. Id. at 17–18. FALLON_PRE_PP  8/19/2010 12:28 PM 
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Allegiance cases could thus not invite defiance of any clearly on-
point precedents. That Congress might invite the state courts to 
defy the implications of Court rulings is a theoretical possibility, 
but the Court’s Establishment Clause cases seem too much a jum-
ble for that rationale to apply. 
Nevertheless, a strong case can be made under modern constitu-
tional doctrine that a statute stripping all federal court jurisdiction 
over cases such as this would violate Article I, Section III, and the 
constitutional separation of powers. That case begins with histori-
cal practice and judicial precedent. Whatever the original under-
standing, over time Marbury v. Madison
190 has come to stand for 
the proposition that the federal judicial branch is the ultimate ex-
positor of constitutional meaning in properly justiciable cases that 
do not present “political questions.”
191 Writing in 1953, Henry Hart 
appeared to regard state courts as being constitutionally permissi-
ble substitutes for the federal courts in nearly all cases.
192 But in de-
cisions since then the Supreme Court has said repeatedly, albeit in 
dictum, that the Constitution assigns ultimate law-declaring re-
sponsibility in justiciable cases to the federal courts and to itself.
193 
Also pertinent is Tarble’s Case,
194 a nineteenth-century precedent 
much reviled by Federal Courts scholars,
195 which holds that state 
courts lack constitutional authority to issue writs of habeas corpus 
to federal officers. Lower courts have read Tarble’s Case as estab-
lishing that state courts cannot issue injunctions against federal of-
ficials either.
196 If these cases are taken at face value, a statute 
190 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
191 See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 616–17 n.7 (2000); Cooper v. 
Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958). 
192 Hart, supra note 15, at 1363–64. Although Hart affirmed that state courts might 
sometimes be the ultimate guarantors, he appeared to believe that there were limits—
which he did not pause to specify—to Congress’s power to strip Supreme Court juris-
diction. See Hart, supra note 15, at 1363–65 (“[T]he exceptions must not be such as 
will destroy the essential role of the Supreme Court in the constitutional plan.”). 
193 See, e.g., Morrison, 529 U.S. at 616–17 n.7; Cooper, 358 U.S. at 18. 
194 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 397 (1872). 
195 See, e.g., Amar, supra note 73, at 1509–10; Collins, supra note 71, at 101–02; Ge-
rald L. Neuman, The Habeas Corpus Suspension Clause After INS v. St. Cyr, 33 Co-
lum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 555, 596 (2002); see also Fallon et al., Hart & Wechsler, supra 
note 11, at 402–06. 
196 See Fallon et al., Hart & Wechsler, supra note 11, at 407; Martin H. Redish & 
Curtis E. Woods, Congressional Power to Control the Jurisdiction of Lower Federal 
Courts: A Critical Review and a New Synthesis, 124 U. Pa. L. Rev. 45, 89 (1975). FALLON_PRE_PP  8/19/2010 12:28 PM 
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stripping the jurisdiction of both the lower federal courts and the 
Supreme Court could potentially bar all judicial declaration and 
enforcement of some constitutional rights against the federal gov-
ernment—a result that many, if not most, commentators would 
think incompatible with the constitutional plan.
197 
Arguments based on Tarble’s Case have cut no ice with adher-
ents of the orthodox view of congressional power to control federal 
jurisdiction. They have dismissed Tarble’s Case as wrongly decided, 
or at least as wrongly reasoned, based on confident assumptions 
that the original constitutional understanding gave Congress ple-
nary control over federal jurisdiction and at least sometimes man-
dated the availability of judicial remedies against federal officials 
who violated constitutional norms.
198 As noted above, however, the 
first of these assumptions is now hotly disputed, with Professor 
Amar having presented a powerful historical challenge. Although 
my earlier discussion expressed skepticism about whether the evi-
dence adduced so far persuasively establishes Amar’s thesis with 
respect to the original understanding,
199 the issue now under discus-
sion is not purely historical. It is whether Congress should be ad-
judged to have the authority to strip all federal courts of jurisdic-
tion over controverted issues in light of (1) some evidence tending 
to suggest, albeit not definitively establishing, that the Constitution 
was originally understood to require that some federal court must 
have jurisdiction to resolve constitutional issues,
200 (2) uncertainties 
about the force and implications of Tarble’s Case,
201 and (3) other 
legally pertinent considerations, including subsequent judicial 
precedent suggesting that the Constitution makes the federal 
courts the ultimate expositors of constitutional law.
202 
197 See, e.g., Amar, supra note 73, at 1509; see also Daniel J. Meltzer, Congress, 
Courts, and Constitutional Remedies, 86 Geo. L.J. 2537, 2565 (1998). 
198 See, e.g., Meltzer, supra note 197, at 2567 n.160 (observing that “the difficulties 
with . . . an interpretation [of Tarble’s Case as holding that the Constitution forbids 
state courts to grant relief against federal officials even in the absence of federal court 
jurisdiction] are well known . . . as is the possibility of interpreting the decision as a 
sub-constitutional one, resting on the existence (and implied exclusivity) of federal 
court habeas jurisdiction”). 
199 See supra Subsection II.A.3. 
200 See supra Subsection II.A.2. 
201 See supra notes 194–97 and accompanying text. 
202 See supra notes 76–83 and accompanying text. FALLON_PRE_PP  8/19/2010 12:28 PM 
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If all of these considerations inform legal analysis, reasonable 
people will undoubtedly differ in their constitutional judgments. 
On the one hand, a commitment to having claims of constitutional 
right subject to ultimate determination by life-tenured judges who 
are free from political pressure counts among the glories of our 
constitutional tradition.
203 On the other hand, there is something 
vaguely disquieting about the federal judiciary’s relying on prece-
dent created by federal judges to establish federal judges’ irreduci-
ble place in the constitutional scheme. I take seriously Charles 
Black’s remark that Congress’s power to withdraw the Supreme 
Court’s appellate jurisdiction is “the rock on which rests the legiti-
macy of the judicial work in a democracy”
204—though I would also 
emphasize that the withdrawal of both Supreme Court and lower 
federal court jurisdiction raises different issues from a withdrawal 
of Supreme Court jurisdiction alone. 
For my own part, I incline toward the view that a statute with-
drawing both Supreme Court and lower federal court jurisdiction 
over Pledge of Allegiance cases—animated by a congressional be-
lief that the state courts would be less likely than federal courts to 
uphold claims of constitutional right that Congress disfavors—
would violate the Constitution as appropriately interpreted in light 
of precedent and functional considerations, as well as less than 
wholly conclusive evidence concerning the original understanding. 
If Congress should attempt to exclude both the Supreme Court and 
the lower federal courts from any role in adjudicating a constitu-
tional issue, concerns that Congress had trenched impermissibly on 
the role of the federal judicial branch under the separation of pow-
ers should rise to their zenith. It is true, of course, that separation-
of-powers concerns would be at stake on the other side if Congress 
viewed itself as checking a runaway federal judiciary. As I shall ex-
plain below, however, Congress has means of checking and balanc-
ing that fall short of totally precluding any role for either the Su-
preme Court or the lower federal courts in constitutional cases in 
203 See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of Legislative Courts, Administrative Agencies, and 
Article III, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 915, 941 (1988) (observing that the Constitution “set[s] 
a higher fairness standard for the courts of the national government than it imposes 
on state courts”). 
204 Charles L. Black, Jr., The Presidency and Congress, 32 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 841, 
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which jurisdiction-stripping legislation unmistakably reflects hostil-
ity to claims of constitutional right. 
B. Withdrawal of Supreme Court Jurisdiction 
Let us now suppose that Congress purports to strip the Supreme 
Court of jurisdiction to hear a class of cases presenting constitu-
tional claims, such as challenges to the Pledge of Allegiance, but 
continues to permit such claims to go forward in state and lower 
federal courts. Would a jurisdiction-stripping statute such as this 
violate the Constitution? 
1. Background Principles 
At least on the surface, the statute would appear to come within 
the plain text of the Exceptions Clause.
205 It could also claim sup-
port in historical practice. Among other examples, the first Judici-
ary Act deprived the Supreme Court of appellate jurisdiction over 
most criminal cases decided by the lower federal courts.
206 The the-
ory developed by Professor Amar and Justice Story would also in-
dicate that the imagined statute passes constitutional muster. 
A statute stripping the Supreme Court of jurisdiction in Pledge 
of Allegiance cases, but retaining jurisdiction in the lower federal 
courts, would not discriminate based on a suspect classification or 
burden any fundamental right. Historical practice and the Excep-
tions Clause refute any suggestion that there is a fundamental con-
stitutional right to litigate every case involving a constitutional 
claim in the Supreme Court.
207 
Nor, so long as those claiming rights had access to the lower fed-
eral courts, would a statute restricting the Supreme Court’s juris-
diction necessarily betray an unmistakable purpose of inviting de-
fiance of the Court’s precedents. The lower federal courts are not 
only legally obliged to follow Supreme Court precedents (as are 
state courts), but also have guarantees of life tenure and non-
205 U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 2. 
206 See Fallon et al., Hart & Wechsler, supra note 11, at 276–77. 
207 See id. (“From 1789 to 1914, the Supreme Court had jurisdiction to review state 
court decisions of federal questions only if the state court had denied a claim of fed-
eral right.”). FALLON_PRE_PP  8/19/2010 12:28 PM 
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reduction in salary to fortify them in discharging their duties con-
scientiously.
208 
It is a further question whether it should be deemed constitu-
tionally impermissible for Congress to exclude federal cases from 
the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction for the purpose of 
shielding lower federal courts’ decisions from anticipated reversals: 
does the Supreme Court’s “supreme” status imply that Congress 
may not preclude the Court from playing a law-shaping role with 
respect to particular, otherwise justiciable constitutional issues? 
The previous section argued that Congress could not validly ex-
clude the federal judicial branch as a whole from performing this 
function. If my argument on this point was persuasive, it might ap-
pear that the most plausible linguistic peg on which to hang that 
conclusion might be Article III’s provision that there shall be “one 
supreme Court”
209—that although Congress can make exceptions to 
the Court’s appellate jurisdiction based on a variety on non-suspect 
considerations, it cannot categorically exclude cases based on their 
constitutional subject matter. 
But too many legally pertinent considerations weigh against this 
argument. It fits uneasily with historical practice, including that 
under the First Judiciary Act. Under the 1789 Judiciary Act, the 
Supreme Court had no appellate jurisdiction to review state court 
decisions of federal questions that upheld claims of federal rights, 
nor did it have appellate jurisdiction over lower federal court deci-
sions in criminal cases.
210 Modern cases affirming the role of the 
Supreme Court and the federal judiciary as the ultimate constitu-
tional expositors
211 are all distinguishable, for none has involved a 
situation in which Congress purported to strip the Supreme Court’s 
jurisdiction while leaving the lower federal courts available to as-
sure fairness to litigants and promote separation-of-powers values. 
Moreover, worries about judicial legitimacy would have special po-
tency if the Supreme Court were to rule, largely on the basis of its 
own prior dicta and without further support from history and prac-
tice, that Congress has no power whatsoever under the Exceptions 
Clause to curb the Court’s self-defined law-shaping role. Over the 
208 U.S. Const. art. III, § 1, cl. 2. 
209 U.S. Const. art. III, § 1, cl. 1. 
210 See Fallon et al., Hart & Wechsler, supra note 11, at 276–77. 
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course of constitutional history, the Supreme Court has acquired a 
larger importance than anyone in the Founding generation could 
possibly have imagined. The normative justification for the Court’s 
ascent to its current status must therefore depend heavily on the 
continuing acceptance by the American people of the legitimacy of 
the Court’s role.
212 One need not go so far as Professor Black in 
characterizing Congress’s power to withdraw the Supreme Court’s 
appellate jurisdiction as “the rock on which rests the legitimacy of 
the judicial work in a democracy”
213 in order to agree that the 
Court ought to hesitate before asserting that the role it has as-
sumed as the ultimate authority on “what the law is” lies too far 
beyond congressional control. For the most part, statutes stripping 
Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction should pass constitutional 
muster if they preserve ultimate authority in the lower federal 
courts to declare and enforce federal law, and thus preserve a 
checking and balancing function for the Article III judiciary as a 
whole. 
2. Jurisdiction-Stripping and Supervisory Powers 
Although the Exceptions Clause should permit Congress to en-
act statutes selectively stripping Supreme Court appellate jurisdic-
tion in cases initially litigated in the lower federal courts, I have 
framed my conclusion in cautious terms. As Henry Hart argued, 
Article III contemplates that the Supreme Court has an “essential 
role” in the constitutional scheme.
214 Congressional motivations 
aside, some imaginable jurisdictional withdrawals might go too far 
in precluding the Court from playing that role. To take an extreme 
example, Congress would almost self-evidently violate Article III if 
it attempted to take away the Court’s appellate jurisdiction in all 
cases in which the lower federal courts have resolved constitutional 
issues.
215 Hart further argued, persuasively in my view, that the 
212 The term “legitimacy” has moral as well as legal and sociological dimensions. See 
generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Legitimacy and the Constitution, 118 Harv. L. Rev. 
1787 (2005) (distinguishing legal, moral, and sociological senses of legitimacy).  
213 Black, supra note 204, at 846. 
214 Hart, supra note 15, at 1365. 
215 In an effort to give content to Hart’s vaguely formulated standard, Leonard Rat-
ner argued that Congress must not preclude the Supreme Court from assuring the su-
premacy and uniformity of federal law. See Ratner, supra note 145, at 957. But fed-FALLON_PRE_PP  8/19/2010 12:28 PM 
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question of “how far is too far?” would need to be answered on a 
case-by-case basis, without the aid of any sharply determinate 
test.
216 
Professor Pfander accepts that Congress has significant authority 
to strip the Supreme Court of jurisdiction to conduct de novo re-
view of lower federal courts’ decisions, but argues that the Court’s 
“supreme” status requires that it be able to exercise at least mini-
mal oversight, even when Congress has precluded it from conduct-
ing ordinary appellate review.
217 According to Pfander, the history 
of the Exceptions Clause shows that it reflected three assumptions. 
First, de novo review in the Supreme Court, available as-of-right, 
would be the norm.
218 Second, because mandatory appeals to a tri-
bunal in the seat of government might prove unduly burdensome 
in some cases, Congress should have the power to create excep-
tions to that norm.
219 Third, even in the absence of appeal to the 
Supreme Court as-of-right, the Court’s status vis-à-vis “inferior” 
federal tribunals implied that the Court must possess jurisdiction to 
eral supremacy is not much threatened in cases in which the lower federal courts re-
tain their jurisdiction, even if the Supreme Court does not, and the conjunction of 
constitutional text—in the form of the Exceptions Clause—and history makes it hard 
to argue that the Supreme Court must have appellate jurisdiction to exercise de novo 
review of all lower court decisions of federal law. Among other pertinent evidence, 
the First Judiciary Act gave the Supreme Court no appellate jurisdiction in federal 
criminal cases. See supra note 210. 
  Steven G. Calabresi & Gary Lawson, The Unitary Executive, Jurisdiction Stripping, 
and the Hamdan Opinions: A Textualist Response to Justice Scalia, 107 Colum. L. 
Rev. 1002, 1005, 1038 (2007), argue that the original public understanding of Article 
III would have required the Supreme Court to have either original or appellate juris-
diction of all cases arising under the Constitution, laws, and treaties of the United 
States. According to the authors, the Exceptions Clause was originally understood to 
permit exceptions to the Court’s appellate jurisdiction only in cases in which Congress 
gave the Court original jurisdiction instead. Id. But Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 
Cranch) 137, 175 (1803), decisively rejected the authors’ view that Congress could 
permissibly add cases to the Court’s original jurisdiction. In my view, it would be pre-
posterous for the Court to overrule Marbury on this point, which has been settled for 
over two hundred years, on the basis of a disputable claim about the original under-
standing of Article III that would also entail the unconstitutionality of provisions of 
the 1789 Judiciary Act excepting cases from the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdic-
tion. 
216 See Hart, supra note 15, at 1364–66. 
217 James E. Pfander, Jurisdiction-Stripping and the Supreme Court’s Power to Su-
pervise Inferior Tribunals, 78 Tex. L. Rev. 1433, 1435 (2000). 
218 Id. at 1459–60 (equating “appellate” jurisdiction with “as-of-right” jurisdiction). 
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supervise the lower courts through “discretionary writs, such as 
mandamus, habeas corpus, and prohibition.”
220 Behind this third as-
sumption lies a further, deeper assumption that Supreme Court su-
pervision via the discretionary writs would be more deferential 
than normal appellate review. 
The Supreme Court appeared to take seriously the possibility 
that Article III might require it to have the capacity for at least 
minimal supervisory oversight, even following the stripping of its 
appellate jurisdiction via the writ of certiorari, in Felker v. 
Turpin.
221  Felker arose under the Antiterrorism and Effective 
Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), which bars inmates from 
filing second or “successive” habeas petitions unless authorized to 
do so by a court of appeals.
222 The AEDPA further provides that 
decisions of the courts of appeals in their gatekeeping role “shall 
not be appealable and shall not be the subject of a petition for . . . a 
writ of certiorari.”
223 Writing for a unanimous Court, Chief Justice 
William Rehnquist held that the preclusion of certiorari review of 
the courts of appeals’ gatekeeping decisions did not violate Article 
III.
224 In doing so, however, the Chief Justice went out of his way to 
determine that the AEDPA did not eliminate the Court’s authority 
to entertain original petitions for habeas corpus.
225 Additionally, in 
a concurring opinion, Justice Souter, joined by Justices Stevens and 
Breyer, pointedly reserved the constitutional question that would 
arise under Article III if the courts of appeals “adopted divergent 
interpretations of the gatekeeper standard” and “statutory avenues 
other than certiorari for reviewing a gatekeeping determination 
were closed.”
226 
As the Felker opinions suggest, whether Article III requires a re-
siduum of Supreme Court supervisory jurisdiction, even in cases in 
which Congress has invoked its power to create an exception to the 
220 Id. at 1441–42. 
221 518 U.S. 651 (1996). 
222 Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1217 (codified as 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A) 
(2006)). 
223 Id. (codified as § 2244(b)(3)(E)). 
224 Felker, 518 U.S. at 662. 
225 The availability of habeas corpus review, Rehnquist said, “obviate[d]” the argu-
ment that AEDPA’s jurisdictional withdrawal violated Article III. Felker, 518 U.S. at 
661. 
226 Id. at 667 (Souter, J., concurring). FALLON_PRE_PP  8/19/2010 12:28 PM 
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Court’s appellate jurisdiction, is not only an open question, but 
also a difficult one. Although I introduced that question by calling 
attention to Professor Pfander’s account of the original under-
standing of Article III, I hesitate either to endorse his historical 
conclusions or to reject them. Scholars who have studied the origi-
nally understood significance of the Constitution’s designation of 
one federal court as “supreme” and of others as “inferior” have 
reached radically different judgments. In contrast with Professor 
Pfander, Professor Engdahl argues that Article III’s reference to a 
“supreme” court did not imply any decisional hierarchy at all.
227 
According to Engdahl, the Supreme Court’s historically under-
stood supremacy inheres solely in the geographic sweep of its ju-
risdiction.
228 Professor Amar concurs with Engdahl that Article III 
requires no role for the Supreme Court when Congress vests the 
judicial power of the United States in a lower federal court.
229 Pro-
fessors Calabresi and Lawson align more nearly with Professor 
Pfander. According to them, “the objective meaning of the Consti-
tution” in 1788 would have forbidden Congress to undermine the 
Supreme Court’s hierarchical superiority to any “inferior” federal 
courts.
230 Calabresi and Lawson go further than Pfander, however, 
in maintaining that the Court must have either original or appellate 
jurisdiction—not mere supervisory power—in “all  cases . . . that 
raise federal issues.”
231 Having read the leading articles closely but 
not having undertaken original research, I can only question 
whether there even was a clear, widely shared original understand-
ing of whether the Supreme Court’s supremacy and the lower 
courts’ inferior status entailed that the former must possess super-
visory authority over the latter. I am equally unconvinced that a 
clear answer would emerge if the question were reframed as one 
about how a hypothetical, reasonable, objective observer would 
have understood the import of Article III’s language in 1789. 
With the language of Article III not unambiguously resolving 
whether Congress has the authority to strip the Supreme Court of 
227 David E. Engdahl, What’s in a Name? The Constitutionality of Multiple “Su-
preme” Courts, 66 Ind. L.J. 457, 466–68 (1991). 
228 Id. at 475. 
229 Amar, Neo-Federalist View, supra note 16, at 221 n.60. 
230 Calabresi & Lawson, supra note 215, at 1005, 1038–39. 
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its supervisory jurisdiction via historically discretionary writs, and 
with no precedent or historical material speaking clearly to the is-
sue, considerations of practical desirability and doctrinal coherence 
should loom large. In light of those considerations, I would endorse 
the view that the Supreme Court must have some capacity to ex-
amine lower courts’ judgments of legal and constitutional issues, 
even if Congress can validly withdraw the Court’s power to con-
duct a de novo review in every case. Although absolute uniformity 
of federal law is a misguided ideal,
232 gross interpretive disparities 
remain undesirable. And with the lower courts normally being le-
gally bound by past Supreme Court decisions—a state of affairs 
that jurisdiction-stripping legislation could not alter
233—the Court is 
the tribunal best situated to enforce the minimal obligations of fi-
delity to precedent. The Court is also the only institution with the 
constitutional authority to relax such obligations with respect to 
precedents that no longer cohere with the surrounding body of 
contemporary constitutional law. 
C. Stripping of District Court Jurisdiction 
As Sections II.A and II.B implied, there should be no doubt that 
Congress has very broad power to limit the jurisdiction of the 
lower federal courts, as long as the Supreme Court retains appel-
late jurisdiction over constitutional claims initially litigated in state 
court. Robert Clinton has advanced an originalist argument that 
would apparently require Congress to vest the lower federal courts 
with, and then prevent any subsequent stripping of, all of the pos-
sible jurisdiction that Article III authorizes, including diversity ju-
risdiction.
234 But his argument rests on questionable historical 
foundations, and, in any event, practice running back to the First 
Judiciary Act thoroughly rejects it.
235 
Professor Theodore Eisenberg has also argued, on quasi-
originalist grounds, that most modern proposals to strip the lower 
federal courts of jurisdiction in cases presenting federal, and espe-
232 See Amanda Frost, Overvaluing Uniformity, 94 Va. L. Rev. 1567 (2008). 
233 See supra note 145 and accompanying text. 
234 See Robert N. Clinton, A Mandatory View of Federal Court Jurisdiction: A 
Guided Quest for the Original Understanding of Article III, 132 U. Pa. L. Rev. 741, 
776 (1984). 
235 See Fallon et al., Hart & Wechsler, supra note 11, at 290–91. FALLON_PRE_PP  8/19/2010 12:28 PM 
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cially constitutional, questions should be deemed constitutionally 
invalid, even in cases remaining within the Supreme Court’s appel-
late jurisdiction.
236 Eisenberg erects his argument on the premise 
that the Founding generation expected Supreme Court review of 
state court decisions normally to occur as-of-right.
237 With vast 
docket increases having made appellate review by the Supreme 
Court a rarity, Eisenberg argues that the Founders’ goal of ensur-
ing ready access to the national judiciary by those claiming federal 
rights supports recognition of a judicially enforceable prohibition 
against most contemporary proposals to strip the lower federal 
courts’ jurisdiction.
238 
Although appeals for a “translation” of original understandings 
to realize original constitutional purposes are sometimes persua-
sive,
239 Eisenberg’s argument comes up short. Too many long-
entrenched statutes and settled legal doctrines tolerate the exclu-
sion of cases presenting constitutional issues from the lower federal 
courts’ jurisdiction. Examples include the exclusion of constitu-
tional issues arising in the context of state criminal prosecutions
240 
and of civil “federal question” cases in which the federal question 
first arises by way of defense.
241 There is also a significant smatter-
ing of long-accepted statutes and doctrines predicated on the as-
sumption that states have special interests in adjudicating certain 
classes of cases in the first instance, possibly based on the assump-
tion that state judges possess relevant specialized expertise.
242 
236 See Theodore Eisenberg, Congressional Authority to Restrict Lower Federal 
Court Jurisdiction, 83 Yale L.J. 498, 501 (1974). 
237 Id. at 507–10. 
238 Id. at 510–13. 
239 See generally Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 Tex. L. Rev. 1165 
(1993). 
240 Subject only to rare exceptions, the statutory scheme generally makes no provi-
sion for removal, and the abstention doctrine of Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43–54 
(1971), bars suits to enjoin pending state criminal prosecutions. See Fallon et al., Hart 
& Wechsler, supra note 11, at 1083–128 (discussing Younger and related doctrines of 
equitable restraint). 
241 See Fallon et al., Hart & Wechsler, supra note 11, at 777. 
242 Examples include the Tax Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (2006), which limits 
federal courts’ authority to issue injunctions in disputes about state taxes: the Johnson 
Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1342 (2006), which similarly limits injunctions of state public utility 
rate orders; and the abstention doctrine of Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 317–
18 (1943), which holds that federal courts as a matter of sound equitable discretion 
should abstain from interfering with decisions of state administrative agencies involv-FALLON_PRE_PP  8/19/2010 12:28 PM 
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Eisenberg is of course aware of settled practices that embarrass 
his thesis, and he distinguishes them mostly on motive-based 
grounds.
243 Congress, he argues, should not be able to exclude cases 
from the lower federal courts’ jurisdiction based on anticipated 
disagreements with how the lower federal courts would likely re-
solve those cases.
244 Consistent with the analysis advanced above, I 
agree that Congress would act with a constitutionally impermissi-
ble motive if it stripped the lower federal courts of jurisdiction in 
cases presenting controversial constitutional issues as a means of 
inviting state courts’ defiance of Supreme Court precedents. Stated 
abstractly, however, this seems to be both an unlikely congres-
sional motivation for, and an unlikely result of, jurisdiction-
stripping legislation that left Supreme Court review of state court 
judgments intact. I would thus conclude that legislation stripping 
district court jurisdiction but retaining the Supreme Court’s appel-
late jurisdiction to review state court judgments should be invali-
dated on purpose-based grounds only in cases of especially clear 
congressional intent to frustrate the enforcement of established 
federal rights. 
III. WITHDRAWAL OF ALL JUDICIAL JURISDICTION 
So far I have considered constitutional issues that would arise if 
Congress attempted to strip jurisdiction from federal courts, while 
leaving state court jurisdiction intact. Now suppose that Congress 
were to use its power over jurisdiction to create a situation in 
which no court, federal or state, could adjudicate a class of cases 
presenting constitutional issues. Congress might contrive to 
achieve this effect in either of two ways. First, citing authorities 
holding that state courts cannot issue injunctions against federal of-
ficers,
245 Congress might purport to strip the federal courts of juris-
diction of suits in which plaintiffs seek injunctions against some 
ing matters of special importance or sensitivity to the states. On the notoriously elu-
sive contours and rationale of the Burford doctrine, see Fallon et al., Hart & 
Wechsler, supra note 11, at 1075–79. 
243 See Eisenberg, supra note 236, at 514–18. 
244 Id. at 518–30. 
245 See supra note 196 and accompanying text. FALLON_PRE_PP  8/19/2010 12:54 PM 
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subcategory of federal officials’ alleged constitutional violations.
246 
Alternatively, Congress might directly deprive the state courts of 
jurisdiction at the same time that it eliminated federal jurisdiction 
over the same class of cases. In a variety of contexts, Congress pos-
sesses undoubted power to divest state courts of jurisdiction as a 
necessary and proper means of achieving legitimate federal pur-
poses. Well-known examples include provisions for exclusive fed-
eral jurisdiction over some categories of cases
247 and statutes au-
thorizing removal to federal court of cases initially filed in state 
court.
248 
As noted above, most jurisdiction-stripping proposals would 
leave state court jurisdiction unimpaired. Although the sponsors 
apparently assume that any preclusion of jurisdiction by all courts 
must lie wholly beyond the pale of arguable constitutional permis-
sibility, the reality is more complex. Before going further, it may 
therefore help for me to provide some examples of the diverse 
range of cases in which Congress might attempt to preclude any 
court whatsoever from entertaining otherwise justiciable constitu-
tional claims. 
Case 1: After Supreme Court interpretations of a federal labor 
law include underground travel in mining sites as part of workers’ 
compensable work time, and thereby expose employers to huge 
retroactive liabilities, Congress enacts the Portal-to-Portal Act.
249 In 
Sections 2(a) and 2(b), the Portal-to-Portal Act wipes out employ-
ers’ liability under the court decisions to which Congress re-
sponded.
250 In Section 2(d), it strips both state and federal courts of 
jurisdiction “to enforce liability”
251 in the cases covered by Sections 
2(a) and 2(b).
252 
 
246 But cf. Fallon et al., Hart & Wechsler, supra note 11, at 405 (suggesting that Tar-
ble’s Case, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 397 (1872), which provides the lynchpin for the argu-
ment that state courts cannot compel certain official actions by federal officers, could 
be read as holding only that the affirmative conferral of federal court jurisdiction im-
pliedly barred state court jurisdiction). 
247 See Fallon et al., Hart & Wechsler, supra note 11, at 390–91. 
248 See id. at 396–97. 
249 29 U.S.C. §§ 251–62 (2006). 
250 29 U.S.C. § 252(a), (b) (2006). 
251 29 U.S.C. § 252(d) (2006). 
252 This case is closely modeled on Battaglia v. General Motors Corp., 169 F.2d 254 
(2d Cir. 1948). FALLON_PRE_PP  8/19/2010 12:28 PM 
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Case 2: Congress provides by statute that no court shall have ju-
risdiction of any suit for injunctive or any other anticipatory relief 
against the collection of any federal tax. The statute does not dis-
place preexisting authorization for suits for refunds.
253 
Case 3: Congress enacts and the President signs a bill providing 
that assessments of tax liability by the Internal Revenue Service 
(“IRS”) are final and binding, that the IRS may summarily collect 
any tax assessments through the seizure of assets if necessary, and 
that no court shall have jurisdiction to entertain any action in 
which is brought in question the constitutional validity of such as-
sessments or their collection, or the statutes, rules, regulations, or 
practices on which assessments are based.
254 
Case 4: A federal statute authorizes the executive branch to de-
tain suspected enemy combatants within the United States and at 
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. It provides that military commissions 
shall conduct proceedings to make binding determinations of en-
emy combatant status and further provides that the decisions of 
those tribunals are final. To enforce the provision for finality, the 
statute directs that no federal or state court shall have jurisdiction 
to inquire into the lawfulness of the detention of any person sub-
ject to or pending a military commission’s determination of enemy 
combatant status.
255 
Case 5: Congress enacts a law forbidding both federal and state 
courts to exercise jurisdiction over any suit calling into question the 
constitutionality of practices of prayer in the public schools of any 
state. 
Case 6: Congress bars both state and federal courts from exercis-
ing jurisdiction of any suit calling into question the validity of any 
federal statute, rule, regulation, practice, or act on the ground that 
it abridges rights to be free from race-based discrimination. 
Case 7: A federal statute provides that decisions of the Social 
Security Administration to award or withhold any benefit are final 
and not judicially reviewable and that no court shall have jurisdic-
253 This case is based on the holdings of Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U.S. 589 
(1931), and Snyder v. Marks, 109 U.S. 189 (1883). 
254 This case is based on Cary v. Curtis, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 236 (1845). 
255 This case is based on Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008). FALLON_PRE_PP  8/19/2010 12:28 PM 
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tion of any suit questioning any such decision or the law, rules, 
regulations, or practices on which any such decision is based.
256 
Cases 1 and 2 are both modeled on Supreme Court decisions 
that upheld jurisdiction-stripping legislation—albeit with a signifi-
cant caveat in Case 1, which I shall address shortly. Case 3 is also 
based on a Supreme Court precedent that sustained a federal stat-
ute against constitutional challenge, though the actual case may, or 
may not, be distinguishable. By contrast, Case 4 is essentially 
Boumediene v. Bush, in which the Court found a jurisdiction-
stripping statute unconstitutional. Cases 5 through 7 are hypotheti-
cal. As I shall explain, the imaginary legislation involved in Cases 5 
through 7 should be deemed unconstitutional, although I cannot 
point to any directly on-point authority supporting this conclusion. 
A. Sources of Limits on Congressional Power 
As my preliminary survey of real and hypothetical cases may 
suggest, assessing Congress’s power to create situations in which no 
court has jurisdiction to rule on constitutional claims requires prob-
ing matters of daunting complexity. Analysis appropriately begins 
with potential sources of congressional power to divest state courts, 
as well as federal courts, of jurisdiction. The most clearly constitu-
tional divestitures of state court jurisdiction involve cases in which 
Congress wishes either to (a) establish exclusive federal jurisdic-
tion in order to promote interests in the accurate and uniform de-
termination of federal issues
257 or (b) prevent state court interfer-
ence with federal functions.
258 Case 2, in which Congress bars both 
state and federal courts from enjoining the collection of federal 
taxes, and thereby forces taxpayers to litigate the constitutionality 
of tax assessments only after paying them, furnishes a doctrinally 
256 Cf. United States v. Erika, Inc., 456 U.S. 201, 211 n.14 (1982) (declining to enter-
tain a constitutional challenge to the preclusion of all review of certain claims under 
the Medicare statute on the ground that they had not been raised properly under ap-
plicable Supreme Court rules). 
257 See Fallon et al., Hart & Wechsler, supra note 11, at 392 (“Arguments in favor of 
exclusive federal jurisdiction frequently invoke the desirability of uniform interpreta-
tion of federal law.”). 
258 See id. at 397 (“Congress has provided since 1815 for the removal of state actions 
or prosecutions against federal officials likely to encounter sectional or state hostil-
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supported example of a divestiture of state court jurisdiction that 
serves legitimate federal interests.
259 
By contrast, if Congress tried simultaneously to withdraw federal 
and state jurisdiction to entertain challenges to the constitutional-
ity of state laws or actions, such as prayer in state public schools in 
Case 5, its authority to strip state court jurisdiction would be diffi-
cult to justify under any constitutional conferral of congressional 
power. Precluding a state court from enforcing the Constitution 
against state officials, in the absence of provision for federal court 
enforcement, would not be in service of any Article I power, nor 
would it be necessary and proper to the exercise of any federal 
governmental function. 
Many of the considerations that could potentially bar Congress 
from stripping the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts—as dis-
cussed in Section II.A above—would also prohibit Congress from 
precluding both federal and state court jurisdiction. To take an un-
questionable example, Congress could not forbid all courts to exer-
cise jurisdiction of suits brought by African-Americans or by 
women. An attempt to do so would violate the equal protection 
component of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. Simi-
larly, if Part II was correct that Congress’s motive should matter to 
the validity of jurisdiction-stripping legislation, then any elimina-
tion of all courts’ jurisdiction for the purpose of inviting non-
judicial officials to violate constitutional norms should fail as a pro-
hibited means to a forbidden end.
260 In my judgment, the hypo-
thetical statutes imagined in Cases 5 and 6 would be invalid under 
this analysis. 
Although multiple factors thus figure in the constitutional analy-
sis of congressional power simultaneously to divest federal and 
state jurisdiction, a consideration of recurring, frequently control-
ling significance involves Congress’s power to prescribe or forbid 
the award of particular remedies, such as injunctions in Case 2. The 
259 See Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U.S. 589, 595–97 (1931); Snyder v. Marks, 109 
U.S. 189, 193–94 (1883). 
260 As Part II also emphasized, however, the identification of prohibited motives can 
be tricky. I thus assume that Congress might preclude some remedies, such as injunc-
tions against tax collection in Case 2, not because it wants to invite unconstitutional 
conduct by non-judicial officials, but to further important government interests such 
as those in the efficient administration of important government policies. FALLON_PRE_PP  8/19/2010 12:28 PM 
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Constitution makes express provision for just two remedies: habeas 
corpus in some cases of bodily detention and just compensation in 
takings cases.
261 Otherwise, the Founding generation relied on, but 
did not expressly mandate, a rich tapestry of common law and eq-
uitable remedies to enforce constitutional norms.
262 Against this 
background, the conventional wisdom holds that “Congress neces-
sarily has a wide choice in the selection of remedies, and . . . a com-
plaint about [the withdrawal of any particular remedy] can rarely 
be of constitutional dimension.”
263 
The recurring significance of Congress’s power over remedies in 
gauging Congress’s power over jurisdiction arises from a conjunc-
tion of two considerations. First, jurisdiction to decide constitu-
tional cases would prove meaningless without judicial power to 
award remedies.
264 Accordingly, where Congress has the power to 
forbid all remedies, it will typically also have the authority to with-
hold jurisdiction to adjudicate claims on the merits. Conversely, in 
cases in which the Constitution mandates the availability of a rem-
edy—as, for example, the Suspension Clause guaranteed access to 
the writ of habeas corpus in Boumediene—then Congress cannot 
validly withdraw all judicial jurisdiction to award relief that the 
Constitution requires. 
Second, and more subtly, the form in which constitutional dis-
putes present themselves for judicial resolution is much more often 
a function of convention or of statutory law than of constitutional 
mandate. For example, a dispute about the constitutional validity 
of a tax assessment—as contemplated in Cases 2 and 3—could po-
tentially come before a court in a suit for a pre-enforcement injunc-
tion, in a post-collection action against the United States (if it 
waived its sovereign immunity), in a post-collection action for 
damages against government officials who coercively extracted 
payment, or as a defense against a criminal prosecution for non-
payment. By withholding one or another remedy, such as injunc-
261 See Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and 
Constitutional Remedies, 104 Harv. L. Rev. 1731, 1779 n.244 (1991). 
262 See id. at 1779. 
263 Hart, supra note 15, at 1366. 
264 Indeed, for a federal court to pronounce on constitutional issues in a context in 
which it was evident from the outset that it could not order a remedy would violate 
the Article III prohibition against advisory opinions. See generally Fallon et al., Hart 
& Wechsler, supra note 11, at 52–58 (discussing advisory opinions). FALLON_PRE_PP  8/19/2010 12:28 PM 
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tions in Case 2, Congress may not so much preclude the courts 
from entertaining constitutional issues—such as the issue of a tax’s 
validity—as shape the form in which a dispute becomes judicially 
cognizable. In other words, Congress’s power over remedies is of-
ten a power to determine when and how a constitutional dispute 
becomes ripe for judicial resolution.
265 The most problematic ques-
tions concerning congressional power thus tend to arise when Con-
gress attempts to preclude the courts from adjudicating a constitu-
tional dispute in any form whatsoever, thereby eliminating judicial 
power to “say ‘what the law is’”
266 and leaving the victims of consti-
tutional violations with no remedies whatsoever. 
B. Remedies and “the Battaglia Principle” 
Although factors unrelated to remedies sometimes bar Congress 
from precluding all courts from exercising jurisdiction over consti-
tutional claims, the linkage between power over remedies and 
power over jurisdiction is sufficiently illuminating that it may be 
useful to explain how a remedy-based analysis is both consistent 
with and helps to make sense of Battaglia v. General Motors 
Corp.,
267 the Second Circuit decision on which Case 1 is based.
268 Al-
though the Battaglia court did not explicitly frame its analysis in 
remedy-based terms, other familiar interpretations would generate 
untenable conclusions. By contrast, a focus on the relationship be-
tween power over remedies and power to strip jurisdiction is at 
least consonant with the Second Circuit’s opinion and illuminates 
why the case was rightly decided. A remedy-based analysis will also 
265 See Fallon, supra note 203, at 962 (noting broad congressional power under the 
“public rights” doctrine to determine when and against whom a constitutional “case” 
arises); James E. Pfander, Article I Tribunals, Article III Courts, and the Judicial 
Power of the United States, 118 Harv. L. Rev. 643, 737 (2004) (interpreting dicta as-
serting congressional power to deny jurisdiction over suits against the government 
and its officers as “concerning the power of Congress to regulate the timing of judicial 
review in ways that permissibly advance the proprietary interests of the govern-
ment”). 
266 Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2259 (2008) (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 
5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)). 
267 169 F.2d 254 (2d Cir. 1948). 
268 The Hart & Wechsler case book treats Battaglia as the leading case on congres-
sional power to bar the exercise of jurisdiction over constitutional claims by any court. 
Fallon et al., Hart & Wechsler, supra note 11, at 305. FALLON_PRE_PP  8/19/2010 12:28 PM 
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point the way to correct decisions of most of the other cases 
sketched above. 
1. Battaglia v. General Motors Corp. 
Battaglia involved the constitutionality of the Portal-to-Portal 
Act, all pertinent details of which were included in Case 1. Sections 
2(a) and 2(b) substantively eliminated employers’ liability under 
the court decisions that Congress sought retroactively to overrule. 
Section 2(d) withdrew both federal and state court jurisdiction to 
enforce the liabilities that Sections 2(a) and 2(b) abolished. 
A few district court decisions held that Section 2(d) deprived the 
courts of jurisdiction to inquire into whether Sections 2(a) and 2(b) 
violated the Due Process Clause or Takings Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment.
269 But the Second Circuit, in Battaglia, reasoned that 
the questions of whether the Portal-to-Portal Act validly stripped 
the courts of jurisdiction and whether it violated the Fifth 
Amendment were inextricably linked: 
[W]hile Congress has the undoubted power to give, withhold, 
and restrict the jurisdiction of courts other than the Supreme 
Court, it must not so exercise that power as to deprive any per-
son of life, liberty, or property without due process of law or to 
take private property without just compensation.  .  .  . Thus, re-
gardless of whether subdivision (d) of section 2 had an independ-
ent end in itself, if one of its effects would be to deprive the ap-
pellants of property without due process or just compensation, it 
would be invalid.
270 
Having so reasoned, the Battaglia court addressed the validity of 
Sections 2(a) and 2(b), which it sustained, before ruling that the ju-
risdictional withdrawal in Section 2(d) was also valid.
271 
2. What Battaglia Forbids and Permits 
In thinking about Battaglia, it would be a mistake to focus on 
what the Second Circuit “said [that] Congress could not do” to the 
269 See Battaglia, 169 F.2d at 257 (citing cases). 
270 Id. 
271 Id. at 261–62. FALLON_PRE_PP  8/19/2010 12:28 PM 
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exclusion of what it said that Congress could do.
272 Although 
Battaglia cites limits on Congress’s power to strip all courts of ju-
risdiction over constitutional claims, the Second Circuit actually 
upheld, rather than invalidated, a withdrawal of jurisdiction over 
cases asserting claims that the Portal-to-Portal Act violated the 
Constitution. 
Battaglia did so, of course, only after ascertaining that the strip-
ping of jurisdiction did not deprive the plaintiffs of constitutional 
rights under the Due Process and Takings Clauses. But what it 
means to say that a congressional elimination of jurisdiction would 
violate the Takings or, especially, the Due Process Clause requires 
unpacking. It is superficially attractive to read Battaglia as standing 
for the proposition that Congress cannot preclude the adjudication 
of any valid claim of deprivation of a legal, or at least a constitu-
tional, right.
273 This, however, is a manifestly untenable position—
as is brought out by Case 2, involving a constitutionally permissible 
withdrawal of jurisdiction to entertain suits for injunctions against 
the collection of federal taxes. When Congress can preclude the 
remedy that a plaintiff seeks, as it can in Case 2, it would make no 
sense to maintain that Congress cannot deny all courts jurisdiction 
to entertain suits in which plaintiffs seek that remedy alone. 
A further difficulty with reading Battaglia as barring withdrawals 
of all judicial jurisdiction to entertain valid constitutional claims is 
that it is impossible to distinguish valid from invalid claims prior to 
adjudication. Yet if Congress could not preclude the exercise of ju-
risdiction to decide any constitutional claims on the merits, the 
conclusion would follow that the Second Circuit actually decided 
Battaglia wrongly, not rightly, in a small but significant respect. The 
Second Circuit should have invalidated, rather than upheld, the 
Portal-to-Portal Act’s jurisdiction-stripping provision and placed 
its dismissal of Battaglia’s suit on the ground that the plaintiff’s 
claim failed on the merits, not the absence of jurisdiction. 
272 Hart, supra note 15, at 1374–75 (discussing Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 
(1932)). 
273 See, e.g., Redish & Woods, supra note 196, at 93 (“There exists a due process 
right to an independent judicial determination of constitutional rights.”); Vladek, su-
pra note 80, at 2132 (“Battaglia suggested a model for how courts could decide . . . 
cases [involving total strips of judicial jurisdiction]: first reach the question whether 
the underlying legal claim has merit, and only then reach the possible unconstitution-
ality of the foreclosure of jurisdiction.”).  FALLON_PRE_PP  8/19/2010 12:28 PM 
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At first blush, this approach might seem preferable to the one 
that the court actually took. It would offer the apparent advantage 
of conceptually disentangling jurisdictional questions from ques-
tions involving substantive rights to relief. But the appearance that 
these inquiries can be rigidly separated is chimerical. When a plain-
tiff’s federal claim to relief is not “substantial,” federal “arising un-
der” jurisdiction does not lie.
274 
Once it is recognized that Battaglia cannot forbid Congress from 
ever barring jurisdiction over valid claims of constitutional right—
such as those that a taxpayer might be barred from asserting in a 
suit for an injunction in Case 2—a more perspicuous formulation 
of what the Hart & Wechsler casebook characterizes as “the 
Battaglia principle”
275 comes into view: Battaglia squarely holds that 
when Congress can validly extinguish a substantive right, it can also 
strip courts of jurisdiction to enforce the right that it has abolished. 
By extrapolation, when Congress can validly extinguish a right to 
one or more judicial remedies, it can also take away judicial juris-
diction over suits in which plaintiffs seek remedies that Congress 
has permissibly precluded. As in Boumediene, however, a statute 
withdrawing judicial jurisdiction to award a constitutionally neces-
sary remedy constitutes a means to an invalid end and, accordingly, 
is “not an exercise of the acknowledged power to Congress” to de-
fine and limit judicial jurisdiction.
276 To state the principle that best 
explains Battaglia in a sentence, limits on Congress’s power to pre-
clude judicial remedies for constitutional rights violations also 
function as limits on Congress’s power to eliminate the judicial ju-
risdiction that would be necessary for courts to award constitution-
ally necessary remedies. 
C. Constitutionally Necessary Remedies   
Although I have maintained that Congress’s power to bar all ju-
dicial jurisdiction is closely linked to its authority to control reme-
dies, I could not hope, here, to set out a full theory of constitution-
ally necessary remedies. That vast topic would require an article 
274 See Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 681–83 (1946). 
275 See Fallon et al., Hart & Wechsler, supra note 11, at 308. 
276 United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 146 (1872). FALLON_PRE_PP  8/19/2010 12:28 PM 
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(or more likely a book) in itself. Nevertheless, a brief discussion 
will put at least some flesh on the bones of the Battaglia principle. 
As suggested already, consideration of constitutionally necessary 
remedies almost inescapably begins with Professor Hart’s incisive 
observation that complaints about the preclusion of particular 
remedies “can rarely be of constitutional dimension.”
277 To illus-
trate that the Constitution seldom dictates the availability of one 
particular remedy, Hart used the example of a taxpayer who ob-
jects on constitutional grounds to an assessment of tax liability.
278 
Even when the taxpayer’s objection is constitutionally meritorious, 
Congress can, as in Case 2, preclude the courts from awarding in-
junctive relief.
279 Then, after the taxpayer has tendered payment, 
sovereign immunity—which generally bars unconsented suits 
against the sovereign, though not usually properly pleaded actions 
against governmental officials
280—will complicate any argument 
that the taxpayer has a right to recover from the state or federal 
treasury.
281 In accepting that sovereign immunity might bar a suit to 
recover taxes paid under duress, Hart pointed to an early constitu-
tional practice in which taxpayers who had been coercively com-
pelled to pay their taxes could sue the tax collector, rather than the 
government.
282 If this avenue to raise a constitutional claim re-
mained open, then Hart thought preclusion of suits against the 
sovereign constitutionally acceptable, as history has understood it 
to be.
283 
In Hart’s view, the hard constitutional question was whether, as 
in Case 3, Congress could not only preclude injunctions against the 
collection of taxes, but also bar all suits to recover coercively col-
lected taxes either from the government or from the tax collector. 
The case most nearly on point, he thought, was Cary v. Curtis,
284 in 
277 Hart, supra note 15, at 1366. 
278 Id. at 1367–70. 
279 Id. at 1369. 
280 See Fallon et al., Hart & Wechsler, supra note 11, at 845 (“[I]t was historically 
taken for granted that sovereign immunity did not always or perhaps even typically 
bar suits against governmental officers.”). 
281 See id. at 312–13. 
282 Hart, supra note 15, at 1367–68 (discussing Cary v. Curtis, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 236 
(1845)). 
283 See id. at 1369. 
284 44 U.S. (3 How.) 236 (1845). FALLON_PRE_PP  8/19/2010 12:28 PM 
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which sovereign immunity barred suit against the government and 
Congress by statute had forbidden actions against the tax collector. 
In Cary, the Supreme Court justified its refusal to find a constitu-
tional violation partly on speculation that other remedies remained 
available.
285 “Personally, I think [a taxpayer] has” a right to litigate 
the legality of a tax, “[b]ut I can’t cite any really square decision,” 
Hart concluded.
286 “The multiplicity of remedies, and the fact that 
Congress has seldom if ever tried to take them all away, has pre-
vented the issue from ever being squarely presented.”
287 
In intimating that the Constitution might mandate that every vic-
tim of a constitutional violation must have some effectual remedy, 
Hart might have appealed to the memorable dictum of Marbury v. 
Madison that for every legal right, there must be a legal remedy.
288 
Yet Marbury’s statement on this point reflects an aspiration, not an 
enforceable rule of constitutional law.
289 I have already alluded to 
the doctrine of sovereign immunity, which typically bars suits 
against the government without the government’s consent. Then, 
when aggrieved parties try to elude the sovereign immunity bar by 
suing government officers, “official immunity” doctrines frequently 
preclude relief, especially the recovery of damages.
290 As a result of 
the conjunction of sovereign and official immunity, situations rou-
tinely arise in which victims of constitutional violations may have 
no individually effective remedy.
291 
285 Id. at 250 (“The claimant had his option to refuse payment  .  .  .  [and] was not 
without other modes of redress, had he chosen to adopt them.”). 
286 Hart, supra note 15, at 1369. 
287 Id. 
288 5 U.S. 137, 163 (1803). Chief Justice Marshall wrote: 
The very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual 
to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he receives an injury. . . .  
 
The government of the United States has been emphatically termed a govern-
ment of laws, and not of men. It will certainly cease to deserve this high appella-
tion, if the laws furnish no remedy for the violation of a vested legal right. 
Id. 
289 See Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 261, at 1778–79. 
290 On official immunity doctrine, see generally Fallon et al., Hart & Wechsler, supra 
note 11, at 986–1011. Such doctrines seldom if ever preclude the issuance of injunc-
tions against officials performing executive functions, other than the President of the 
United States. See id. at 1009–11. 
291 See Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 261, at 1779–86. FALLON_PRE_PP  8/19/2010 12:28 PM 
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Daniel Meltzer and I have tried to make sense of the conjunc-
tion of immunity doctrines with cases echoing Marbury v. Madi-
son’s dictum that for every right there must be a remedy by postu-
lating that two principles underlie the law of constitutional 
remedies.
292 The first, which represents the aspiration of individual 
redress for official wrongs, establishes a presumption that the Con-
stitution requires some form of individually effective relief in all 
cases.
293 But this principle is not absolute and will sometimes yield 
to interests in efficient government administration, such as those 
that immunity doctrines protect. The second principle, reflecting 
separation-of-powers values and an ideal of the rule of law, looks 
to systemic needs for constitutional remedies.
294 It holds that even 
when individually effective relief is not available for every violation 
of constitutional rights, there must be a sufficient scheme of avail-
able remedies to ensure that constitutional rights do not become 
nullities and that government officials remain answerable as a sys-
temic matter to the demands of law.
295 
These two principles accommodate the phenomenon of the sub-
stitutability of remedies that Professor Hart emphasized. They also 
explain why, despite gaps in the availability of individually effec-
tive remedies, congressional attempts to preclude all possible 
remedies for the systematic or ongoing violation of constitutional 
rights—as in several of the hypothetical cases that introduced this 
Part—should be deemed intolerable. It would be incompatible with 
the Constitution’s evident aspiration to establish a government 
subject to the rule of law for Congress to be able to license ongoing 
lawbreaking through the device of a jurisdictional withdrawal. Be-
cause of the flexibility of the two principles that I have argued un-
derlie the law of constitutional remedies, those principles will not 
point directly to a determinate result in every case. Nevertheless, 
they rationalize a number of superficially contradictory doctrines 
and provide a framework for assessing the constitutional necessity 
292 See id. at 1787–91. 
293 See id. at 1789 (“[T]he aspiration to effective individual remediation for every 
constitutional violation represents an important remedial principle, but not an un-
qualified command.”). 
294 See id. at 1790. 
295 See id. at 1789 (“What would be intolerable is a regime of public administration 
that was systematically unanswerable to the restraints of law.”). FALLON_PRE_PP  8/19/2010 12:28 PM 
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of particular remedies under particular circumstances. As Boume-
diene teaches and as Professor Hart averred, some remedies are 
constitutionally necessary in the absence of a constitutionally ade-
quate substitute. Under modern constitutional doctrine, moreover, 
the constitutional necessity of any particular remedy should be re-
garded as a function not only of the availability or unavailability of 
other remedies, but also of the particular constitutional provision 
under which a party seeks relief. 
1. Nullification of Constitutionally Invalid Laws 
Under Marbury v. Madison, a constitutionally invalid law is not 
law at all. A statute that purported to require judicial enforcement 
of constitutionally defective laws—for example, by vesting courts 
with criminal enforcement responsibility but depriving them of ju-
risdiction to inquire into the validity of the laws that they were 
charged to enforce—would itself be constitutionally invalid.
296 A 
court should, and under Marbury must, ignore or nullify it. 
Difficult jurisdiction-stripping issues have arisen when Congress 
has directed one court to enforce a statute and assigned to another 
the responsibility for determining the statute’s validity, and has 
precluded the enforcement court from assessing the constitutional-
ity of the statute that Congress charged it with enforcing.
297 Al-
though I cannot pause to probe the issues that such arrangements 
pose under Article III and the Due Process Clause, the essential 
point for current purposes is that nullification of an invalid statute 
or regulation is a constitutionally necessary remedy that some 
court must have jurisdiction to provide to any party against whom 
the statute or regulation would otherwise be judicially enforced.
298 
296 See Hart, supra note 15, at 1373. 
297 See Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 443–48 (1944); cf. United States v. 
Mendoza-Lopez, 481 U.S. 828, 838–39 (1987) (holding that a court could not predi-
cate criminal liability on a prior administrative determination where there had not 
been a meaningful opportunity for judicial review of the administrative rule). 
298 See Hart, supra note 15, at 1378–79. Professor Monaghan has dubbed the rule 
that a court cannot be required to enforce a constitutionally invalid rule the “valid 
rule requirement.” Henry P. Monaghan, Harmless Error and the Valid Rule Re-
quirement, 1989 Sup. Ct. Rev. 195 (1989); Henry P. Monaghan, Overbreadth, 1981 
Sup. Ct. Rev. 1, 4–14; cf. John Harrison, Jurisdiction and Remedies: Congressional 
Power and Constitutional Remedies, 86 Geo. L.J. 2513, 2521–23 (1998) (arguing that FALLON_PRE_PP  8/19/2010 12:28 PM 
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2. Habeas Corpus 
Boumediene v. Bush holds that the Suspension Clause makes ei-
ther habeas corpus or an effectual substitute a constitutionally nec-
essary remedy for anyone who would have had access to the writ in 
1789—and possibly to some others as well.
299 
3. Post-Deprivation Monetary Remedies for Coercive Deprivations 
of Property and Liberty 
As noted above, it not infrequently happens that following the 
deprivation of a constitutional right, sovereign immunity will bar a 
damages remedy against the government, while official immunity 
will preclude relief against the official through whom the govern-
ment acted. In some circumstances, however, the Supreme Court 
has held that the Constitution mandates post-deprivation monetary 
remedies for past constitutional violations if pre-deprivation reme-
dies were not available. A leading case is Reich v. Collins, which 
initially appeared to hold that the Due Process Clause mandates 
post-deprivation monetary remedies for the coercive collection of 
unconstitutional taxes, state sovereign immunity notwithstanding.
300 
Five years later, in an opinion expanding the reach of sovereign 
nullification by an enforcement court is the only constitutionally necessary remedy for 
constitutional violations). 
299 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2248 (2008) (noting that “‘at the absolute minimum’ the [Suspen-
sion] Clause protects the writ as it existed when the Constitution was drafted and rati-
fied” (quoting INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001))). Absent a suspension of the 
writ, the status of habeas corpus as a constitutionally necessary remedy, when joined 
with the Marbury principle that a constitutionally invalid assertion of authority is not 
law at all, refutes the suggestion of Eugene Kontorovich, Liability Rules for Constitu-
tional Rights: The Case of Mass Detentions, 56 Stan. L. Rev. 755, 813–32 (2004), that 
the constitutional rights that would be violated by mass detentions could be treated as 
“liability rules,” which mandate post-deprivation compensation, rather than as “prop-
erty rules,” which presumptively authorize injunctive relief. On a petition for habeas 
corpus, the detaining officer must show legal justification for a detention, and if the 
purported justification is not a legally valid one, then the court must issue the writ. 
300 513 U.S. 106, 111–14 (1994). To largely the same effect are a series of pre-Reich 
cases holding that state courts could not invoke non-retroactivity principles to deny 
refunds of tax payments exacted under laws subsequently held to be unconstitutional. 
See Harper v. Va. Dep’t of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 100 (1993); James B. Beam Distill-
ing Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 544 (1991); Am. Trucking Ass’ns v. Smith, 496 U.S. 
167, 188 (1990). FALLON_PRE_PP  8/19/2010 12:28 PM 
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immunity,
301 the Court recharacterized Reich as having mandated a 
post-deprivation remedy only because state law had promised 
one.
302 But even when Reich is limited in this way, it stands for the 
proposition that sometimes the Due Process Clause requires post-
deprivation monetary remedies for the coercive collection of un-
constitutional taxes. 
Dictum in First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glen-
dale v. County of Los Angeles also describes just compensation as a 
constitutionally mandated remedy for the taking of private prop-
erty for public use.
303 A subsequent opinion treats as unsettled the 
question of whether sovereign immunity might modify the Just 
Compensation Clause’s dictate.
304 But in cases involving cities and 
counties, which may possess the power of eminent domain but do 
not enjoy sovereign immunity, the Just Compensation Clause es-
tablishes a constitutionally necessary post-deprivation remedy. 
Although the Supreme Court has thus held that both the Due 
Process Clause and the Just Compensation Clause sometimes 
mandate monetary remedies, it has seldom if ever suggested that 
other constitutional guarantees have the same effect, even when 
suits for pre-deprivation remedies—such as injunctions—would 
have proven impossible to bring. In 1971, in Bivens v. Six Unknown 
Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics,
305 the Court rec-
ognized a non-statutory federal cause of action for damages against 
federal officials who violated the Fourth Amendment.
306 It did not, 
however, describe the right to sue as constitutionally mandated. In 
subsequent cases, the Court has increasingly treated Bivens actions 
seeking damages from federal officials who violated other constitu-
tional provisions as “disfavored”
307 and has said that it is reluctant 
to “extend Bivens liability ‘to any new context or new category of 
301 Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 712 (1999) (holding that a state may invoke sover-
eign immunity to preclude non-consented suits against it by private parties for viola-
tions of federal law in state as well as federal court). 
302 See id. at 740. 
303 482 U.S. 304, 314–16 (1987). 
304 See City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 714 
(1999). 
305 403 U.S. 388, 397 (1971). 
306 Although 42 U.S.C. § 1983 creates a cause of action against state officials who 
violate federal constitutional rights, there is no comparable statutory provision creat-
ing a cause of action against federal officials who violate the Constitution. 
307 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1948 (2009). FALLON_PRE_PP  8/19/2010 12:28 PM 
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defendants.’”
308 Even where Bivens actions do lie, the Supreme 
Court has consistently held that defendant officials possess either 
absolute or qualified immunity from suits for damages.
309 
4. Injunctive or Similarly Effective Relief Against Ongoing 
Deprivations of Constitutional Rights That Would Not Be 
Adequately Compensable by Damages 
The conventional wisdom cites Ex parte Young
310 as having ruled 
that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment some-
times mandates the availability of an injunctive remedy for parties 
wishing to challenge a constitutionally invalid state criminal stat-
ute.
311 “[T]o impose upon a party . . . the burden of obtaining a ju-
dicial decision . . . only upon the condition that if unsuccessful he 
must suffer imprisonment and pay fines . . . is, in effect, to close up 
all approaches to the courts  .  .  .  and [is] therefore invalid,” the 
Court said.
312 The conventional wisdom similarly views Young as a 
generative source of authority for the proposition that constitu-
tional provisions such as the Fourteenth Amendment “provide[] a 
cause of action” for injunctive relief against government officials
313 
when the requisites for equitable relief are met.
314 
In a recent revisionist article, John Harrison maintains that the 
claim to relief in Ex parte Young “did not rest on a novel cause of 
action derived from the Fourteenth Amendment,” but instead in-
voked “general” or common law principles authorizing suits to en-
join prosecutions on the basis of valid legal defenses.
315 With the is-
sue thus framed, the question of the historically understood or 
intended meaning of Ex parte Young seems to me to be as difficult 
as many questions involving the original understanding of constitu-
tional language. Harrison appears correct that federal equity prin-
308 Id. (quoting Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 68 (2001)). 
309 See, e.g., Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 806 (1982). 
310 209 U.S. 123 (1908). 
311 See Fallon et al., Hart & Wechsler, supra note 11, at 891. 
312 Young, 209 U.S. at 148. 
313  Fallon et al., Hart & Wechsler, supra note 11, at 891. 
314 The requisites for injunctive relief also include an equitable calculus involving the 
balance of public and private interests. See, e.g., United States v. Oakland Cannabis 
Buyers’ Coop., 532 U.S. 483, 496–97 (2001); Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 
305, 312–13 (1982). 
315 John Harrison, Ex parte Young, 60 Stan. L. Rev. 989, 990 (2008). FALLON_PRE_PP  8/19/2010 12:28 PM 
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ciples sometimes permitted anti-suit injunctions.
316 At the same 
time, some of Young’s language at least intimates the existence of a 
constitutional right to injunctive relief, without which no one might 
have risked challenging an unconstitutional criminal statute.
317 
Moreover, even if Professor Harrison were right about Ex parte 
Young, subsequent Supreme Court cases have unquestionably rec-
ognized rights to sue for injunctions directly under the Constitu-
tion, without regard to whether such suits could have gone forward 
under traditional equity rules that generally authorized suits for in-
junctions only in cases involving tortious misconduct or threats to 
bring lawsuits. Post-Young doctrine includes cases in which the 
Court has upheld suits to enjoin federal officials’ alleged violations 
of the Establishment and Free Speech Clauses,
318 engagement in 
gender and race discrimination,
319 and failures to provide proce-
dural due process.
320 
The timing of the most currently important post-Young cases 
bears comment. Writing in 1953, Professor Hart asserted that 
plaintiffs rarely if ever have a constitutional right to injunctive re-
lief.
321 But Hart wrote on the eve of a constitutional revolution, of-
ten associated with the 1954 decision in Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion,
322 which reversed long prevailing assumptions and made 
injunctive relief the norm, rather than the exception, in cases seek-
ing to enforce broadly shared rights the value of which would be 
hard to quantify.
323 
316 See id. at 998–1000. Although Professor Harrison cites a number of treatises sup-
porting his claim on this point, he does not identify any square rulings by the Supreme 
Court prior to Ex parte Young that actually upheld an anti-suit injunction. 
317 See supra note 312 and accompanying text. 
318 See, e.g., United States v. Nat’l Treasury Employees Union, 513 U.S. 454, 457, 
480 (1995) (upholding injunctive relief to protect government employees’ First 
Amendment rights); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 103 (1968) (upholding plaintiffs’ 
standing to sue to enjoin an alleged Establishment Clause violation). 
319 See, e.g., Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 653 (1975) (gender discrimina-
tion); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954) (race discrimination). 
320 See, e.g., United States Dep’t of Agric. v. Murry, 413 U.S 508, 514 (1973). 
321 See Hart, supra note 15, at 1366. 
322 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
323 See Fallon et al., Hart & Wechsler, supra note 11, at 724; Kontorovich, supra note 
299, at 818–20 (discussing “the obscure origins” of the “injunctive essentialis[t]” as-
sumption that injunctions are the normal and mandatory remedy for constitutional 
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None of these cases holds squarely that the Constitution creates 
a right to equitable relief. It is, therefore, arguable that suits for in-
junctions against federal race and gender discrimination and Estab-
lishment Clause violations assert “implied” causes of action, analo-
gous to Bivens suits for damages, that are as constitutionally 
gratuitous as the Court believes Bivens to be. The Court, however, 
has treated suits for injunctions against ongoing constitutional vio-
lations strikingly differently from Bivens actions. In cutting back on 
Bivens, the Court has said that the decision whether to authorize 
damages remedies for constitutional violations is more appropri-
ately made by Congress than the courts and that judges should be 
wary of recognizing “implied” causes of action.
324 By contrast, the 
post-Brown Court, so far as I am aware, has never suggested that 
injunctions against ongoing constitutional violations are constitu-
tionally problematic in the way it now believes Bivens actions to 
be. 
Under these circumstances, the suggestion that Congress could 
eliminate all courts’ jurisdiction to award injunctive as well as 
damages remedies for at least some constitutional violations—such 
as race discrimination in Case 6—strikes me as wholly out of joint 
with the substantive constitutional law of the modern day. The ju-
risdiction-stripping imagined in Case 6 should be judged unconsti-
tutional under cases such as Bolling v. Sharpe
325 and Adarand Con-
structors, Inc. v. Pena,
326 which held that the Due Process Clause 
bars most if not all race discrimination by the federal government. 
To quote Henry Hart, it would be “monstrous illogic . . . [t]o build 
up [Congress’s] mere power to regulate jurisdiction into a power” 
to nullify rights or totally to preclude their enforcement.
327 The sub-
stantive rights recognized in Bolling and Adarand were almost 
surely not anticipated by the Constitution’s Framers and ratifiers, 
but, once those rights are established, they can generate entitle-
ments to remedies. This position will seem radical only if we as-
sume, falsely and selectively, that those who wrote and ratified the 
Constitution made all of the important decisions and that nothing 
remained to be liquidated by practice and precedent. 
324 See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1947–48 (2009). 
325 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954). 
326 515 U.S. 200, 235 (1995). 
327 Hart, supra note 15, at 1371. FALLON_PRE_PP  8/19/2010 12:28 PM 
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5. Remedies for Deprivations of “New Property” 
Beginning in the 1970s, the Supreme Court has said on several 
occasions that congressional preclusion of judicial review of consti-
tutional claims arising from determinations of entitlements to 
benefits, as in Case 7, or from dismissals from federal employment 
would present serious constitutional questions.
328 Justice Scalia has 
derided the constitutional concern.
329 According to him, the doc-
trine of sovereign immunity, among others, demonstrates that 
there can be no right to a judicial remedy in benefits cases.
330 If I 
am correct that rights to judicial review frequently depend on 
rights to judicial remedies, then Justice Scalia frames an apt ques-
tion. But his answer is mistaken, or at least too blunt. 
Substantive constitutional doctrine now establishes unmistaka-
bly that even when the government dispenses constitutionally gra-
tuitous “privileges”—such as education, employment, or welfare—
constitutional guarantees generate rights. To cite just a few exam-
ples,  Brown v. Board of Education
331 and its companion case, 
Bolling v. Sharpe,
332 recognized rights to nondiscrimination in the 
distribution of educational opportunities. Numerous cases hold 
that the First Amendment confers rights on public employees not 
to be dismissed from constitutionally gratuitous jobs on constitu-
tionally forbidden grounds.
333 Welfare programs can create prop-
erty interests that in turn generate rights to fair administrative pro-
cedures under the Due Process Clause.
334 
For so long as the doctrine of sovereign immunity remains rela-
tively robust, Justice Scalia seems correct that Congress could val-
idly preclude direct suits against the government in cases arising 
from the administration of education, employment, and welfare 
programs. (I shall return to issues arising from the withdrawal of 
jurisdiction to order compensatory payments out of the state and 
328 See, e.g., Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 603 (1988); Bowen v. Mich. Acad. of 
Family Physicians, 476 U.S. 667, 681 n.12 (1986); Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 
366–67 (1974). 
329 See Webster, 486 U.S. at 611–12 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
330 See id. at 611–14. 
331 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954). 
332 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954). 
333 E.g., Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 565 (1968). 
334 E.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 261 (1970). FALLON_PRE_PP  8/19/2010 12:28 PM 
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federal treasuries below.) The doctrine of sovereign immunity, 
however, is only one aspect of a complex doctrinal mosaic. Consti-
tutional rights run against governmental officials, who cannot claim 
sovereign immunity, as well as against the government itself.
335 
Moreover, as discussed above, substantive constitutional doctrines 
sometimes give rise to rights to remedies, which can be remedies 
against government officials rather than the government. Recog-
nizing that substantive rights sometimes entail rights to remedies, I 
find it simply unimaginable that Congress, if it so chose, could si-
multaneously preclude both state and federal courts from exercis-
ing jurisdiction over all constitutional claims to all forms of relief 
arising out of constitutionally gratuitous programs, including, for 
example, challenges to race- or gender-based discrimination and to 
First Amendment violations by government employers. As Justice 
Brandeis pungently put it, sometimes “the constitutional require-
ment of due process is a requirement of judicial process.”
336 When a 
right to judicial process exists, congressional action precluding all 
access to such process would violate the Due Process Clause. 
Eliding complex questions about the substitutability of remedies, 
my principal point is a general one. Issues involving substantive 
constitutional rights, rights to judicial remedies, and congressional 
power over jurisdiction are complexly interrelated. The emergence 
of new constitutional rights in the twentieth and twenty-first centu-
ries may entail new constitutionally necessary remedies to make 
those rights meaningful. And constitutional rights to remedies may, 
in turn, limit congressional power to curb jurisdiction. 
IV. STRIPPING OF JUDICIAL JURISDICTION TO REVIEW AGENCY 
ACTION 
Many leading discussions of Congress’s power to withdraw juris-
diction from the federal courts start and finish with the question of 
whether Congress can leave the state courts as ultimate guarantors 
335 See, e.g., Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 155–56 (1908) (“[I]ndividuals who, as of-
ficers of the State, are clothed with some duty in regard to the enforcement of the 
laws of the State, and who threaten and are about to commence proceedings, either of 
a civil or criminal nature, to enforce against parties affected an unconstitutional act, 
violating the Federal Constitution, may be enjoined by a Federal court of equity from 
such action.”). 
336 Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 87 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). FALLON_PRE_PP  8/19/2010 12:28 PM 
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of constitutional rights.
337 This perspective ignores the realities of 
federal adjudication in the modern world. Today, non-Article III 
judges in administrative agencies and legislative courts vastly out-
number Article III judges and collectively adjudicate far more 
cases.
338 Accordingly, the topic of Congress’s power to substitute 
non-Article III federal adjudicators for Article III courts and to 
preclude judicial review of the non-Article III tribunals’ decisions 
holds great importance.
339 
In the context of congressional employment of non-Article III 
federal tribunals, the term “jurisdiction-stripping” can refer to one 
or both of two overlapping sets of issues. The first set involves the 
permissibility of Congress’s depriving the Article III courts of 
original jurisdiction by assigning cases to legislative courts or ad-
ministrative agencies. The second, closely related set involves 
whether Congress, after having employed a non-Article III tribunal 
to resolve a dispute in the first instance, can then preclude judicial 
review of that tribunal’s action. 
As Louis Jaffe observed, judicial review of administrative action 
is a “necessary condition” for the political legitimacy of the mod-
ern administrative state.
340 Accordingly, Congress has made judicial 
review the norm.
341 Applicable statutes typically contemplate: (a) 
337 See, e.g., Amar, Neo-Federalist View, supra note 16, at 212–16; Gunther, supra 
note 4, at 914–16. 
338 See generally Fallon et al., Hart & Wechsler, supra note 11, at 36–47 (collecting 
data on non-Article III and on Article III judges and dockets). In perhaps the most 
striking indication of the current practical significance of adjudication by non-Article 
III federal tribunals, “the Social Security Administration alone conducts roughly 
650,000 hearings per year—a caseload larger than the civil docket of all Article III 
courts combined.” Id. at 39. 
339 See, e.g., Judith Resnik, Rereading “The Federal Courts”: Revising the Domain 
of Federal Courts Jurisprudence at the End of the Twentieth Century, 47 Vand. L. 
Rev. 1021, 1027–31 (1994). 
340 Louis Jaffe, Judicial Control of Administrative Action 320 (1965) (noting that ju-
dicial review is a “necessary condition, psychologically if not logically, of a system of 
administrative power which purports to be legitimate, or legally valid”). 
341 See Richard J. Pierce, Jr. et al., Administrative Law and Process 133 (4th ed. 
2004) (“Congress has expressly provided a statutory right to judicial review of most 
agency actions, either by including such a right in the organic act that authorizes the 
agency to take the challenged action or by making the agency’s action subject to the 
judicial review provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act.”); see also Bowen v. 
Mich. Acad. of Family Physicians, 476 U.S. 667, 670 (1986) (“We begin with the 
strong presumption that Congress intends judicial review of administrative action.”). 
Many statutes specifically authorize judicial review of administrative action at the be-FALLON_PRE_PP  8/19/2010 12:28 PM 
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de novo judicial review of agency determinations of constitutional 
questions; (b) judicial review of agency determinations of law, sub-
ject to the prescriptions of judicial deference to agency interpreta-
tions outlined in such cases as Chevron USA, Inc. v. National Re-
sources Defense Council, Inc.
342; and (c) highly deferential judicial 
review of agency determinations of fact.
343 Against this background, 
any further circumscription of judicial review could be regarded as 
jurisdiction-stripping. 
Congress has not so regularly provided for the Article III courts 
to review the decisions of so-called “legislative courts”—non-
Article III tribunals denominated as “courts,” including the local 
courts for various territories and the District of Columbia.
344 Never-
theless, questions about the permissible use of such tribunals to de-
cide cases within the constitutionally authorized jurisdiction of the 
Article III courts could easily fall under the topic of jurisdiction-
stripping, too. 
A. The Scope of the Inquiry 
In an article written more than twenty years ago, I advocated re-
solving constitutional issues arising from congressional assignment 
of cases to non-Article III tribunals under an “appellate review 
theory.”
345 According to appellate review theory, Congress could 
employ non-Article III tribunals to adjudicate cases that the Arti-
cle III courts otherwise could have decided if, but only if, it pro-
vided for sufficiently searching review in an Article III court.
346 The 
earlier article supported appellate review theory on the grounds 
that it was consistent with the language of Article III, derived 
hest of aggrieved private parties. The Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–
59, 701–06 (2006), which Congress enacted in 1946, provides a more general authori-
zation, albeit one subject to some exceptions. These include exceptions for cases in 
which “statutes preclude judicial review,” id. § 701(a)(1), and “agency action is com-
mitted to agency discretion by law,” id. § 701(a)(2). 
342 467 U.S. 837, 838, 844 (1984). 
343 See generally Pierce et al., supra note 341, at 119–26 (describing how courts “typi-
cally review three aspects of agency decisions—conclusions of law, findings of fact, 
and procedures used in the decision-making process”). 
344 See Fallon et al., Hart & Wechsler, supra note 11, at 36–39 (surveying legislative 
courts). 
345 Fallon, supra note 203, at 917. 
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strong support from precedent and policy concerns, and accorded 
with the animating purposes of Article III and the separation of 
powers, even if it did not exactly match the Founding generation’s 
specific expectations of how Article III would apply.
347 
The central ambition of appellate review theory still seems to me 
to be correct. Although it is too late to insist that the Constitution 
forbids a variety of forms of adjudication by non-Article III tribu-
nals—centrally including military courts or commissions, territorial 
courts, and administrative agencies—the assignment of judicial 
power to federal tribunals that lack Article III safeguards of judi-
cial independence can threaten individual rights and the separation 
of powers. Appellate review helps to protect constitutional values 
without quixotically demanding eradication of the administrative 
state. Boumediene v. Bush does not endorse this appellate review 
approach but is consistent with it. The Boumediene Court did not 
question Congress’s entitlement to provide for military commis-
sions to adjudicate enemy combatant status in the first instance, 
but it held that the Constitution mandated habeas corpus review by 
an Article III court.
348 
Despite the continuing attractions of appellate review theory, 
Professor Pfander has persuaded me that if the Supreme Court 
were to embrace appellate review theory today, it would probably 
need both to invalidate more adjudicative structures (due to the 
absence of adequate appellate review) and apply more varied and 
lax standards for gauging adequacy (in order to avoid yet more in-
validations) than I had once anticipated.
349 In addition, in accor-
dance with arguments made already, I now believe that a court im-
plementing appellate review theory should begin with a threshold 
question with which my earlier article had proposed to dispense: 
does Congress have a constitutionally valid purpose for employing 
a non-Article III tribunal in the first instance? Finally, subsequent 
judicial decisions, including Boumediene, make clear that the Su-
preme Court will frame its analysis of some jurisdiction-stripping 
schemes under constitutional provisions other than Article III, 
such as the Suspension Clause and the Seventh Amendment.
350 
347 See id. at 943–49. 
348 Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2262 (2008). 
349 See Pfander, supra note 265, at 749–57, 775. 
350 See Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 51–55 (1989). FALLON_PRE_PP  8/19/2010 12:28 PM 
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Under these circumstances, I shall not attempt here to fit as 
many doctrinal developments as possible into the framework of 
appellate review theory. Nor shall I try to work out how appellate 
review theory might be adjusted, especially through variations in 
the requisite scope of appellate review, to deal with every constitu-
tional issue potentially arising from congressional employment of 
non-Article III federal adjudicators. Instead, I shall focus on the 
most salient jurisdiction-stripping issues stemming from congres-
sional reliance on legislative courts and administrative adjudica-
tion. These involve the determination of an otherwise justiciable 
case or issue by an administrative agency, or by a legislative court 
other than a territorial court, and the total or partial preclusion of 
judicial review of the agency’s or the legislative court’s decision. 
Among the issues that I leave for another day are those generated 
by congressional assignment of disputes to multi-national tribu-
nals,
351 those involving the use of magistrate judges,
352 and those 
presented by territorial courts.
353 
As in Parts II and III, my efforts to define limits on Congress’s 
powers to strip jurisdiction will reflect a multi-factored, construc-
tivist coherence approach. Although I shall not hesitate to offer 
judgments about how the law ought to develop in the future, I as-
sume that central modern doctrines and practices are crucially im-
portant in determining how courts would, and should, respond to 
jurisdiction-stripping initiatives. 
B. Some Varieties of Jurisdiction-Stripping Issues 
Because the only constitutionally authorized function of the Ar-
ticle III courts is to adjudicate cases,
354 Congress cannot “strip” the 
Article III courts of jurisdiction except insofar as it either precludes 
them from deciding cases or, as occurs more commonly, bars them 
351 See generally Fallon et al., Hart & Wechsler, supra note 11, at 367–73 (surveying 
issues presented by United States participation in treaties and conventions that con-
template use of non-Article III international tribunals). 
352 See generally id. at 363–67 (discussing powers of magistrate judges and surround-
ing constitutional questions). 
353 My reason for not discussing territorial courts is that they play a role that is 
partly, though not wholly, analogous to that of state courts. 
354 See, e.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984) (“Article III of the Constitu-
tion confines the federal courts to adjudicating actual ‘cases’ and ‘controversies.’”). FALLON_PRE_PP  8/19/2010 12:28 PM 
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from deciding issues within a case by requiring them to accord def-
erence or preclusive effect to an agency’s judgment. The varieties 
of administrative action are highly diverse. Accordingly, a cata-
logue of jurisdiction-stripping issues must also be diverse. In the 
remainder of this Part, I shall separately consider attempted pre-
clusions of judicial review of agency decisions that: (1) directly au-
thorize criminal punishment or physical detention; (2) determine 
judicially enforceable legal duties; (3) coercively enforce the law 
against private citizens without resulting in ongoing physical deten-
tions; and (4) reject claims of entitlement to governmentally dis-
tributed benefits or opportunities. As should soon become clear, 
analysis of many of these issues builds on, and in some cases re-
peats, now familiar themes. 
1. Agency Actions Authorizing Criminal Punishments or Other 
Bodily Detentions 
a. Criminal Punishments  
It is sometimes said categorically that agencies cannot impose 
the penalty of criminal imprisonment.
355 The leading support for 
this claim comes from Wong Wing v. United States, which held on 
habeas that Congress could not authorize an administrative agency 
to prescribe criminal punishment for a non-citizen.
356 Under the 
Fifth and Sixth Amendments, the Court ruled, “even aliens 
[can]not be held to answer for a capital or other infamous crime, 
unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury, nor be de-
prived of life, liberty or property without due process of law.”
357 
Whether it is categorically true that agencies cannot impose 
criminal punishments may depend on how one classifies military 
tribunals. From the beginning of the republic, courts martial have 
tried members of the American armed forces for alleged service-
connected crimes.
358 In addition, military courts, commissions, or 
tribunals have long had authority to impose criminal sanctions for 
violations of the laws of war.
359 Insofar as the permissibility of juris-
355 See, e.g., Bernard Schwartz, Administrative Law 98–99 (3d ed. 1991). 
356 163 U.S. 228, 229, 237–38 (1896).  
357 Id. at 238. 
358 See Pfander, supra note 265, at 715–17. 
359 See David J. Bederman, Article II Courts, 44 Mercer L. Rev. 825, 834–35 (1993). FALLON_PRE_PP  8/19/2010 12:28 PM 
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diction-stripping legislation is concerned, nothing should hinge on 
whether military tribunals are classified as legislative courts or as 
sub-units in the Defense Department—an administrative agency 
with rulemaking as well as administrative and judicial functions. 
Even when military adjudication is permissible in the first in-
stance, Boumediene v. Bush makes clear, as noted above, that the 
Suspension Clause will often require judicial review via habeas or a 
constitutionally adequate substitute. Although Boumediene in-
volved the habeas rights of petitioners subject to non-criminal de-
tention, its rationale almost inevitably extends to petitioners that 
military tribunals have convicted of violating the laws of war. 
Boumediene’s rationale must seemingly also extend to members of 
the American armed forces who have been convicted of crimes by 
courts martial.
360 If so, legislation purporting to preclude the Article 
III courts from providing such review would violate the Suspension 
Clause. 
Where judicial review of administrative action must exist, a fur-
ther issue involves the constitutionally necessary scope of judicial 
inquiry. This question is too intricate to permit thorough analysis 
here.
361 Under Boumediene, however, the scope of available review 
must be at least as broad as in 1789,
362 with functional considera-
tions apparently also mattering.
363 
360 Apart from habeas, the provisions for judicial review of courts martial are quite 
limited. Following review within the military chain of command, current law provides 
for review by an Article I Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces, see 10 U.S.C. §§ 
941–42 (2006), the decisions of which are reviewable on certiorari by the Supreme 
Court, 28 U.S.C. § 1259 (2006). See generally Note, Military Justice and Article III, 
103 Harv. L. Rev. 1909, 1912–18 (1990) (describing provisions for and history of judi-
cial review of decisions of military courts). Under Boumediene, the requisite scope of 
habeas review may vary with the extent of the procedural safeguards that a military 
tribunal provides. See Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2267–69 (2008). 
361 For a pre-Boumediene analysis of the minimal requisites of habeas review of de-
tentions authorized by military commissions, see Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 30, at 
2095–111. 
362 128 S. Ct. at 2248. 
363 See id. at 2266–71 (noting that “common-law habeas corpus was, above all, an 
adaptable remedy” and surveying a variety of historical and modern authorities in 
discussing the necessary scope of review of decisions by military tribunals). FALLON_PRE_PP  8/19/2010 12:28 PM 
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b. Bodily Detentions  
The Constitution rarely permits non-criminal bodily deten-
tions.
364 Even more rarely will the Constitution permit such deten-
tions without prior judicial authorization. But there are exceptions. 
For example, the Immigration and Naturalization Service fre-
quently detains non-citizens and sometimes coercively removes 
them based on administrative determinations.
365 Additionally, as 
contemplated in Boumediene, Defense Department tribunals can 
make quasi-judicial determinations of whom the government can 
lawfully detain preventively as enemy combatants. 
Even when the Constitution permits bodily detentions based on 
an initial administrative adjudication, Boumediene establishes that 
Congress cannot strip the courts of jurisdiction to inquire into the 
lawfulness of the administrative action in cases subject to the Sus-
pension Clause.
366 Though Boumediene involved the detention of 
suspected enemy combatants under the laws of war, the Court’s 
decision leaves no doubt about the constitutional underpinnings of 
INS v. St. Cyr, which held that a petitioner detained for purposes of 
removal under the immigration laws had a right of access to habeas 
corpus.
367 
2. Agency Action Determining Private Citizens’ Legally 
Enforceable Duties 
Congress sometimes authorizes agency officials, rather than Ar-
ticle III courts, to determine private parties’ legally enforceable du-
ties. Sometimes agencies determine rights and duties through adju-
dicative or quasi-adjudicative applications of law to fact. Other 
times they specify legal obligations through rulemaking. 
364 See Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 30, at 2067. 
365 See Thomas Alexander Aleinikoff et al., Immigration Process and Policy 582–629 
(3d ed. 1995) (describing administrative procedures for removal of aliens). 
366 See Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2269–77 (2008); see also INS v. St. Cyr, 
533 U.S. 289, 308–14 (2001). 
367 533 U.S. at 308–14 (2001). Many questions about the necessary scope of habeas 
review remain unanswered, partly because of historical uncertainties and partly be-
cause Boumediene, in particular, suggested that context matters greatly. See 128 S. Ct. 
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a. Adjudicative Determinations of One Private Party’s Civil 
Liability to Another Private Party  
Crowell v. Benson held that Congress could provide for adminis-
trative adjudication of one private party’s rights against another 
under a federal statute (the Longshoremen and Harbor Workers’ 
Compensation Act) as long as an Article III enforcement court 
conducted a de novo review of the agency’s determinations of law 
and jurisdictional fact.
368 Described differently, Crowell permitted 
Congress to assign initial adjudicative responsibilities to an agency 
and to mandate considerable judicial deference to the agency’s 
factfinding in a civil enforcement proceeding. 
Since Crowell, the Supreme Court has consistently upheld ad-
ministrative adjudication pursuant to what it has termed “the 
agency model,”
369 which applies when agencies adjudicate disputes 
under their governing statutes, subject to appellate review in an 
Article III court. Moreover, subsequent cases have eroded Cro-
well’s specifications concerning the Article III courts’ necessary 
powers in cases of agency adjudication of what the Crowell Court 
called a “private right,” involving “the liability of one individual to 
another under the law as defined.”
370 The category of “jurisdic-
tional fact” now has little significance.
371 Under Chevron and re-
lated doctrines, reviewing courts must frequently accord substan-
tial deference to agencies’ determinations of law.
372 In the domain 
of agency adjudication of private parties’ legally enforceable duties 
to one another under federal law, it is therefore hard to deny that 
current practice and modern doctrine have wandered far from the 
original constitutional understanding,
373 under which “private 
rights” matters were apparently regarded as the exclusive province 
of the courts.
374 
368 285 U.S. 22, 50–65 (1932). 
369 See Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 851–52 (1986). 
370 285 U.S. at 51. 
371 See Fallon et al., Hart & Wechsler, supra note 11, at 334–35. 
372 See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865 
(1984); Pierce et al., supra note 341, at 383–88. 
373 See, e.g., Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 Harv. 
L. Rev. 1231, 1231–36 (1994). 
374 See, e.g., Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 
How.) 272, 284 (1856) (“[W]e do not consider [that] congress can . . . withdraw from FALLON_PRE_PP  8/19/2010 12:28 PM 
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Although it is far too late for courts to apply an exclusively 
originalist approach on a consistent basis, and the agency model 
enjoys entrenched status, the Supreme Court has displayed consid-
erable uncertainty about whether and when Article III will permit 
an agency adjudicating a case under its governing statute to exer-
cise pendent jurisdiction over related state law claims.
375 The Court 
has similarly anguished about the exercise of pendent jurisdiction 
over state law claims by Article I bankruptcy courts.
376 In my view, 
the Court’s anxieties about allowing pendent adjudication of state 
common law claims, subject to review by the Article III courts, 
arise largely from the kind of misplaced and selective Article III 
originalism that I have criticized throughout this Article.
377 
judicial cognizance any matter which, from its nature, is the subject of a suit at the 
common law, or in equity, or admiralty . . . .”). 
375 The central case is Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Schor, 478 U.S. 
833, 857 (1986), which upheld the constitutionality of the exercise of pendent jurisdic-
tion over a state law claim by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, but did 
so only after, first, relying on the parties’ consent to obviate fairness concerns, id. at 
848–50, and second, conducting an elaborate multi-factor analysis to assure itself the 
scheme under review posed no undue threat to separation-of-powers values, id. at 
850–57. The decision left it entirely unclear whether pendent jurisdiction would be 
constitutionally acceptable in the absence of consent. 
376 See Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 50 (1989); N. Pipeline Constr. 
Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 52 (1982). 
377 The best defense of an originalist or quasi-originalist approach of which I know is 
Nelson, Adjudication, supra note 31, which reads Article III through the lens of nine-
teenth-century legal categories. According to Professor Nelson, legal thought and 
doctrine of that era drew a sharp distinction between “private rights” disputes, any 
adjudication of which was an inherently judicial act that Congress could assign only to 
Article III courts, and disputes involving “public rights” and “privileges,” the adjudi-
cation of which could be viewed as “execution” of the law assignable to administrative 
agencies. Id. at 566–72. Although Nelson appears to believe that continued adherence 
to the nineteenth-century framework would be functionally beneficial in categorically 
barring Congress from diminishing judicial protection of “private rights,” see id. at 
609, his formalist quasi-originalism grows selective when he acknowledges that 
“[s]tatutory entitlements” that would historically have fallen in the category of privi-
leges “trigger the modern doctrine of procedural due process” that might sometimes 
require judicial review of administrative action. See id. at 626, 626 n.259. In addition, 
Nelson can rationalize agency adjudication in private rights cases such as Crowell v. 
Benson only by adopting the plain fiction that agency decisionmakers function as “ad-
juncts” to Article III courts rather than as independent adjudicators. See id. at 601–
02. Although Nelson makes an impressive case that residues of nineteenth-century 
legal thought exert a continuing, often unrecognized influence on modern doctrine, 
see id. at 613–24, I fail to understand why that influence should be categorically con-
clusive in some cases, such as those involving pendent agency jurisdiction over state 
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A more sensible approach would begin by recognizing, as the 
Supreme Court did in Boumediene, that the Framers could not 
possibly have foreseen the issue to which modern circumstances 
give rise: does the Constitution permit an administrative agency, 
adjudicating the liability of one private party to another pursuant 
to “the agency model,” to assert pendent jurisdiction over state law 
claims? With the question so framed, it should matter deeply that 
twentieth- and twenty-first-century precedents, beginning with 
Crowell v. Benson, have widely authorized administrative adjudica-
tion, but also have appropriately insisted that there must be func-
tionally sensible limits on Congress’s capacity to rely on adminis-
trative agencies to determine the judicially enforceable civil 
liability of one private party to another. Although the pertinent 
cases are not always consistent in their reasoning,
378 I would extract 
from them three considerations that should guide determinations 
of constitutional permissibility. The first involves the nature and 
force of Congress’s reasons for wanting to confer pendent jurisdic-
tion over state law claims on a non-Article III tribunal otherwise 
operating under the agency model.
379 Typically, but perhaps not al-
ways, Congress will have legitimate reasons, involving efficiency 
and convenience, to provide for the adjudication of federal and re-
lated state law claims in a single proceeding. The second variable 
involves potential non-Article III obstacles to agency adjudication. 
For example, if a state law claim or counterclaim constitutes a “suit 
at common law,” then the Seventh Amendment would guarantee a 
right to trial by jury, not by an agency, absent waiver.
380 The final 
consideration should be whether there is adequate review in an Ar-
ticle III court to protect underlying Article III values. Typically 
and perhaps always, however, appellate review that satisfies Arti-
cle III with respect to federal claims should also satisfy Article III 
with respect to state law claims. Contrary arguments that depend 
378 See Fallon et al., Hart & Wechsler, supra note 11, at 362–63. 
379 See Schor, 478 U.S. at 851. 
380 The question whether an action before an agency is a “suit at common law” sub-
ject to the Seventh Amendment can itself be an intricate one. See Fallon et al., Hart 
& Wechsler, supra note 11, at 361–62 (summarizing leading cases). FALLON_PRE_PP  8/19/2010 12:28 PM 
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on exclusive originalist premises invite inconsistency and confusion 
in an age of administrative adjudication.
381 
b. Quasi-Adjudicative Determinations of Duties Enforceable Under 
the Criminal Law. 
Sometimes Congress has made the violation of agency orders the 
predicate for imposition of criminal liability by an Article III court. 
It did so, for example, in the World War II-era selective service 
statute that came before the Supreme Court in Falbo v. United 
States
382 and Estep v. United States.
383 In the latter case, the Court 
held, as a matter of statutory construction, that although Congress 
had made the decisions of local draft boards “final” when it author-
ized prosecutions in federal court for failure to submit to induction, 
it had not precluded a judicial inquiry into whether draft boards 
had acted beyond their jurisdiction by reaching determinations 
with “no basis in fact.”
384 Well prior to Estep, moreover, Congress 
had prescribed criminal penalties for violations of cease-and-desist 
orders promulgated by administrative agencies. In doing so, it had 
severely limited judicial inquiries into the agency factfinding sup-
porting those orders.
385 
These precedents make it hard to conclude that congressionally 
mandated judicial deference to agency decisions in criminal cases 
should be deemed categorically prohibited by Article III. Never-
theless, the special burdens and stigma of criminal punishment 
should require more extensive judicial process under the Due 
Process Clause, and possibly under Article III as well, than do im-
positions of civil liability. The Supreme Court rested on the Due 
Process Clause in United States v. Mendoza-Lopez, which held, in 
381 Cf. N. Pipeline Constr. Co., 458 U.S. at 90 (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (concluding 
that Congress could not assign to an Article I bankruptcy court common law claims 
that “are the stuff of the traditional actions . . . tried by the courts at Westminster in 
1789”). There should be no practical ground for concern that Congress threatens the 
constitutionally central role of the Article III courts when it provides for agency adju-
dication of a small set of state law claims, many of which, because they do not arise 
under federal law, would afford no independent basis for original jurisdiction in an 
Article III court anyway. 
382 320 U.S. 549, 554 (1944). 
383 327 U.S. 114, 119–20 (1946). 
384 Id. at 122. 
385 See Nelson, supra note 31, at 596–98. FALLON_PRE_PP  8/19/2010 12:28 PM 
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part, that “the result of an administrative proceeding may not be 
used as a conclusive element of a criminal offense” in the absence 
of an opportunity for judicial review of the administrative determi-
nation.
386 When criminal penalties potentially attend the violation 
of an agency’s order, a stronger argument may also be made that 
the Constitution mandates the availability of injunctive or even 
preliminary injunctive remedies.
387 
c. Rulemaking as a Predicate for the Civil Liability of One Private 
Party to Another 
Agencies sometimes determine private parties’ rights and obliga-
tions through rulemaking, not adjudication. Congress’s assignment 
of rulemaking responsibilities to agencies does not inherently 
threaten the courts’ necessary or traditional functions. Because Ar-
ticle III will permit federal courts only to decide cases or contro-
versies, Congress could not vest the Article III courts with rule-
making authority even if it wished to do so. 
Agency rulemaking may, of course, generate cases or controver-
sies. It is, therefore, constitutionally permissible for Congress to 
authorize judicial review of agency rulemaking, as it normally does 
under the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”). But neither 
Article III nor any other provision of the Constitution uniquely re-
quires APA review. From a constitutional perspective, the ques-
tion is whether, and if so when, an agency’s determination of pri-
vate obligations through rulemaking violates legal rights for which 
the Constitution mandates the availability of a judicial remedy. As 
emphasized above, Congress typically has great flexibility in the 
choice of remedies, even when the Constitution requires that a 
party whose rights have been violated must have some mode of re-
dress. Accordingly, there is no constitutional problem with preclu-
sion of APA review of rulemaking that establishes legally enforce-
able duties as long as parties against whom a rule can be enforced 
can bring their legal complaints before a court in another form—
for example, in a suit for declaratory or injunctive relief, or as a de-
386 481 U.S. 828, 838 n.15 (1987). 
387 Cf. Lockerty v. Phillips, 319 U.S. 182, 189 (1943) (citing statutory severability as a 
ground for not needing to rule on whether the Constitution mandates the availability 
of interlocutory relief pending final adjudication of the validity of regulations en-
forceable by criminal penalties and treble damages). FALLON_PRE_PP  8/19/2010 12:28 PM 
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fense in a civil or criminal enforcement action (provided that the 
alternative procedure affords due process). 
When Congress mandates judicial deference to agencies’ deter-
minations of legally enforceable duties, hard questions can arise 
about the constitutionally requisite scope of judicial inquiry into 
the correctness of agency determinations. Chevron and related 
doctrines make clear, however, that Congress, if it so chooses, can 
require considerable deference to agency determinations of statu-
tory law.
388 
3. Agency Actions Coercively Enforcing the Law Against Private 
Citizens Without Resulting in Ongoing Physical Detentions 
Agency officials frequently take a variety of coercive actions 
without first resorting to any court. Above, I discussed one exam-
ple at length: Congress can require taxpayers to pay first and liti-
gate later.
389 When Congress does so, it can also authorize the coer-
cive collection of taxes from those who refuse to pay.
390 Similar 
principles apply to the enforcement of customs regulations at the 
border.
391 
In attempting to explain permissible cases of extra-judicial gov-
ernmental coercion, courts and commentators have sometimes 
cited the “public rights” tradition as explicated in Murray’s Lessee 
v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co.,
392 in which the Supreme 
Court asserted that “there are matters, involving public rights, 
which may be presented in such form that the judicial power is ca-
pable of acting on them, . . . but which congress may or may not 
bring within the cognizance of the courts of the United States, as it 
may deem proper.”
393 Tradition has listed government officials’ co-
388 See supra note 342 and accompanying text. Chevron deference can apply even in 
cases in which statutes impose criminal penalties for the violation of regulations and 
the validity of regulations under a statute is the question in issue. See Sanford N. 
Greenberg, Who Says It’s a Crime? Chevron Deference to Agency Interpretations of 
Regulatory Statutes That Create Criminal Liability, 58 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 1, 40 (1996). 
389 See, e.g., Phillips v. Comm’r, 283 U.S. 589, 595–97 (1931); Snyder v. Marks, 109 
U.S. 189, 194 (1883). 
390 See, e.g., Phillips, 283 U.S. at 599; Springer v. United States, 102 U.S. 586, 593–94 
(1880). 
391 See Ex parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438, 458 (1929). 
392 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 284 (1856). 
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ercive, non-criminal enforcement of public law as falling within the 
public rights domain.
394 Academic commentary has echoed 
Murray’s Lessee in noting that “the whole point of the [traditional] 
‘public rights’ analysis was that no judicial involvement at all was 
required—executive determination alone would suffice.”
395 
This report of the public rights tradition is both misleading and 
pernicious.
396 Above I discussed attempted congressional preclu-
sions of judicial review of coercive tax collection as requiring in-
quiry into whether and when the Constitution mandates judicial 
remedies for constitutional violations.
397 Now, when the question is 
whether and when Congress can preclude judicial review of admin-
istrative action,
398 the analysis should proceed no differently. 
Seldom if ever will the Constitution demand the kind of judicial 
review of agency action that now constitutes the norm under the 
APA and other modern statutes. Because Congress could invoke 
sovereign immunity to preclude direct suit against the United 
States, it can strip courts of authority to conduct forms of judicial 
review that could never have existed without congressional au-
thorization. As my earlier discussion should also have made clear, 
however, the constitutional inquiry cannot end at this point. Fol-
lowing the permissible withdrawal of one remedy for an alleged 
constitutional violation, the question would loom whether the Con-
stitution requires some other remedy in some other kind of judicial 
proceeding to stop constitutional guarantees from being reduced to 
a nullities. Again as discussed above, the answer to that question 
should often be yes, at least in cases involving ongoing deprivations 
of liberty or property that injunctive relief would redress. 
In other words, in cases involving alleged violations of constitu-
tional rights, the price of a valid congressional preclusion of ordi-
nary, statutorily authorized judicial review of administrative action 
might be the substitution of constitutionally based suits for dam-
394 See Fallon et al., Hart & Wechsler, supra note 11, at 332–33. 
395 Peter L. Strauss, The Place of the Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers 
and the Fourth Branch, 84 Colum. L. Rev. 573, 632 (1984) (original emphasis omit-
ted). 
396 See Pfander, Article I Tribunals, supra note 265, at 731–38. 
397 See supra notes 275–294 and accompanying text. 
398 The Administrative Procedure Act provides that agency decisions are unreview-
able when a statute expressly precludes judicial review, 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(1) (2006), 
and when a decision is “committed to agency discretion by law,” id. § 701(a)(2). FALLON_PRE_PP  8/19/2010 12:55 PM 
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ages or, more frequently—in light of limitations that the Supreme 
Court has imposed on the availability of Bivens actions
399—
injunctive relief against the officials who engaged in coercive action 
on the government’s behalf. A preclusion of all judicial jurisdiction 
to enforce a constitutional guarantee, through suits against gov-
ernment officers as well as through statutory review of administra-
tive action, should be deemed to violate both the rights guarantees 
that Congress sought to exclude from judicial enforcement and the 
Due Process Clause. 
Different issues would arise if Congress, instead of wholly pre-
cluding judicial review, mandated judicial deference to the agency 
determinations of fact and law that underlie coercive agency ac-
tion. Under modern doctrine, prescriptions of deference would ap-
pear as permissible in this context as in any other. 
4. Agency Decisions Involving the Distribution or Withholding of 
Material Benefits Such as Money, Education, or Employment 
As with respect to agency actions coercively enforcing regulatory 
obligations, Congress could undoubtedly strip the Article III courts 
of jurisdiction to conduct APA-style statutory review of agency de-
cisions denying benefits or terminating employment.
400 If Congress 
did so, however, the question would again arise whether, under the 
circumstances, the Constitution mandates the availability of an-
other remedy for constitutional rights violations. Whatever the 
original constitutional understanding, it is well-settled today that 
 
399 See Fallon et al., Hart & Wechsler, supra note 11, at 735–40 (describing “re-
trenchment” from Bivens). 
400 Such preclusion would be consistent with early historical practice. For example, 
the first Congress established a scheme for the payment of pensions to veterans of the 
Revolutionary War. See Act of Sept. 29, 1789, ch. 25, 1 Stat. 95. Although the Consti-
tution would have permitted the assignment of disputed claims to Article III courts 
for authoritative resolution, early Congresses consistently withheld federal jurisdic-
tion of cases in which the government would have been a defendant. See Office of 
Personnel Mgmt. v. Richmond, 496 U.S. 414, 430 (1990) (“Congress’ early practice 
was to adjudicate each individual money claim against the United States, on the 
ground that the Appropriations Clause forbade even a delegation of individual adju-
dicatory functions where payment of funds from the Treasury was involved.”); Vicki 
C. Jackson, Suing the Federal Government: Sovereignty, Immunity, and Judicial In-
dependence, 35 Geo. Wash. Int’l L. Rev. 521, 576 n.206 (2003) (citing William Cowen 
et al., The United States Court of Claims, a History Part II: Origin, Development, Ju-
risdiction, 1855–1978, at 5 (1978)). FALLON_PRE_PP  8/19/2010 12:28 PM 
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citizens have a variety of substantive and procedural constitutional 
rights that government officials can infringe as much when distrib-
uting benefits as when enforcing regulatory duties. To cite obvious 
examples, the government cannot, when distributing benefits, draw 
invidious distinctions,
401 penalize speech or association,
402 or act in 
procedurally arbitrary ways.
403 
With respect to these matters of substantive constitutional law, 
controlling modern precedents treat original understandings and 
early historical practice as nearly irrelevant. As pointed out above, 
race-based discrimination by the federal government would have 
been understood as constitutionally permissible in the late eight-
eenth and early nineteenth centuries, but is not permissible now. 
Free speech rights have expanded dramatically, as have procedural 
due process rights. As substantive constitutional rights have ex-
panded, so, I have suggested, has the set of constitutionally neces-
sary judicial remedies for violations of those rights. For example, 
just as it is “unthinkable” today that the federal government could 
operate schools distributing the “benefit” of free education only to 
whites,
404 so it should be unthinkable that Congress could preclude 
all access to judicial remedies for unlawful discrimination. If Con-
gress cannot eliminate the right, then neither can it eliminate all 
judicial remedies for violations of the right. 
The Supreme Court has never had occasion so to hold, because 
no case squarely presenting the question has ever arisen. More-
over, as I acknowledged above, the conjunction of the doctrines of 
sovereign and official immunity makes it impossible to maintain 
that the Constitution mandates an individually effective remedy for 
every violation of a constitutional right. Suits seeking monetary 
compensation for past violations—in which the bite of official im-
munity manifests itself most frequently—are those in which effec-
tive remedies are most commonly denied. 
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has correctly identified the 
central point in cases in which it has invoked the doctrine of consti-
tutional avoidance to refuse to read statutes as having precluded 
401 See, e.g., Heckler v. Mathews, 465 U.S. 728, 744–46 (1984); U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. 
Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534–35 (1973). 
402 See, e.g., Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 357 (1976) (plurality opinion). 
403 See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 261–63 (1970). 
404 Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954). FALLON_PRE_PP  8/19/2010 12:28 PM 
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judicial review of constitutional questions arising from agency de-
terminations in benefits and employment cases.
405 Even though 
Congress could withdraw statutory review if it permitted non-
statutory suits against government officers, it seems highly unlikely 
that Congress, if determined to preclude statutory review, would 
mean to allow other actions for constitutional remedies. Yet if 
Congress were understood to have precluded all judicial remedies 
for constitutional rights violations, the Court seems clearly right 
that a very serious constitutional question would be presented. 
The crucial point should now be familiar: analysis of the permis-
sibility of congressional preclusion of judicial review can com-
mence with the text and original understanding of Article III, but it 
cannot conclude there. Constitutional provisions besides Article III 
are frequently pertinent. Issues involving the preclusion of judicial 
review are often bound up with substantive constitutional doctrine 
and with constitutional rights to remedies. In the complex and dy-
namic interplay among doctrines defining substantive rights, rights 
to remedies, and congressional power to preclude judicial review, 
original understandings require synthesis with subsequent, non-
originalist constitutional developments. 
Especially difficult questions of synthesis can arise when Con-
gress purports to bar all judicial review of agencies’ determinations 
of statutory, rather than constitutional, law. As I have pointed out 
before, aspects of both modern due process and Article III doc-
trine have acquired a strikingly “managerial” focus, with courts 
sometimes insisting that they must be able to review agencies’ ar-
ticulations of broadly applicable legal rules, even when they accept 
the preclusion of review of agencies’ case-by-case applications of 
law to fact.
406 The notion that modern doctrine might require judi-
cial review of agency determinations of law with far-reaching im-
plications should not be ruled out solely on the basis of  exclusive 
originalism. 
405 See, e.g., Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 603 (1988); Bowen v. Mich. Acad. of 
Family Physicians, 476 U.S. 667, 681 n.12 (1986); Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 
366–67 (1974). 
406 See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Some Confusions About Due Process, Judicial Re-
view, and Constitutional Remedies, 93 Colum. L. Rev. 309, 333–37 (1993). FALLON_PRE_PP  8/19/2010 12:28 PM 
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CONCLUSION 
Questions involving Congress’s power to strip jurisdiction from 
the federal and state courts are multifarious, multidimensional, and 
frequently complex. Boumediene v. Bush
407 in no way alters this ba-
sic fact. Nevertheless, Boumediene—the first Supreme Court case 
to hold a jurisdiction-stripping statute unconstitutional since United 
States v. Klein
408—provides not only an apt occasion, but also a par-
tial template, for reconsidering debates about congressional power 
over jurisdiction. Boumediene, which rested on Article I’s Suspen-
sion Clause, serves as a reminder that provisions of the Constitu-
tion besides Article III bear crucially on Congress’s power to con-
trol judicial jurisdiction. Boumediene also demonstrates that the 
original understanding of how constitutional language would be 
applied is just one consideration, and not always the decisive one, 
in gauging Congress’s authority. 
Debates about jurisdiction-stripping have too often proceeded 
on exclusively originalist grounds. As is the case with other issues, 
assessments of the constitutionality of jurisdiction-stripping should 
turn on multiple factors, including judicial precedent, functional 
considerations, and inferences from the Constitution’s structure, as 
well the original understanding of the text of Article III. At the 
very least, participants in jurisdiction-stripping debates need to 
reckon with issues of constitutional theory involving the appropri-
ate synthesis of original understandings, when they are identifiable, 
with non-originalist substantive constitutional doctrines and with 
other factors of recognized interpretive significance in other areas 
of constitutional law. 
The synthesis advocated in this Article defies brief summary be-
cause, as I have emphasized, the general topic of jurisdiction-
stripping encompasses diverse elements. But three themes have 
helped to organize my analysis. 
First, notwithstanding contrary language in the 1869 case of Ex 
parte McCardle,
409 Congress’s purpose or motive in enacting juris-
diction-stripping legislation may sometimes bear crucially on such 
legislation’s constitutionality. More precisely, legislation enacted 
407 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008). 
408 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 147 (1872). 
409 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 514 (1869). FALLON_PRE_PP  8/19/2010 12:28 PM 
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with the aim of inviting state courts to defy applicable Supreme 
Court precedent is not necessary and proper to any constitutionally 
legitimate purpose and should be held unconstitutional on that ba-
sis. Some evidence exists that the Supreme Court recognized the 
pertinence of motivation to the constitutionality of jurisdiction-
stripping legislation as early as the nineteenth century. In any 
event, scrutiny of legislative motivation is now the norm, not an 
anomaly, in constitutional law. Indeed, the Supreme Court has pre-
scribed a motive-based analysis to appraise the constitutionality of 
state legislation withdrawing state court jurisdiction to adjudicate 
federal claims. Purpose-based analysis should apply equally to con-
gressional enactments purporting to strip judicial jurisdiction. 
Second, Congress cannot use its power to control jurisdiction to 
preclude constitutionally necessary remedies for the violation of 
constitutional rights. It is not always easy to determine which 
remedies are constitutionally necessary. The Constitution does not 
require individually effective redress for all constitutional viola-
tions, especially in cases involving plaintiffs for whom “it is dam-
ages or nothing.”
410 Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has held that 
some remedies are indeed constitutionally mandatory. Boumediene 
found habeas corpus to be a constitutionally necessary remedy in 
the absence of an adequate substitute. The Supreme Court has 
held that the Constitution mandates monetary remedies for some 
unconstitutional deprivations of property. In cases involving ongo-
ing deprivations of liberty, the Court has held that the Constitution 
sometimes creates rights to injunctive relief from ongoing constitu-
tional violations. Writing in 1953, Henry Hart asserted that the 
Constitution very seldom confers rights to injunctions.
411 But Hart 
wrote before a twentieth-century constitutional revolution that 
made injunctive remedies the norm, not the exception, in cases in-
volving ongoing violations of rights that have no easily quantifiable 
values, such as rights to vote and to be free from invidious dis-
crimination. In some cases, maybe many, newly recognized consti-
tutional rights entail rights to injunctions when no other remedy is 
available. Congress’s power over jurisdiction does not encompass 
410 Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 
388, 410 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
411 Hart, supra note 15, at 1366. FALLON_PRE_PP  8/19/2010 12:28 PM 
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any authority to destroy those rights. Regardless of original under-
standings, it should be as “unthinkable” today that Congress could 
lawfully preclude all judicial jurisdiction to provide remedies for 
vote dilution or invidious discrimination as it was “unthinkable” in 
1954 that the Due Process Clause might tolerate race-based dis-
crimination by the federal government.
412 
Third, as Boumediene teaches, issues involving congressional 
preclusion of judicial jurisdiction are often bound up with issues 
involving the permissible use of non-Article III federal tribunals 
such as legislative courts and administrative agencies. In this con-
text, too, Boumediene’s approach is instructive. Even when initial 
adjudication by a non-Article III tribunal is permissible, the Con-
stitution may mandate the availability of either appellate review or 
some other mode of access to an Article III court. Some such man-
dates may issue from Article III, but other constitutional provi-
sions—including the Suspension and Due Process Clauses—are 
sometimes pertinent. 
It is often thought that Congress can preclude judicial review of 
agency action involving “public rights.” The reality is much more 
complex. If Congress wishes, it can preclude the types of judicial 
review of agency applications of law to fact that now constitute the 
norm under the APA and other modern statutes. Congress would 
go too far, however, if, besides precluding statutory forms of judi-
cial review, it purported to bar other modes of access to court—
such as suits against government officers for damages and espe-
cially injunctive relief—through which parties whose rights have 
been violated could seek constitutionally necessary remedies. 
Once again, it is impossible to think deeply about the preclusion 
of jurisdiction without thinking about constitutionally necessary 
remedies under modern constitutional doctrines, rooted in provi-
sions of the Constitution other than Article III, that have some-
times diverged from original constitutional understandings. Al-
though analysis of jurisdiction-stripping has characteristically 
begun with the text and original understanding of Article III, it is 
often a fallacy to believe that it can terminate there. 
 
412 Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954). 